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  This dissertation addresses the problem of the lack of agreement among interpreters 
of Arminius concerning the nature, sources, development, and roles of prevenient grace 
in Arminius’s soteriology.    
 Purpose 
 
 The dissertation aims to investigate, analyze, and define the probable sources, nature, 
development, and role of the concept of prevenient or “preceding” grace in the theology 




 The dissertation relies on Arminius’s own writings, mainly the standard London 
Edition, translated by James Nichols and Williams Nichols. However, I also frequently 
consulted the original Latin edition of his works when needed to clarify some 
translations. Secondary sources played an important role in the narrative of Arminius’s 
world, life, and ministry as well as for the background of prevenient grace. I also 
consulted secondary sources to check, balance, and support my own reading of Arminius 
on prevenient grace.  
 Conclusions 
 Arminius placed prevenient grace rather than human free will at the center of his 
soteriology and developed this doctrine primarily in continuity with Reformed and 
Protestant theological precedents and frameworks rather than uniquely Catholic sources 
and views.  For Arminius, prevenient grace is the working of the Holy Spirit that 
precedes any kind of human participation or acceptance in salvation.  Prevenient grace 
works unavoidably, restoring and healing human freedom of will; only then does it work 
in a resistible way in the working of salvation.  Although there is a special connection 
between the internal working of the Holy Spirit and the external preaching of the Word, 
prevenient grace as the working of the Holy Spirit is not limited to this event. The Holy 
Spirit works apart from the preached word, in ways inscrutable to the human mind. The 
role of prevenient grace in regeneration and faith, and the relation between prevenient 
grace and divine foreknowledge also support the conclusion that prevenient grace is the 
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Background to the Study 
Without doubt, Jacobus Arminius (1559–1609) was a controversial figure within 
the Reformed tradition in the second half of the sixteenth century. His appointment as 
professor of theology at the University of Leiden early in 1603 provoked both strong 
opposition and fervent support among professors and authorities of the Faculty of 
Theology.
A main matter of concern was Arminius’s view on Romans 7.1 Franciscus 
Gomarus, professor at Leiden since 1594, stigmatized Arminius’s interpretation as 
Pelagianism in much the same way that Petrus Plancius had done in Amsterdam.2 
Essentially, like Plancius before him, Gomarus believed that Arminius’s position openly 
                                                
1 See Carl Bangs, Arminius: A Study in the Dutch Reformation (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 1985), 231–238; Caspar Brant, The Life of James Arminius, trans. John 
Guthrie (London: Ward and Lang Adamson, 1854), 95–117. 
2 Petrus Plancius, a minister at Amsterdam, reacted to Arminius’s position on 
Romans 7. He believed that Arminius’s idea contradicted the teaching of the Reformed 
tradition on this point. See, Brant, Life of Arminius, 41–43; Carl Bangs, Arminius, 138–
152. 
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contradicted the Heidelberg Catechism and the mainstream thinking in the Reformed 
tradition.3  
In Gomarus’s view, Arminius’s identification of the human beings in Romans 7 
as an unregenerate individual granted too much power to the human will. Gomarus and 
other ecclesiastical authorities reasoned that if an unregenerate individual could struggle 
with sin as in the Pauline descriptions of Romans 7, this clearly undermined the 
Reformed teaching of total depravity. Not so, said Arminius, and asserted that humans 
were naturally depraved and therefore needed the ongoing converting and transforming 
grace of the Holy Spirit to be able to respond to God.4 Nevertheless, Arminius continued 
to defend the idea that humans are not unwilling participants in the salvific process. He 
insisted that their freedom of will must consent with God.5  
The discussions generated from these conflicting views were only the initial point 
of an extended theological battle that endured until Arminius’s death in 1609, the 
repercussions of which continue to this day. In order to clarify the problem addressed 
here, I begin by presenting Arminius’s views on the topics of total depravity, freedom of 
the will, and prevenient grace.  
                                                
3 Ronald V. Huggins presents a good summary of the major issues in this 
conference and the principal concerns of Gomarus against Arminius’s ideas. See 
“Romans 7 and the Ordo Salutis from Arminius to Ironside (1591–1928): With Special 
Emphasis on the American Revivalist Tradition in its Trans-Atlantic Connection” (PhD 
diss., Wycliffe College and Toronto University, 1996), 21; Bangs, Arminius, 140–141. 
4 James Arminius, The Works of James Arminius, trans. James and William 
Nichols (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1986), Pub. Disp. XI, 2:189–196; Priv. 
Disp. XXXI, 2:374–375, Art. XI, 2:716. 
5 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:194–195. 
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Arminius described original sin as “absence of original righteousness . . . , that 
which alone is sufficient to commit and produce any actual sin whatsoever.”6 Total 
depravity and inability, according to the Dutch reformer, include bondage of all spiritual 
and moral capacities bestowed on humans by God, even freedom of will. Arminius 
affirmed “that the mind of [animalis] a natural and carnal man is obscure and dark, that 
his affections are corrupt and inordinate, that his will is stubborn and disobedient, and 
that the man himself is dead in sins.”7  
Focusing on the principal accusation against his views—the apparent power of 
human will8— he adamantly denied that the will had any capacity in spiritual matters. He 
stated that “the free will of man towards the true good is not only wounded, maimed, 
infirm, bent, and [attenuatum] weakened; but it is also [captivatum] imprisoned, 
destroyed, and lost.”9 These remarks appear to demonstrate that Arminius was in full 
                                                
6 Priv. Disp. XXXI, in Works, 2:375. However, Arminius tried to avoid the use of 
the concept “original sin,” preferring to talk in terms of “total depravity.”   
7 Hippolitus Lett. in Works, 2:700. I have drawn my observations about 
Arminius’s concept of original sin and total depravity from the works of Arminius 
translated into English. However, recently, Keith D. Stanglin published a series of 
missing public disputations penned by Arminius. Among these disputations there are two 
of essential importance for the study of these concepts in Arminius’s thinking: Disputatio 
XXXI De Lapsu Primi Hominis, and Disputatio XXXII De Peccato Originali. See, Keith 
D. Stanglin, The Missing Public Disputations of Jacobus Arminius, ed. Wim Janse 
(Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 201–217. 
8 Decl. Sent. in Works, 1:659–660. 
9 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:192. 
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agreement with Reformed tradition and theology regarding the tremendous impact of sin 
on human nature.10  
However, Arminius also pointed out the participation of the human will in the 
process of salvation. In his opinion, individuals are free and able to accept or reject the 
divine calling to salvation. Quoting Bernardo’s work De libero arbitrio et gratia that 
affirms “no one, except God, is able to bestow salvation; and nothing, except free will, is 
capable of receiving it,”11 Arminius seems to concede a role for both the grace of God 
and the will of humans in salvation.12 Such an assertion was completely erroneous and 
heretical to Gomarus and Johannes Kuchlinus. Gomarus stressed “that God makes 
unwilling people into willing people,” while Kuchlinus pointed out “that God distributes 
the Holy Spirit to whomever he will, not as people will.”13 In contrast to Arminius, they 
denied any participation of a freed human will in the acceptance of the gospel.  
It is on this particular point—the concession of a role to the human will in the 
process of salvation—that Arminius has been widely criticized. Calvinists have 
vociferously repeated that according to Arminius humans have an “unblemished 
                                                
10 For a general review of Calvin and Reformed theology on total depravity and 
freedom of will. See Michael Horton, For Calvinism (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2011), 35–52. 
11 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:196. 
12  See in particular Arminius’s examination of William Perkins’s treatise 
concerning predestination and divine grace, Perkins Exam., in Works 3:249–484. 
13 Keith Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation: The Context, Roots, 
and Shape of the Leiden Debate, 1603–1609 (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 79. 
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integrity”14 of their free will with an inner ability to move toward God and rectitude. 
They seem to misunderstand Arminius by not considering his declarations about freedom 
of will in a proper and balanced relationship with the grace of God. 
Arminius noted that his opponents discovered an apparent anthropological tension 
in his theological argumentations on total depravity and freedom of will. However, for 
Arminius, there was not any contradiction. For him, the real issue was to understand the 
role of divine prevenient grace in human responsiveness to God. Both Gomarus and 
Kuchlinus overlooked this central point.15 For Arminius, the controversy could be 
concluded by clarifying a simple question: By what means does the depraved person 
acquire some freedom of will in order to answer to the divine offer of salvation? The 
answer, according to Arminius, is that it is the work of the Holy Spirit through divine 
prevenient grace. Therefore, human responsiveness to God comes not out of an unbound 
free will, but out of prevenient grace, said Arminius.  
In spite of its specific importance for Arminius’s theology, the doctrine of 
prevenient grace has received little attention among Arminian scholars.16 Most studies on 
Arminius have focused on the controversial topic of divine election. Yet while 
considering the general theological features of divine grace in Arminius’s writings, some 
of these studies do include seminal reflections on prevenient grace. For instance, John M. 
                                                
14 Robert A. Peterson and Michael D. Williams, Why I Am Not an Arminian 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2004).  
15 See Stanglin, Arminius on Assurance of Salvation, 77–82. 
16 See Peterson and Williams, Why . . . Not an Arminian, 176; Roger E. Olson, 
Arminian Theology: Myth and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2006), 181.  
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Hicks, William G. Witt, Keith D. Stanglin, Thomas H. McCall, Robert E. Picirilli, Carl 
Bangs, and Roger Olson17 generally seem to agree that prevenient grace refers to the 
internal work of the Holy Spirit in the unregenerate individual that creates the possibility 
for an individual to believe and answer freely to God’s offer of salvation. Nevertheless, 
these scholars do not completely clarify the precise nature and role of prevenient grace, 
nor the continuity and discontinuity of this doctrine within the history of Christian 
tradition in the writings of Arminius.  
State of Scholarship  
A new interest in and a revival of Arminius’s scholarship have produced both new 
scholarly and popular literature. Most of this new literature is focused on the issue of 
predestination, election, and assurance of salvation. Some is more general, and analyzes 
Arminius and Arminianism more broadly. Because there is no major work on Arminius’s 
theology of prevenient grace, here I would like to review some of the most significant 
works that discuss the concept of prevenient grace.  
The awakening of modern scholarship to Arminius owes a great deal to Carl 
Bangs. In his book Arminius: A Study in the Dutch Reformation, Bangs uncovers the 
                                                
17 John M. Hicks, “The Theology of Grace in the Thought of Jacobus Arminius 
and Philip Van Limborch: A Study in the Development of Seventeenth–Century Dutch 
Arminianism” (PhD diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 1985), 41–64; William G. 
Witt, “Creation, Redemption and Grace in the Theology of Jacob Arminius” (PhD diss., 
Notre Dame University, 1993), 625–632; Keith D. Stanglin and Thomas H. McCall, 
Jacob Arminius: Theologian of Grace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15–
157; Robert E. Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will—Contrasting  Views of Salvation: 
Calvinism and Arminianism (Nashville, TN: Randall House, 2002), 153-160; Bangs, 
Arminius, 212–215; R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 141–181. 
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historical Arminius in his social, political, and theological world. Although the work is 
primarily biographical, Bangs summarizes some of the key theological concepts of 
Arminius’s theology. For Bangs, grace is critical for Arminius’s concept of sin, free will, 
and salvation. “The entire process of believing,” he argues, results from the working of 
the prevenient grace of God in the human heart.18 Indeed, Bangs corrects previous 
Arminian scholars like H. Orton Wiley and John Miley for presenting Arminius as a 
synergist in which the ability of the human will to cooperate with grace is closely related 
to “a general human capacity.”19 Instead, says Bangs, Arminius believed that prevenient 
grace illuminates and regenerates the human will resulting in cooperation with grace, 
meaning the acceptance of God’s prevenient grace.20 However, Bangs does not explicitly 
discuss the nature and role of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology. He also does not 
explore the probable theological sources of this idea in Arminius.   
John Mark Hicks in his dissertation The Theology of Grace in the Thought of 
Jacobus Arminius and Philip van Limborch: A Study in the Development of Seventeenth-
Century Dutch Arminianism, discusses prevenient grace in the context of the operation of 
grace. Hicks argues that prevenient grace in Arminius is always sufficient, and it operates 
without the participation of human will. According to Hicks, this underlines “the 
passivity of man in prevenient (sufficient, primary, operating) grace.”21 Interestingly, 
                                                
18 Bangs, Arminius, 341.  
19 Ibid., 342.  
20 Ibid., 341. 
21 Hicks, “Theology of Grace in . . . Jacobus Arminius,” 58. 
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Hicks argues against a universal giving of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology.22 
Instead, says Hicks, Arminius believed that wherever the word is preached prevenient 
grace is granted to all the hearers.23 Similar to Bangs, Hicks suggests that Arminius 
restricts the cooperation of human will with prevenient grace in particular and grace in 
general only to “reception, approval or concurrence.”24 Therefore, Arminius supports an 
individual’s participation in the acceptance of prevenient grace in which the “free will is 
not a concurrent cause of grace in salvation.”25 Hicks concludes his consideration of 
prevenient (sufficient or operating) grace by dissociating Arminius from what he calls 
“some kind of Melanchthonian synergism, and from the late Medieval synergism of 
Occam and Biel.”26 Though Hicks points to important aspects of the concept of 
prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology, he does not completely and systematically 
address the nature and role of this idea in Arminius. He also fails to explore properly 
Arminius’s connections with Reformation theologians, Reformed divines, and medieval 
scholastic theologians.  
Richard A. Muller, in his book God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of 
Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early 
Orthodoxy does not discuss Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace extensively, 
                                                
22 Hicks, “Theology of Grace in . . . Jacobus Arminius,” 60–63. 
23 Ibid., 62–63. 
24 Ibid., 64. 
25 Ibid., 65. 
26 Ibid. 
 9 
reserving his discussion of it to link it with the thought of Louis de Molina and other 
Catholic scholars.27 Similarly, in his article “Arminius and Arminianism” in the 
Dictionary of Historical Theology he links Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient grace to 
that of Gabriel Biel. Such conclusions demonstrate Muller’s interest in discovering 
Arminius’s theological sources, which were often in medieval scholasticism. In Muller’s 
view, not only do Arminius and Biel agree that prevenient grace is “offered to all and is 
not irresistible,” but more significantly Arminius’s emphasis that “‘who does what he can 
by the primary grace already conferred upon him’ will receive from God further grace” is 
identical to Gabriel Biel’s maxims that “‘to those who do what is in them, God will not 
deny grace.’”28 Thus, Muller effectively correlated Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient 
grace with medieval semi-Pelagianism. In a similar way, Raymond A. Blacketer, using 
Muller’s assumption that grace is imbued in nature, determines that prevenient grace is an 
integral part of the created order.29 Likewise, J.V. Fesko argues that Arminius’s use of the 
concept of prevenient grace is akin to that of Biel and other scholastic theologians and 
                                                
27 Richard A. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob 
Arminius: Sources and Directons of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early 
Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1991), 163, 255.   
28 Richard A. Muller, “Arminius and Arminianism” in The Dictionary of 
Historical Theology, ed. Trevor A. Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 34; 
Richard A. Muller, “Grace, Election, and Contingent Choice: Arminius’s Gambit and the 
Reformed Response” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of Will: Historical Perspectives 
on Calvinism, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 
2:261. 
29 Raymond A. Blacketer, “Arminius’s Concept of Covenant in Its Historical 
Context,” Dutch Review of Church History/Nederlands Archief Voor Kerkgeschiedenis 
80, no. 2 (July 2000), 207. 
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not a genuine or novel contribution to Reformed or Protestant theology.30 Indeed, I will 
argue from the implication of Fesko’s conclusions that because prevenient grace is 
closely related to the medieval teaching of facientibus, it “falls into a semi-Pelagian 
category.”31 Muller and Fesko do not discuss the nature and role of prevenient grace 
extensively, but they do explore succinctly the most likely sources of Arminius’s doctrine 
of prevenient grace, connecting him with medieval Catholicism rather than with the 
conclusions of Reformed and Protestant theology. 
William Gene Witt briefly explores the concept of prevenient grace in his 
dissertation Creation, Redemption, and Grace in the Theology of Jacob Arminius. Witt 
says that for Arminius prevenient grace is the divine answer to human sinfulness.32 
Prevenient grace helps individuals to deal with the substantial evil and natural effects of 
both original sin and of actual sins in the human will. Such grace gives individuals the 
necessary strength or regeneration to counter their sinful nature.33 Prevenient grace is a 
universal gift that operates through the divine act of vocation (preaching of the word) in 
all human beings. Witt also sees the operation of prevenient grace in repentance and faith, 
but I will argue that repentance and faith should not be considered an integral part of 
                                                
30 J. V. Fesko, “Arminius on Facientibus Quod In Se Est and Likely Medieval 
Sources,” in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of 
Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, 
David S. Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2013), 356.    
31 Ibid. 
32 Witt, “Creation, Redemption, and Grace,” 625.  
33 Ibid., 628.  
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prevenient grace, but simply the resulting spiritual gift provided the will does not resist.34 
Witt does not explore the sources of this concept in Arminius. But, he actually distances 
Arminius from Pelagian’s teachings. He also does not offer a comprehensive analysis of 
the nature and role of prevenient grace in Arminius’s writings.  
Though Evert Dekker in his book Rijker dan Midas: Vrijheid, genade en 
predestinatie in de theologie van Jacobus Arminius (1559–1609) [Richer than Midas: 
Freedom, Grace, and Predestination in the Theology of Jacobus Arminius (1559–1609)] 
does not deal directly with the concept of prevenient grace, he does explore Arminius’s 
teaching on grace. It seems to me that some of his ideas ultimately describe Arminius’s 
concept of prevenient grace. Dekker says that the operation of [prevenient] grace is 
resistible because God’s omnipotence does not force the acceptance of salvation. Rather, 
prevenient grace is a soft and sweet divine touch.35 According to Dekker, Arminius’s 
prevenient grace should be more accurately be called “sufficient grace.” All humans 
universally receive sufficient grace, but it is not enough for the acceptance of salvation. 
The totality of grace is sufficient [prevenient] grace plus efficacious grace, or sufficient 
grace plus an extra portion equal to efficacious grace.36 For Dekker, this is determined by 
God’s foreknowledge, on the basis  of which every human being is either under God’s 
providence [prevenient grace] because he or she has rejected that grace, or under God’s 
                                                
34 Witt, “Creation, Redemption, and Grace,” 630–632. 
35 Evert Dekker, Rijker dan Midas: Vrijheid, genade en predestinatie in de 
theologie van Jacobus Arminius 1559–1609 (Zoetermeer, The Netherlands: Uitgeverij 
Boekencentrum B.V., 1993), 165.   
36 Ibid., 166.  
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predestination because he or she has accepted that grace.37 Dekker also understands that 
the [prevenient] grace is universal, but this does not mean that every human being 
experiences the working of the Holy Spirit in their heart; by universal Dekker 
understands grace to be available wherever the Gospel is preached. Those who have not 
heard the preaching of the word are rejected.38  
Robert E. Picirilli in his book Grace, Faith, Free Will: Contrasting Views of 
Salvation, Calvinism and Arminianism describes prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology 
as the work of the Holy Spirit that “precedes regeneration.”39 In order to avoid the 
anachronistic and probable misunderstandings of the word prevenient, he suggests the use 
of new terminology like “enabling grace” or “pre-regenerating grace” to describe the 
working of this divine action in salvation. According to Picirilli, for Arminius, prevenient 
grace operates in the human mind by “persuasion” rather than by exerting irresistible 
force.40 Conviction and enabling are also essential elements of prevenient grace. These 
two characteristics point to the power of the Holy Spirit in opening the understanding of 
the human mind and reversing the bondage of the human will to give all individuals the 
opportunity to comprehend and accept the gospel.41 For that reason, Picirilli argues that 
prevenient grace in Arminius “is so close to regeneration that it inevitably leads to 
                                                
37 Dekker, Rijker dan Midas, 164. 
38 Ibid., 167.   
39 Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 153.  
40 Ibid., 153, 155, 157.   
41 Ibid., 155, 157.  
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regeneration unless finally resisted.”42 According to Picirilli, for Arminius this enabling 
(prevenient) grace is the initial step in the order of salvation.43 Picirilli does not endeavor 
to discuss the continuity or discontinuity of  Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient grace with 
Reformed and Protestant theology. He also does not completely systematize this doctrine 
in Arminius’s theology, and sometimes he combines Arminius’s concept with what seem 
to me to be his own ideas from biblical passages.  
Roger Olson makes a significant contribution to Arminian theology with his well- 
known work Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities. Olson does not focus primarily on 
Arminius’s theology itself, but on Arminian theology in general. Yet to my mind he 
accurately introduces Arminius’s ideas and contributions as the father of Arminianism in 
every topic under consideration. Olson regards prevenient grace as an essential element 
of Arminius’s and Arminian theology. He boldly says that prevenient grace is the 
“distinctive doctrine of Arminianism.”44 I agree with Olson and hope to demonstrate that 
prevenient grace is the organizing principle in Arminius’s own soteriology. Olson, like 
Picirilli, argues that prevenient grace is both persuasive as well as enabling of the human 
will. The first and most important work of prevenient grace is to liberate the will. This 
new freedom results not in a free will but in a “freed” will.45 In this regard, unlike 
                                                
42 Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 154. 
43 Ibid., 160. 
44 R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 159. See also, R. Olson, Arminianism FAQ: 
Everything You Always Wanted to Know (Roger E. Olson, 2014), 1. 
45 R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 164. 
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Picirilli, Olson speaks of a new “intermediate stage” in which humans are “neither 
unregenerate nor regenerate, but perhaps post-unregenerate and pre-regenerate”46 — an 
idea that I do not find in Arminius’s writing. Although Olson suggests that prevenient 
grace is universal, he also argues that for Arminius prevenient grace tended to be 
restricted to where the Gospel is preached.47 In this way, Olson circumscribes prevenient 
grace as occurring only in connection with the preaching of the Word. By contrast, my 
reading of Arminius suggests that he believed that there is something universal about 
prevenient grace, beyond the context of Christianity, thanks to the salvific actions of the 
Holy Spirit. Olson does not deal with the sources of Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient 
grace. 
To my mind, Keith Stanglin is currently the leading scholar in the revival of 
Arminius’s scholarship. Although Stanglin in his dissertation does not specifically 
address the concept of prevenient grace, much less its sources in Arminius’s theology, he 
clearly disputes Muller and Fesko’s conclusions regarding the medieval origin of  the 
facientibus in Arminius. It is precisely because of prevenient grace that Arminius’s use of 
the facere quod in se est is distinct from the medieval sources such as Gabriel Biel and 
others.48 This opens the opportunity for this dissertation to explore the continuity of 
Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient grace with Reformed and Protestant sources or to 
                                                
46 R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 164–165.  
47 Ibid., 167. David Eugene Eaton defends a similar view in Arminianism in the 
Theology of John Wesley (PhD diss., Drew University, 1988), 72.  
48 Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance, 83. 
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validate Muller and Fesko’s claims. More recently, Stanglin co-authored Jacob Arminius: 
Theologian of Grace with Thomas H. McCall. There they explore more extensively the 
concept of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology, in particular suggesting some 
antecedents of this idea in the history of Christian doctrine, such as in Augustine, the 
Council of Orange, and Thomas Aquinas. Interesting, all these sources are Catholic 
precedents, but there is no mention of Reformed or Protestant antecedents.49 They also 
claim that prevenient grace initially operates monergistically by coming to the door of the 
soul and gently calling for human acceptance. I agree that God’s prevenient grace 
operates unavoidably and monergistically in the human heart, but I suggest it does so not 
just by knocking at the door, but also by restoring the human ability to use freedom of 
will. They seem to see this restoration of the will as part of subsequent grace and not of 
prevenient grace.50 Besides this, they do not present novel ideas about the concept of 
prevenient grace except to emphasize the resistibility of grace.51  
To conclude this review of scholarly analysis of the concept of prevenient grace, I 
would like to pay attention to the most recent work to focus specifically on the concept of 
prevenient grace: W. Brian Shelton’s Prevenient Grace: God’s Provision for Fallen 
Humanity.52 This work is the only detailed and cogent work that I know that specifically 
                                                
49 Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 153–154. 
50 Ibid., 155. 
51 Ibid., 156–157. 
52 W. Brian Shelton, Prevenient Grace: God’s Provision for Fallen Humanity 
(Wilmore, KY: Francis Asbury Press, 2014). 
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investigates the concept of prevenient grace from a historical, systematic, and biblical 
point of view and from an Arminian perspective. Indeed, Shelton calls Arminius and 
Wesley the “artisans of prevenient grace.”53 Unfortunately, he dedicates only two pages 
to Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace and in these makes only general assertions 
regarding the universality and gracious nature of prevenient grace.54 For this reason, 
perhaps, he wrongly claims that “Arminius did not thoroughly develop his credence in 
prevenient grace; it was more of a broad attempt to synthesize the biblical notion of free 
will with passages on divine sovereignty and causation.”55 With this declaration, Shelton 
reinforces the idea that Arminius’s soteriology makes freedom of will rather than 
prevenient grace its central concept. Shelton, however, does extensively explore the idea 
in the history of Christian doctrine. He considers supporters and detractors of prevenient 
grace theology from Irenaeus to twentieth-century theologians like Richard Niebuhr and 
Emil Brunner. Nevertheless, he omits critical figures like Melanchthon and the radical 
reformers. It is important to note that Shelton does not explore the way in which these 
precedent theological voices influenced Arminius in his conceptualization of prevenient 
grace. 
                                                
53 Shelton, Prevenient Grace, 99. 
54 Ibid., 118–120. 
55 Ibid., 92. 
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Problem Statement 
This dissertation addresses the problem of the lack of agreement among 
interpreters of Arminius concerning the nature, sources, development, and roles of 
prevenient grace in Arminius’s soteriology. Though scholars of Arminius have 
demonstrated the centrality of grace (in general) in Arminius’s theology, they disagree 
about the sources of the concept of prevenient grace, the extent of the universality of 
prevenient grace, and the nature of the concept of prevenient grace. Some of those studies 
seem to imply that Arminius gave the concept of grace equal importance to the concept 
of freedom of will. Reformed theologians, however, argue that Arminius’s main concern 
was to elevate human freedom of will to a place of prominence in his soteriology. As a 
consequence, they also contend that Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace was in 
discontinuity with the Reformed and Protestant theological tradition. They claim that the 
way in which Arminius used the concept was akin to the Catholic conceptualization of 
prevenient grace rather than that of Reformed or Protestant thinking.   
Research Questions 
To address this problem properly, it is necessary to answer the following 
questions: First, what is the actual nature and role of the doctrine of prevenient grace in 
Arminius’s soteriology? That is, how it works and in what ways. Second, what are the 
more likely historical sources of this concept in his writings? In other words, is 
Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient grace in continuity with Reformed and Protestant 
soteriology, or medieval catholic tradition, or does he strike out on his own? Third, does 
Arminius use the terminology of earlier sources in the same way they used it, or does he 
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redefine the common terms to express theological concepts that are clearly not found in 
the earlier sources? 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study of historical theology is to investigate, analyze, and 
define the probable sources, nature, development, and role of the concept of prevenient or 
“preceding” grace in the theology of Jacobus Arminius (1559–1609). The study attempts 
to identify the role that prevenient grace plays vis à vis the freedom of will in Arminius’s 
soteriology. In order to understand the development of Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient 
grace, this study considers his own place in the social and intellectual world of his time 
and the theological sources that most likely stimulated the development of what I suggest 
is his unique doctrine of prevenient grace. 
Thesis Statement 
Arminius placed prevenient grace rather than human free will at the center of his 
soteriology and developed this doctrine primarily in continuity with Reformed and 
Protestant theological precedents and frameworks rather than uniquely Catholic sources 
and views.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The present study is delimited in three specific ways. First, this study focuses only 
on the nature and function of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology. Therefore, it does 
not attempt to produce a scholarly analysis of his complete theology on the doctrine of 
salvation. Second, this research focuses specifically on Jacobus Arminius’s literary 
corpus and refers to other authors and works only as these are relevant to an 
 19 
understanding of prevenient grace in the writings of Arminius. Finally, the dissertation 
explores Arminius’s theology of prevenient grace in his historical context, the late 
sixteenth century in the Low Countries, and generally considers the sources which would, 
most probably, have been available to Arminius at the time, based on which he would 
have formed his understanding of the doctrine of prevenient grace. In this manner, the 
study is informed by the social and intellectual background of Arminius’s time (1559–
1609), and predominantly notes the influences of his predecessors and contemporaries on 
his theological development and thinking. 
Justification 
Roger Olson, Richard Muller, and Keith Stanglin, currently the chief current 
expositors among Arminian theologians, claim that the scholarly community has widely 
ignored and misinterpreted Jacobus Arminius’s teaching, purposes, and theology.56 Olson 
even regrets that well-known theologians, who have been influenced by Arminius’s 
theology, object to being associated with his name and teachings. However, trends in 
scholarship seem to be moving toward a more detailed acknowledgment and scholarly 
consideration of Arminius’s thinking.  
This recent surge of interest in Arminius’s theological thinking, led by Keith 
Stanglin, has been strengthened by the conference Arminius, Arminianism, and Europe at 
Leiden University, whose findings have been published in Arminius, Arminianism and 
                                                
56 Stanglin, Arminius on Assurance of Salvation, 1; R. Olson, The Story of 
Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999), 455; R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 29. 
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Europe: Jacobus Arminius (1559/60–1609), and the Arminianism and Adventism 
Symposium at Andrews University.57 One of the main contributions of these conferences 
has been to make evident several topics in Arminius’s theology that are in need of further 
consideration.  
Stanglin suggests a research program of “primary works,” for instance the 
identification of unknown writings by Arminius, and “secondary analyses,” the 
exposition of Arminius’s thoughts on “Scripture, Trinity, Christology, sin, anthropology, 
ecclesiology . . . and eschatology.”58 Stanglin points out that his “list is neither exhaustive 
nor detailed”59 regarding the studies to be considered on Arminius’s theology. The 
present study focuses on one important topic in Arminius’s thinking that requires further 
clarification and systematization, that is, the nature and the role of prevenient grace in his 
soteriology. This seems to be a necessary study for the following three main reasons: 
                                                
57 While the Leiden conference met from October 9–10, 2009 to commemorate 
the 400th anniversary of the death of Jacobus Arminius, the Andrews’ symposium 
gathered from October 14–16, 2010 to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the 
Arminian Remonstrance. The Leiden conference papers and contributions have been 
published in Th. Marius van Leeuwen, Keith D. Stanglin, and Marijke Tolsma, Arminius, 
Arminianism, and Europe: Jacobus Arminius (1559/60–1609) (Leiden, the Netherlands: 
Brill, 2009). The papers from the Andrews University Symposium will soon be published 
in Martin Hanna, Darius Jankiewicz, and John Reeve, eds., Salvation: Contours of 
Adventist Soteriology (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University press, forthcoming). 
58 Keith D. Stanglin, “Arminius and Arminianism: An Overview of Current 
Research,” in  Arminius, Arminianism, and Europe: Jacobus Arminius (1559/60–1609), 
ed. Th. Marius van Leeuwen, Keith D. Stanglin, and Marijke Tolsma (Leiden, the 
Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 21–24. 
59 Stanglin, “Arminius and Arminianism,” 23. 
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First, for the theology of Arminius to be consistent, logical, and defensible, his 
doctrine of prevenient grace is critical. Arminian studies seem to have overlooked this 
fact. To my knowledge, prevenient grace represented for Arminius an organizing 
principle that brought congruence to his reading of the biblical evidence of a totally 
depraved human nature and a freedom to choose the spiritual good. For the Dutch 
theologian, prevenient grace traces the line between the spiritual ability and inability of 
human beings in salvation. 
Second, although some studies of prevenient grace in Arminius’s writings have 
been done, there is no systematic consideration of the nature and role(s) of prevenient 
grace in Arminius’s theological system. For instance, secondary studies have different 
opinions about whether Arminius saw prevenient grace as universal or limited; resistible 
or irresistible; and more essentially, how effective prevenient grace could be in a 
corrupted human nature.60 In addition, most of the studies do not directly take into 
consideration the function of prevenient grace in the ordo salutis (order of salvation) of 
Arminius and its relation to calling, faith, regeneration, preaching, and other essential 
topics of the doctrine of salvation.  
                                                
60 Hicks, “Theology of Grace in . . . Jacobus Arminius,” 43–44, 51–56, 60–64; 
Witt, “Creation, Redemption, and Grace,” 629–632; Bangs, Arminius, 212–216; R. 
Olson, Arminian Theology, 159–178, 180–181; Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 153–
159; Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 151–157; Peterson and Williams, Why . . 
. Not an Arminian, 173–191; Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic 
Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 562; Mildred 
Bangs Wynkoop, Foundations of Wesleyan-Arminian Theology (Kansas City, KS: 
Beacon Hill Press, 1967), 59. 
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Third, it is necessary to make a study of Arminius’s theology of prevenient grace 
that interprets Arminius in his historical and intellectual context. Therefore, this study 
looks for continuity or discontinuity with Reformed and Protestant soteriology in 
Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace. In this context, it is also necessary to review the 
history of doctrine of prevenient grace in the antecedent theological voices of Arminius. 
In this way, this study attempts to discover how Arminius used and redefined previous 
theological languages and ideas of prevenient grace for his own soteriological 
constructions.  
Methodology and Outline  
I am following an inductive analytical approach to Arminius theological thinking 
to uncover Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient grace. In my methodological approach, the 
inductive analytical reading of Arminius’s documents does not follow a chronological 
approach, but rather a topical approach in an effort to discover all significant 
declarations, in their context, that Arminius made concerning prevenient grace and its 
nature and role.61 Thus, my methodology looks not only for specific and clear references 
to the concept of prevenient grace, but also for the theological language of prevenient 
grace that is quite abundant in Arminius’s writings. This approach involves three critical 
steps. First, the method looks for answers in Arminius’s documents. Therefore, the 
dissertation interprets Arminius’s writings, giving them the opportunity to clarify their 
                                                
61 William den Boer has successfully used an analytical approach to Arminius’s 
theological thinking to uncover Arminius’s theology on God’s justice and love. See 
God’s Twofold Love: The Theology of Jacob Arminius 1559–1609, trans. Albert Gootjes 
(Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 40–41. 
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theological notions and languages. In other words, the study will primarily allow 
Arminius to speak for himself. This is completely indispensable in order to avoid 
misrepresentation of Arminius’s theology and thinking by assuming current theological 
categories in the reading of the past.62  
Most of Arminius’s writings in Latin were published in Jacobus Arminius, 
Theological Works.63 A great number of his personal and professional letters were 
published in Amsterdam in 1660.64 Additionally, Stanglin recently identified and 
published several missing public disputations of Arminius.65 Despite some doubts about 
                                                
62 Richard A. Muller, “Reflections on Persistent Whiggism and Its Antidotes in 
the Study of Sixteenth–and Seventeenth–century Intellectual History,” in Seeing Things 
Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion, ed. Alister Chapman, John 
Coffey, and Brad S. Gregory (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 
135. 
63 Jacobus Arminius and Petrus Bertius and Pre-1801 Imprint Collection (Library 
of Congress). Iacobi Arminii, Opera Theologica. Lugduni Batavorum, Apud Godefridum 
Basson, 1629, in the HathiTrust Database, 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/dul1.ark:/13960/t00010j48 (accessed September 3, 2012). The 
works of Arminius contained in this Opera Theologica are accessible in English in two 
principal publications: the original translation of Jacobus Arminius in The Works of 
James Arminius, trans. James Nichols and William R. Bagnall (Auburn, NY: Derby, 
Miller and Orton, 1853) and the American reprinted work, Jacobus Arminius, Writings 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1956). 
64 The professional and personal letters of Arminius can be found in Praestantium 
ac eruditorum virorum epistolae ecclesiasticae et theoloicae, ed. Christian Hartsoeker 
and Phillip van Limborch (Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 1660). 
65 See Stanglin, Missing Public Disputations. Especially helpful as a guide to 
Arminius documents is the chronology of Arminius’s letters and writings published by 
Keith D. Stanglin and Richard A. Muller, “Bibliographia Arminiana,” in  Arminius, 
Arminianism, and Europe: Jacobus Arminius (1559/60 – 1609), ed. Th. Marius van 
Leeuwen, Keith D. Stanglin, and Marijke Tolsma (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 
265–290. 
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Arminius’s authorship of the public and private disputations, I treat the disputations as 
genuine professional writings of Arminius.66 It seems to me that Arminius’s public and 
private disputations are essentials to understanding his doctrine of prevenient grace.  
Second, this methodology also recognizes the great degree of influence that the 
social, economical, intellectual, and religious contexts exert on theological thinking 
within the Christian Church. For this reason, this study explores Arminius’s life and 
historical context. As Muller suggests, meaning is to be found in the proper reading of the 
historical context and the documents.67 Arminius’s theology of prevenient grace should 
not be reduced to the intellectual and social context that influenced him. Instead, it is 
important to exercise careful judgment, especially in the case of Arminius, to note when 
he abandoned the understanding of his theological background within the Calvinist 
milieu to construct his own theological system. Consequently, this study will analyze the 
world in which Arminius penned his theological considerations in close relation with the 
documents themselves.  
Finally, this dissertation recognizes that ideas do not arise in a vacuum. Therefore, 
doctrinal ideas like prevenient grace, the main focus of this study, have a history that it is  
theological, biblical, and philosophical. Thinkers are continually influenced by the 
reflections of their forerunners and contemporaries, even in some measure by those 
whom they reject or with whom they disagree. Therefore, this study would be incomplete 
                                                
 66 For the discussion regarding the authorship of Arminius’s public and private 
disputations, see den Boer, God’s Twofold Love, 23–34; Stanglin, Missing Public 
Disputations, 43–100; Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation, 47–58. 
67 Muller, “Reflections on Persistent Whiggism,” 136–137. 
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if it did not take into account the probable sources of Arminius’s theology of prevenient 
grace provided by early church, medieval, and his own contemporary thinkers.  
Theological influences in Arminius thinking were varied and disparate. Influences 
of the Early Church Fathers like Augustine of Hippo (354–430), medieval theologians 
like Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Catholic scholars like Francisco Suarez (1548–1617) 
and Luis de Molina (1535–1600), and Protestant theologians like John Calvin (1509–
1564) and Phillip Melanchthon (1497–1560) are well attested in his writings and in 
recent scholarly research.68 In addition, he was in contact with the most brilliant minds in 
theological studies of his days, scholars like Theodore of Beza (1519–1605) and several 
of his partners at Leiden.69 This part of the study is important in order to note how 
Arminius appropriated, used, reacted to, and changed their ideas in the conceptualization 
of his theology of prevenient grace. In this way, the study will be better able to identify 
how he developed this doctrine in his own way over time. 
                                                
68 Aza Goudriann, “‘Augustine Asleep’ or ‘Augustine Awake’? Jacobus Arminius 
Reception of Augustine,” in Arminius, Arminianism, and Europe: Jacobus Arminius 
(1559/60–1609), ed. Th. Marius van Leeuwen, Keith D. Stanglin, and Marijke Tolsma 
(Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 51–72; Stanglin and McCall, Jacob Arminius: 
Theologian of Grace, 19, 39, 43, 45, 199; Diana Stanciu, “Re-Interpreting Augustine: 
Ralph Cudworth and Jacobus Arminius on Grace and Free Will,” Zeitschrift für antikes 
Christentum 11, no. 1 (2007): 96–114; Richard A. Muller, “Arminius and the Scholastic 
Tradition,” Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 2 (1989): 263–277; Carl Bangs, 
“Arminius and the Reformation,” Church History 30, no. 2 (1961): 155–170; Eef Dekker, 
“Was Arminius a Molinist,” Sixteenth-Century Journal 27, no. 2 (1996): 337–352. 
69 F. Stuart Clarke, “Arminius’s Understanding of Calvin,” Evangelical Quarterly 
54,  (1982): 25–35; Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation, 13; Richard A. 
Muller, “Arminius and the Reformed Tradition,” Westminster Theological Journal 70, 
no. 1 (2008): 19–48. 
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Having presented the methodological steps, it seems useful to present the general 
design of this study. 
Chapter 1, the introduction, reviewed the literature of previous works on 
Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace. It also presented the statements of problem, 
purpose, thesis, and methodology of this study. 
Chapter 2 next explores Arminius historical, social, political and religious 
context. It also tries to discover the main theological influences in his thinking. The 
chapter closes by analyzing the person and his life. 
 Chapter 3 reviews the background of the doctrine of prevenient grace that 
provides possible sources that may have influenced Arminius’s thought in this doctrine. 
Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate Jacobus Arminius’s theology of prevenient grace in 
order to define its nature and role as a crucial organizing principle in his writings. In this 
manner, these chapters clarify the function of prevenient grace in Arminius’s soteriology. 
They explain the interrelationship between Arminius’s conception of prevenient grace, 
corrupted human nature, and freedom of will. They also seek to understand how 
prevenient grace relates to calling, faith, the preaching of the Word, and the divine law, 
among other related topics, in the initial process of conversion.  
 Chapter 6 gives a summary and conclusions that outline the principal findings 
and their critical implications for Arminian studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LIFE AND WORK OF JACOBUS ARMINIUS 
Historical Introduction  
Jacobus Arminius’s life and work is well documented in the biographical works 
of Caspar Brant and Carl Bangs.1 These works rely on the funeral oration delivered by 
Bertius at Arminius’s death. While it is unnecessary to outline his life in detail here, it is 
nonetheless helpful to note some critical aspects of his life that pertain to his 
understanding of the doctrine of prevenient grace. My reconstruction is based on 
recognized secondary sources and on Arminius’s writings and letters contained in The 
Works of Arminius. This account of Arminius’s life and historical context, however, is an 
attempt to understand how the experiences of the man and his world influenced his 
development of the doctrine of prevenient grace.  
I do not mean, however, that every historical detail discussed here directly 
connects to the theological outcome of prevenient grace in Arminius’s writings. But there 
are instances in Arminius’s life and context like the theological context, the diverse 
                                                
1 There are several summaries or accounts of Arminius’s life in different 
publications even before the work of C. Bangs that rely on Brant’s account. I do not think 
that it is useful to mention all of them here. For instance see, Geo L. Curtis, Arminianism 
in History; or, The Revolt from Predestinationism (Cincinnati, OH: Cranston & Curts, 
1894), 15–50. 
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religious influences, and some theological writings that most probably impacted his 
thinking on the doctrine of prevenient grace. The biographical details presented here also 
intend to introduce some readers to Arminius before they consider his theology. 
Furthermore, this chapter also intends to present the way in which I understand the 
previous biographical accounts of Arminius’s life giving me the opportunity to show 
intances where those accounts differ and to suggest probable solutions to those 
differences.  
In this chapter, I first scrutinize the social, religious, and theological world of 
Arminius. The study pays special attention to those events, ideas, personalities, and 
writings that influenced Arminius as a person, pastor, and theologian. Second, after 
understanding Arminius’s historical context, I consider Arminius as an individual in light 
of his family, patrons, studies, pastoral and academic work, and his last years of 
controversies over the doctrine of predestination. Second, I explore the public images and 
the self-image of Arminius to see how others perceived him and how he perceived 
himself. This is critical for understanding the man and his ideas, both internally and 
externally. Finally, I briefly explore Arminius’s theological method and hermeneutic as a 
helpful tool for reading and interpreting his doctrinal and religious conceptualizations. 
All these exploration will show that Arminius was a man of his time, but one who was 
not completely conformed to the ideas and the world that surrounded him. He found in 
the Scriptures the impetus and spirit to discover and explore new theological horizons as 
well as new ways to construct the Christian community.  
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The Social, Religious, and Intellectual  
World of Arminius 
The social, religious, and intellectual world of the late sixteenth-century in Europe 
surely influenced Arminiu’s life and work to some extent. The main purpose of this 
section is to set Arminius in his historical context. In general, it describes those particular 
social, religious, and intellectual events and influences with which Arminius was in 
contact, and which made him a man of his time. Yet in his writings Arminius himself 
does not give very much indication of how the social reality of his time influenced him, 
or how he reacted to specific events like the death of his whole family and three of his 
children, or the struggle between his people and the Spanish troops.  
The Social World of Arminius 
The social world of Arminius was, like most periods of human history, a 
convulsed one—a society marked by injustices, political struggles, religious dissensions, 
and the common activities of human life. Europe in general and the Netherlands in 
particular were involved in political and religious upheaval. In Arminius’s time, society 
and the Christian Church, as Christine Kooi affirms, lived between two singularities, “the 
war . . . against Spain, that is, the region’s partial detachment from the Habsburg 
imperium, and . . . the spread of Protestant Reformation, particularly its Reformed 
variant.”2 Here, I will pay attention first to the social-political life in Arminius’s 
Netherlands.  
                                                
2 Christine Kooi, “The Netherlands,” in Reformation and Early Modern Europe: 
A Guide to Research, ed. David M. Whitford (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University 
Press, 2008), 273.  
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In 1559 Philip II, the Catholic King of Spain, controlled territories from every 
continent including the Netherlands. The expression “the empire on which the sun never 
sets” originally referred to the extent of Spain’s vast territories. Philip II, like his father 
Charles V and his grandparents Isabella and Ferdinand, considered himself the protector 
of the Catholic faith. Prohibitions against freedom of worship, and persecution of those 
who accepted the Protestant faith, were an integral part of his domestic and foreign 
policies. He wrote to Luis Requesens y Zúñiga, ambassador in Rome, “you can assure his 
Holiness that rather than suffer the least injury to religion and the service of God, I would 
lose all my states and a hundred lives if I had them, for I do not intend to rule over 
heretics.”3 However, all his efforts to destroy the strong Reformation movements already 
present for decades in the Low Countries proved fruitless.  
Since 1565, the leaders of the Low Countries had requested of the Spanish crown 
more openness, specifically for religious liberty and moderation against dissenting 
religious voices in the Netherlands.4 However, their plea was rejected, leading to 
widespread violence, iconoclasm, and destruction of Catholic properties, churches, and 
monasteries.5 Accordingly, but belatedly, Philip II reacted in a vindictive fury with a 
                                                
3 Quoted in Andrew Pettegree, Europe in the Sixteenth Century (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2002), 214. 
4 Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1998), 119–121. 
5 Parker, Grand Strategy, 121. See also, Geert H. Janssen, The Dutch Revolt and 
Catholic Exile in Reformation Europe (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 23–26. 
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bloody campaign against the Dutch Revolt.6 The famous (or infamous) Duke of Alba or 
the Iron Duke, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo y Pimentel, led the Spanish troops in years 
(1572–1579) of war, destruction, and carnage against Dutch civilians, members of the 
nobility, and Protestant religious leaders. Oudewater, unlike other destroyed cities, was 
not an important economic, religious, or educational center in the country. However, the 
city played a central role in the movement of national liberation and the Protestantization 
of the northern territories that supported the cause of William of Orange.7 Consequently,  
the city experienced the destruction of almost all of its five hundred structures8 and the 
                                                
6 It is important to highlight that many of the narratives regarding the massacres, 
pillaging, and atrocities committed by the Spanish troops in the Netherlands come from 
the perspective of witnesses, second-hand accounts, and historians prone to 
misrepresentations, exaggerations, and prejudices. For instance, Bangs claims that the 
Oudewater experience was a carnage unparalleled “even in those bloody days,” Arminius, 
40; however, Geoffrey Parker, a well-respected historian of Philip II and the Spanish 
campaigns in the Netherlands asserts in a more balanced account that “by the sixteenth-
century standards, the number of executions was relatively small considering the scale of 
the troubles. No government at that time voluntarily chose to leave traitors and rebels 
alive once they were captured. Queen Elizabeth’s treatment of the northern rebels after 
1569 was no different from Alva’s behavior (except that Elizabeth’s victims were 
Catholics and Alva’s Protestants),” Philip II (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 
1978), 99. Indeed, Bangs recognizes that at least one of his own sources has the tendency 
to “dramatize the events with a possible exaggeration of numbers,” Arminius, 41. Also, in 
the religious struggles for power in the sixteenth century between Catholics and 
Protestants, events like those in Oudewater were unfortunately frequent occurrences. 
Consequently, there is no reason to doubt the historical facts of the destruction of the city 
and the murder of many people in the population; however, the extent of the carnage 
should be doubted, or at least questioned. See also, Janssen, The Dutch Revolt, 20–22. 
7 Bangs, Arminius, 38–39. 
8 W. Stephen Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration of Sentiments: An Annotated 
Translation with Introduction and Theological Commentary (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2012), 13. 
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murder of great numbers of its population.9 In this Spanish military crusade Arminius’s 
whole family was killed.10  
It is important to understand that Philip II’s war against the Netherlands was 
basically driven by religious sentiments against the heretics. Geoffrey Parker argues that 
to “drive against heresy and non-Catholic” groups was not only the policy of Philip II in 
the Netherlands but in all his territories.11 In the same spirit of his grandparents, Philip 
II’s ultimate goal was the complete destruction in his kingdom of all heretics, idolaters, 
and false Jew and Moslem converts. Overwhelmed by financial troubles and failures in 
his war against the infidels, he demonstrated his understanding of divine mission. He said 
to his secretary, “God will have mercy on us, because the cause is His; and [the thought 
of] this, and the damage that his religion is suffering, is what causes me most anguish in 
this matter.”12 Therefore, in Philip II’s vision, his war against the Dutch heretics was less 
a desire to retain one of his large territories than, in his opinion, to support and maintain 
the true Christian faith. Indeed, he saw himself as the divinely appointed protector of the 
Roman Catholic faith.  
                                                
9 Bangs, Arminius, 43. 
10 Ibid., 42. 
11 Parker, Philip II, 99. 
12 Quoted in Parker, Philip II, 125. The personal Christian devotion of Philip II 
led him ardently to support ardently and enforce religious policies in favor and defense of 
the Catholic faith; see Parker, The Grand Strategy, 77–109; 115–146 and Geoffrey 
Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2014), 80–99. This is not to say that the Spanish lacked political and economic interests; 
surely they had both. Likewise, the Dutch also were fighting not only to regain religious 
liberty, but also for political and economic freedom. 
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At that time, Arminius was studying in Utrecht. When he heard the news of the 
fate of his home town, he immediately decided to return to Oudewater to ascertain what 
had become of his family. Arminius’s reaction to Oudewater and other Spanish 
massacres in Holland most likely affected his entire life and thought.  
Arminius’s world was a world of political and social struggle. In other words, the 
society of Arminius’s time was changing rapidly, including its political and religious 
structures of power. Some European territories long dominated by royalist and foreign 
powers were fighting for their freedom. In particular, Holland was beginning to enjoy 
modest independence from Spain after years of war and suffering. However, it still 
struggled internally with establishing a government, the unification of the country, and 
issues of national identity.  
On one side, John Oldenbarnevelt, prime minister of the United Provinces and 
faithful supporter of Arminius, and the middle-class oligarchy favored a republican 
government that was completely independent of Spain but maintained good relations with 
the former imperial power. On the other side of the political spectrum, Prince Maurice, 
son of William of Orange and head of the Army, along with the nobility and the peasants 
favored a sovereign monarchy and desired to continue the war against Spain until they 
attained independence. Despite the bitter opposition of Prince Maurice, Oldenbarnevelt 
worked out a peace treaty with Spain at least as a temporary solution to years of war. 
However, to some extent it did not guarantee Spain’s total recognition of Netherlands’s 
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independence.13 In addition, like Arminius, Oldenbarnevelt had a principled vision of 
religious tolerance for Holland that would at least assure freedom of worship for 
Catholics, Lutherans, Anabaptists, and later the Remonstrant ministers and believers.14 
Consequently, he was unfairly accused of being pro-Spain and a traitor. In 1617, Prince 
Maurice led a military coup and deposed the council members who had Remonstrant and 
Republican sympathies. In this coup, Oldenbarnevelt and the Remonstrant ministers and 
politicians confronted prison, bitter persecution, and death.15 It seems evident that the 
sympathies of Arminius sided with Oldenbarnevelt and the merchants in this political 
affair. One could speculate that if Arminius had been alive at the time of the persecution 
against the Remonstrants he likely would have died as a martyr of the cause. 
The social world of Arminius was closely entwined with the religious reality of 
the time. Here, for the sake of clarity and in order to point to specific differences I treat 
                                                
13 See Jan Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt: 1606–1619, trans. R. B. Powell, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 2:299–422. The Truce was not popular either in 
Holland or in Spain. While Oldenbarnevelt forced it in Holland, the archduke forced it 
upon the Spanish court. See J. P. Cooper, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History: The 
Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War 1609–48/59 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), 4:260–267. See also Charles S. McCoy and J. Wayne Baker, 
Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenantal Tradition 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1991), 66–67; J. P. Heering, Hugo Grotius as 
Apologist for the Christian Religion: A Study of His Work ‘De veritate religionis 
christianae,’ 1640 (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2004), 2; Justo González, The Story of 
Christianity, vol. 2, The Reformation to the Present Day (San Francisco, CA: Haper & 
Row, 1984), 180. 
14 Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, 426, 430; A. T. van Deursen, “The Dutch Republic, 
1588–1780” in History of the Low Countries, ed. J. C. Blom and E. Lamberts, trans. 
James C. Kennedy (New York: Berghahn, 2006), 161. 
15 van Deursen, “The Dutch Republic,” 163–167. 
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the social and religious world of Arminius separately. Obviously, the social and political 
struggles of the time greatly influenced the church and the religious conflicts during 
Arminius’s life.  
The Religious World of Arminius  
Geert H. Janssen argues that Reformation ideas and ideals encountered a “fertile 
soil in the Netherlands from the start.”16 Luther’s pamphlets circulated in the territory as 
early as 1520. Due to the influence of Luther’s ideas among the new spiritual ideas and 
religious practices of the Protestant movement, all dissenting voices and new spiritual 
practices were termed Lutheran. However, Lutheranism was not widely successful in the 
Low Countries.17 From 1540 on, Calvin’s ideas and the Reformed tradition with its 
distinct ecclesiastical organization, well-prepared ordained ministers, effective use of 
literature, music, and the Bible, and a well-defined theological system, rapidly became 
the leading force for Reformation in the country.18 Calvinists used impresive methods, 
like public recitation of biblical texts and preaching and chanting the Psalms, to gain 
believers and provoke the Catholic establishment.19 As a result, the Reformed tradition 
overrode the influence of the Anabaptist movement that had enjoyed a prevailing 
                                                
16 Janssen, The Dutch Revolt, 21. 
17 Joke Spaans, “Reform in the Low Countries,” in A Companion to the 
Reformation World, ed. R. Po-Chia Hsia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 119–120. 
18 Janssen, The Dutch Revolt, 21; Spaans, “Reform in the Low Countries,” 122; 
Guido Marnef, “The Changing face of Calvinism in Antwerp, 1550–185,” in Calvinism 
in Europe, 1540–1620, ed. Andrew Pettegree, Alastair Duke, and Gilliam Lewis (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 158. 
19 Spaans, “Reform in the Low Countries,” 123. 
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presence in the country since 1530.20 Obviously, Catholicism’s religious and political 
influence was still strong in the Low Countries specifically for the support of the Spanish 
Empire. 
At this point it is important to analyze in more detail Anabaptism in the 
Netherlands, because it was the most important influence from the 1520s to around 
1572.21 Anabaptism became a broad and successful Protestant movement in the 
Netherlands thanks mainly to the influence of Melchior Hoffman. Indeed, Melchiorite 
Anabaptism “became predominant in some cities and some areas of the Netherlands” 
especially in Amsterdam, the city in which Arminius would become a pastor about sixty 
years later.22 Anabaptists confronted heavy persecution from the beginning. Hofmann, a 
Lutheran preacher and pastor but already connected with the Radical reformers, asked for 
liberty and a place of worship for the Anabaptists.23 Although, for some scholars, 
                                                
20 George Huntston Williams, The Radical Reformation, 3rd ed. (Kirksville, MO: 
Truman State University, 1992), 1177. The influence of the Anabaptists was greatly 
discredited in the eyes of many because of the Münster debacle in 1535. See John D. 
Woodbridge and Frank A. James III, Church History From the Pre-Reformation to the 
Present Day: The Rise and Growth of the Church in Its Cultural, Intellectual, and 
Political Context (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2013), 197–198. 
21 Andrew Pettegree, “The Calvinist Church in Holland, 1572–1590,” in 
Calvinism in Europe, 1540–1620, ed. Andrew Pettegree, Alastair Duke, and Gilliam 
Lewis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 174–175. 
22 L. Lindeboom, Het Bijbelsch humanisme in Nederland (Leiden, the 
Netherlands: 1913), 31, quoted in Cornelius Krahn, Dutch Anabaptism: Origin, Spread, 
Life and Thought 1450–1600 (The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 119. 
See also Arnold C. Snyder, Anabaptist History and Theology: An Introduction 
(Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora, 1995), 144–145. 
23 Krahn, Dutch Anabaptism, 90. Krahn believes that these actions marked the 
complete identification of Hoffmann with the Anabaptists. 
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Hoffmann’s imprecise preaching on the use of the sword by believers obscures his 
pacifist legacy, he always maintained that true Christians would not use the sword. 
Misunderstanding and misuse of Hoffmann’s teaching on the sword and views on 
eschatology led to the drastic actions at Münster.24 Obviously, the tragedy of Münster and 
local actions like trying to assail and capture towns in the Netherlands by radicalized 
Anabaptists negatively impacted Anabaptism in the Low Countries, but the Anabaptist 
movement did not die.25 After these tragedies, pacifist Anabaptists like the brothers Dirk 
and Obbe Phillips and Menno Simons, the true spiritual heirs of Hoffmann,26 continued 
as a significant religious force in the Low Countries until the days of Arminius. It 
remains an open question to what extent the most positive view of Anabaptists about the 
freedom of will and the role of God’s prevenient grace influenced Arminius’s 
conceptualization of prevenient grace.    
To this point, our discussion demonstrates that the religious landscape in the 
Netherlands during Arminius’s life and ministry covered a wide spectrum of theological 
ideas and ecclesiastical practices. This complex mixture of religious ideas and tensions 
                                                
24 Because the radical events at Münster under the leadership of Jan Matthijs and 
his successor Jan van Leiden are well known, it is not necessary to recount them here. For 
an account of the history of Münster’s tragedy, see James M. Stayer, Anabaptists and the 
Sword (Lawrence, KA: Coronado Press, 1972), 205–280. 
25 Spaans, “Reform in the Low Countries,” 121. See also, Alastair Duke, “The 
Netherlands,” in The Early Reformation in Europe, ed. Andrew Pettegree (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 158. 
26 Stayer, Anabaptists, 223.  
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was also fertile ground for religious dissension and political struggle, and resulted in 
mutual persecution and animosity.  
It is this religious reality of his time and this spirit of the epoch that Arminius 
seems to be describing in his oration, On Reconciling Religious Dissensions Among 
Christians,27 delivered at the University of Leiden on February 8, 1606. After poignantly 
describing the way in which religious dissension seizes and controls the human intellect 
and emotions, resulting in persecution and efforts to completely exterminate others, he 
called for loving Christian dialogue, personal submission to God and his Word, and a 
spirit of tolerance to the different religious sentiments of his time.28 In his opinion, 
intolerance and bitter opposition are an integral part of the spirit of Rome, but are not part 
of a genuine Christian. Therefore, in the oration, Arminius outlined a program to “assert 
liberty of conscience and of worship; and then, upon that fundamental principle, to 
persuade all Christians, however divided in opinion, to lay aside the distinctions of sects 
                                                
27 See, Orat. 5., in Works, 1:434–541.  
28 Ibid., 1:447, 468–470, 485–486; 504–514. He says that in some cases the 
bitterness is such that “rage is excited and cruelty exercised against the reputation, the 
property, and the persons of the living; against the ashes, the sepulchers, and the memory 
of the dead; and against the souls both of the living and the dead. Those who differ from 
the stronger party are attacked with all kinds of weapons; with cruel mockings, 
calumnies, execrations, curses, excommunications, anathemas, degrading and scandalous 
libels, prisons and instruments of torture.” Ibid., 1:449. Arminius is most probably 
describing the spirit of the Catholic Middle Ages and Reformation practices of 
persecution and tortures. However, he was also fully aware of the persecutions of the 
Anabaptists and dissenters of the Reformed Church. In addition, he worried that the same 
spirit showed itself among his opponents. 
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and party”29 in favor of a more peaceful and unified Christian spirit and relationship 
within Christianity.  
Indeed, in Arminius’s view of tolerance, a view probably influenced by 
Hoffmann’s advocacy for tolerance of Anabaptism in the Netherlands, even Roman 
Catholics should enjoy the liberty to exercise their religion. He called the Reformed 
ministers and believers to exercise “Christian charity” in favor of Catholics. Furthermore, 
he seems to disagree with the practice of some towns and cities that “forced Catholics to 
attend services of the Reformed, under penalty of fine.”30 Arminius’s attitude regarding 
religious tolerance especially in favor of Catholics has been interpreted either as a 
compromise with Roman Catholicism or as a political move to gain the favor of the 
University’s moderate leaders.31 Nonetheless, in reading Arminius’s writings regarding 
religious dissensions it seems to me that he had a genuine interest in tolerance and 
acceptance of fellow Christians despite the doctrinal divide.  
Arminius’s advocacy of religious tolerance, however, does not mean that he was a 
promoter of ecumenical ideals; this was obviously a foreign concept in his days. Neither 
was he open to diluting biblical truth in order to attain Christian unity. In reality, 
Arminius advocated tolerance because he himself was open to challenging some 
interpretations of his own tradition. According to Brant, Arminius affirmed that he “was 
                                                
 29 Nathan Bangs, The Life of James Arminius, D.D., Formerly Professor of 
Divinity in the University of Leyden (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1843), 258. 
30 See, Eric H. Cossee, “Arminius and Rome,” in van Leeuwen, Stanglin, and 
Tolsma, Arminius, Arminianism, and Europe, 80. 
31 Cossee, “Arminius and Rome,” 80. 
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in no respect bound to every private interpretation of the Reformation, but was plainly 
free and entitled to expound the heavenly oracles, and particular passages of the sacred 
volume, according to the dictates of conscience.”32 Consequently, Arminius expressed his 
theological ideas and biblical interpretations to correct some doctrinal points of the 
Reformed tradition but always within the boundaries of his own Reformed Church. In 
other words, in his contacts with the different streams of Christian religions, Arminius 
firmly situated himself as a minister of the Reformed tradition.  
Accordingly, Arminius in his disputation On the Roman Pontiff and other treatises 
harshly criticized Roman Catholic doctrines and the papal office for opposing the biblical 
truth and assuming Christological titles and roles.33 Likewise, he expressed points of 
disagreement with the Lutheran churches, but acknowledged Lutherans as “brethren.”34 
He also was asked to confront the Anabaptists. This task he did not fully accomplish, not 
because he fully supported all Anabaptist doctrines, but most probably because he was 
involved in the dispute over predestination at the time and was also trying to keep up with 
his teaching responsibilities. In reality, he expressed that the Anabaptist view on 
predestination was akin to his own conclusions.35 However, Arminius actually wrote a 
                                                
32 Brant, The Life of James Arminius, 42.   
33 Pub. Disp. XXI, in Works, 2:264–274. 
34 Decl. Sent., in Works, 1:695; Apology, Art. I and II,” in Works 1:740; Romans 
VII., in Works, 2:633. 
35Letter to Uitenbogardt, dated January 26, 1600, in Works, 1:594–595; Decl. 
Sent., in Works, 1:640–641. Arminius expressed to his friend that he was also concerned 
that the task to contest the Anabaptists was given to him in order to uncover his own 
sentiments, a move that Arminius considered most aberrant for a Christian. 
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small public disputation opposing specific Anabaptist teachings like the negation of 
poedobaptismo [paedo-baptism], the non-participation of Christians in the magistratu 
[government], and the requirement to avoid any kind of iuramento [oath].36  
In sum, Arminius was well aware of the dissensions within Christianity in his day. 
However, he wanted to avoid futile discussions and disagreements over irrelevant matters 
and sectarian divisions that naturally occur among humans. Instead, Arminius wanted to 
concentrate intellectual effort, fruitful conversation, and intense study on settling critical 
points of doctrine as well as Christian living and worship. For this reason, he said that the 
distinction of the true “catholic” Church should be based on doctrine, worship, and 
morality in close consideration of the biblical truth, and not based on traditions and 
locations. But even in this case, his spectrum for evaluating the different churches is 
wider and vacillates between the extreme of “orthodox and heretical . . . right worshiper 
and idolatrous . . . purer and more impure.”37 The closer one was to the right side of the 
spectrum, the closer one was to being identified as a true member of the Universal 
church. In other words, Arminius set the borders of true Christian religion and teachings 
more broadly than did many of his contemporaries.  
The Theological World of Arminius  
The theological world of Arminius in the Netherlands and Europe had been 
experiencing tremendous changes since the Reformation. Gone were the times when 
                                                
36 “Contra Anabaptistas,” in Stanglin, Missing Public Disputations, 575–588. 
37 Priv. Disp. LV, in Works, 2:421. 
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Christian theology was defined by the Church, the decisions of her councils, and the 
constructions of her theologians. The protestant principle of sola scriptura in 
combination with the humanistic motto ad fontes epitomized the renewed reading of the 
sacred text, the construction of new theological insight, and the transformation of 
Christian worship, ministry, government, and life. Arminius was completely smitten by 
this new spirit; after all, he was making his early incursions in theology only about thirty- 
four years after Luther’s death and sixteen years after Calvin’s death.  
During his time of studies and indeed throughout his pastoral and teaching career, 
he was under the influence and formed an integral part of the development of early 
Reformed orthodoxy and Protestant scholasticism. William J. van Asselt defines 
Reformed orthodoxy as “the stream of theology that is tied to the Reformed confessional 
documents.”38 Muller states that Reformed scholasticism denotes a “common method” 
shared by Reformers of the sixteenth century in pursuing theological or philosophical 
questions.39 It could therefore not be directly related to a specific “theological result or 
                                                
38 Willem J. van Asselt, Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, Reformed 
Historical-Theological Studies, ed. Joel R. Beeke and Jay T. Collier; trans. Albert 
Gootjes (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), 104. 
39 Richard A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of  a Theological 
Tradition, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University, 2003), 
27; Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: Prolegomena to Theology: 
The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 2nd ed. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker, 2003), 1:35. According to Muller, the common method of scholastic 
works entails “(1) identifying the order and pattern of argument suitable to technical 
academic discourse, (2) presenting an issue in the form of a thesis or question, (3) 
ordering the thesis or question suitably for discussion or debate, often identifying the 
‘state of the question,’ (4) noting a series of objections to the assumed correct answer, 
and then (5) offering a formulation of an answer or an elaboration of the thesis with due 
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philosophical perspective.”40 Muller and van Asselt consider that the natural marker of 
the beginning of Protestant Scholasticism spanned from the death of the second 
generation of Reformed theologians like Calvin and German Reformed theologian 
Wolfgang Musculus, extended to the adoption of the Heidelberg Catechism, and 
culminated in the Synod of Dort.41 Most scholars agree with Muller that one 
characteristic of this early period was the use of an eclectic methodology that explored a 
variety of philosophical as well as theological traditions.42 This basically means that 
Reformed theologians willingly used scholastic methods to conceptualize Protestant 
doctrine and theology exploring theological and philosophical works from different 
traditions including the Church fathers and the medieval theologians.   
Consequently, Arminius interacted with numerous and diverse theological and 
philosophical voices to construct his own theological work. In order to understand 
Arminius’s theology, it seems critical to review some of his most probable theological 
influences. I propose that, first, it is important to summarize briefly central theological 
                                                
respect to all known sources of information and the rules of rational discourse, followed 
but a full response to all objections,” Muller, After Calvin, 27. For more information 
regading reformed scholasticism see, Justo L. González, The History of Theological 
Education (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2015), in eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 
EBSCOhost (accessed March 15, 2017). 
40 Muller, After Calvin, 28. 
41 Asselt, Reformed Scholasticism, 104; Muller, PRRD, 1:31. 
42 Muller, “Problem of Protestant Scholastism—A Review and Definition,” in 
Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, ed. Willem J. Van Asselt and 
Eef Dekker (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2001), 45–64;  Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, 
‘Christian Aristotelianism,” Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 81 (2001): 306–
325.   
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ideas within the Reformed tradition. And second, it is also essential to see Arminius in 
the wider spectrum of theological reactions against Calvin’s idea of predestination. 
Central Theological Concepts 
In order to understand Arminius’s theological work, it seems important to 
consider the critical doctrinal issues that theologians were facing at the end of the 
sixteenth century. A question is how Arminius related to and worked with those 
important theological issues of his time? There is a risk here of oversimplifying the 
theological issues that abounded during Arminius’s life. However, I will restrict myself to 
the consideration of three main topics, topics I choose for their importance for Arminius’s 
theology: The relationship between free will and grace, predestination and election, and 
the ordo salutis in God’s program of salvation.   
One main theological topic was the relationship between human free will and 
God’s grace.43 Since the early days of the Reformation, this topic was a contentious 
problem for all the Reformers as well as Catholic theologians. Erasmus of Rotterdam in 
his treatise De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio (On Free Will) and Martin Luther in 
his reply De servo arbitrio (On the Bondage of the Will) stridently disputed the role of 
human will and God’s sovereign grace in salvation. Similarly, John Calvin, the 
Anabaptists, and most of the reformers dedicated extensive analysis to the issue.44 By the 
                                                
43 Van Asselt, Reformed Scholasticism, 105–107. 
44 Consider John Calvin, The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of 
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time of Arminius, the subject was still an ongoing question. Arminius himself dedicated 
considerable effort to the issue that he regarded as central for human salvation and God’s 
character. William van Asselt explains that the dispute that was already present within the 
Catholic church came to the Reformed camp, that those who followed Reformed 
orthodoxy sided with Aquinas and the Arminians and Lutherans followed Suarez and 
Molina.45  
Another key discussion within reformed tradition was on the issue of 
predestination. The concept of double predestination was not only a construction of 
Calvin, but also of Huldrych Zwingli, Martin Bucer, Heinrich Bullinger, and Theodore 
Beza.46 One would expect to find the stronger controversies on predestination within this 
particular branch of the Reformation. Divines at the time usually wrote small treatises 
regarding the different views on the topic, ending with a defense of their own opinions.47 
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45 Van Asselt, Reformed Scholasticism, 107. 
46 For detailed analysis of the doctrine of predestination in the theology of the 
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“John Calvin and later Calvinism: The Identity of the Reformed Tradition,” in The 
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Not only did Arminius argue throughout his writings against the predestinarian 
conceptualization of the forerunners of Reformed theology, but in his Declaration of 
Sentiments he followed a similar structure to that of his contemporaries.  
These soteriological discussions on God’s grace and human free will and the 
concept of predestination resulted in general analysis and constructions of the divine ordo 
salutis. During the post-Reformation period, Protestant and Catholic theologians alike 
described the process of salvation in “highly sophisticated” logical or temporal 
sequences.48 The ordo salutis described the essential unity and interrelations of the 
multidimensional divine actions in favor of human redemption, and highlighted aspects 
like calling, illumination, faith, election, justification, and glorification. In contrast to 
John Fesko, who argues that a Reformed ordo salutis results from a biblical reflection on 
Romans 8:29–30, I think that while in some instances the ordo salutis naturally 
developed from biblical reflection, in others it responded to rational and doctrinaire 
impositions upon the Scriptures.49 Like his contemporaries, then, Arminius developed a 
clear ordo salutis. Obviously, the sequences of the Holy Spirit’s movements in 
                                                
Arminius’s theological context see, J. Matthew Pinson, “Will the Real Arminius Please 
Stand up? A Study of the Theology of Jacobus Arminius in Light of His Interpreters,” 
Integrity 2 (2003): 121–139. 
48 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of 
Doctrine, vol. 3, The Growth of Medieval Theology, 600–1300 (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 108; Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “Ordo Salutis,” in 
Global Dictionary of Theology: A Resource of the Worldwide Church. ed. William A. 
Dyrness and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2008), 622.  
49 John V. Fesko, Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early 
Modern Reformed Theology, 1517–1700, Reformed Historical Theology, ed. Herman J. 
Selderhuis, vol. 20 (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 261–262. 
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Arminius’s ordo salutis appear differently from the understanding of his Calvinist 
colleagues. So it is critical to keep in mind these theological concepts while working to 
understand Arminius’s theology and the role of prevenient grace.  
The Wider Context of Arminius’s  
Theological World 
Arminius belongs to a wider theological world of anti-predestinarian thinkers in 
the late sixteenth century. It is impossible to understand Arminius without a knowledge 
of this reality. Catholic and Anabaptist theologians consistently rejected the doctrine of 
predestination in the way that the magisterial reformers understood it. However, here I 
focus on the reactions within the Reformed tradition. Not all Reformation theologians 
accepted the Reformed and early Lutheran understanding of human free will and God’s 
grace in the context of predestination. Since Calvin’s day theological voices like Albertus 
Pighius, Jerome Bolsec, and Sebastian Castellio have pointed to the awful theological 
implications of the doctrine of predestination, such as making God the author of evil and 
thus destroying the goodness of God.50  
It is interesting that here we find a probable connection between the ideas of 
Calvin’s opponents and Arminius. It is more probable than not that Arminius was 
familiar, at least historically, with the ideas of Pighius, Bolsec, and Castellio. However, it 
is in the writings of Coornhert that we find the ideas of Castellio disseminated in the 
Netherlands. Coornhert is the same person to whom the consistory in Amsterdam asked 
                                                
50 Mirjam G. K. van Veen, “Calvin and His Opponents,” in The Calvin Handbook, 
ed. Herman J. Selderhuis, trans. Henry J. Baron, Judith J. Guder, Randi H. Lundell, and 
Gerrit W. Sheeres (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 160–161. 
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Arminius to respond. Finding support in Castellio, Coornhert opposed Calvin’s doctrine 
of predestination affirming human freedom of choice and human capacity to receive 
God’s grace.51 It is a historical fact that Castellio and Coornhert incited a theological 
revolution over freedom of will in the Netherlands. Arminius himself reported that the 
opponents to Calvin’s view around 1590 were numerous. However, at the time he did not 
count himself among them.52  
Reactions against the doctrine of predestination were not limited to the 
Netherlands. In England, Puritan theologians advanced a strict view on predestination, 
even calling others to promote it systematically in preaching, teaching, and publishing.53 
However, a group of anti-predestination theologians called “freewillers” by their 
contemporaries opposed the radical conclusions of their Calvinist contemporaries.54 As 
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early as 1569, Anthony (Antonio del) Corro, an Spanish reformer and former Calvinist 
minister, at Oxford argued that election and reprobation rest on the presence of  “faith or 
its lack” in the life of believers.55 Likewise, during the early 1590s William Barret, Peter 
Baro, and John Overall at Cambridge favored an unlimited view of atonement, 
understood faith as the ground of election and perseverance of the saints as conditional 
upon a continued life of faith.56 These are obviously similar views to those present later 
in Arminius’s writings. Interestingly, Arminian scholars do not find an influence of these 
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balancing the Protestant views on grace, election, and the human role in salvation. The 
only complete analysis of Corro’s life and ministry is the unpublished PhD. dissertation 
of W. McFadden, “The Life and Works of Antonio del Corro, 1527–1591” (PhD diss., 
Queen’s University Belfast, 1953). I have based this brief analysis on Paul L. Hauben, 
Three Spanish Heretics and the Reformation (Genève, Switzerland: Librairie Droz, 
1967), 3–81. 
56 Ibid., 30, 35, 37. Peter Baro, a French refugee in England, was undoubtedly 
influence by Corro, see Hauben, Spanish Heretics, 68. 
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English divines upon Arminius’s theology, or vice versa. Stanglin says that “English 
Arminianism” developed independent of the Continent.57 Similarly, Bangs states that 
Baro most probably never knew the works of Arminius.58  
However, with appropriate caution I suggest that there are some interesting and 
possible connections between Arminius and these Spanish, French, and English free will 
thinkers. They were all familiar with the work of the prestigious Danish Lutheran 
theologian Neils Hemmingsen (Nicholas Hemmingius, 1513–1600). Corro appealed to 
Hemmingsen as his authority, Baro submitted to him his opinions on predestination for 
approval and publication, and Arminius referred to his writings as support in his 
Declaration of Sentiments.59 One important historical question could be: To what extent 
did Hemmingsen’s writings and theology nurture and influence their anti-predestinarian 
theology? Regrettably, no studies have investigated the nature of the influence of 
Hemmingsen on Corro, Baro, and Arminius. It would also be critical to explore the 
similarities and differences between Hemmingsen, Corro, and Baro’s theology and that of 
Arminius.  
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One thing is possible to conclude: that Arminius’s wider theological context was 
involved in a widespread reaction against the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. Those 
opposed to the doctrine believed that the reading of the Confessions, Catechism, and 
other church documents through a Calvinist worldview necessarily distorted the biblical 
teachings about God’s love and goodness and represented God as the creator of evil and 
as a moral monster. 
Jacobus Arminius: The Person  
Having considered the social, religious, and theological world of Arminius, it is 
now time to pay attention to the person in that context. In this section, I discuss 
Arminius’s early life as well as his experiences as a student, pastor, and theologian.  
Early Years: Family and Patrons 
Although the precise date of Jacobus Arminius’s birthday is uncertain, he most 
probably was born around 1559 in a small Dutch town named Oudewater.60 Arminius 
never knew his father and his entire family was assassinated by Spanish troops in the 
massacre of Oudewater in August 7, 1575.61 Bertius reports that in the Spanish attack of 
                                                
60 The biographical information in this chapter predominantly relies on the 
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the town “scarcely a single inhabitant had escaped the general carnage, and that his 
[Arminius] mother, sister, brother, and other relations, had unfortunately perished.”62 The 
recollection of such a tragedy left a great and sorrowful impression on Arminius’s mind 
long after the event. He always referred to the character of the Spaniards as a people 
“who cannot exist without having an enemy”63 and recalled the tragedy of his small town 
in elegiac and poetic verse.64 I have previously discussed the Oudewater experience.   
Arminius probably left his home as soon as he was “capable of receiving the 
elements of learning”65 to study in Utrecht66 under the tutelage and with the financial 
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support of Theodore Aemelius, a former Catholic priest who had become a Protestant 
minister. Aemelius discovered in Arminius not only intellectual aptitudes but most 
importantly a pious disposition. Consequently, he encouraged his young protégé to 
pursue an education and to dedicate his life, talents, and conscience to God’s service in 
hopes of a more glorious and eternal mode of existence.67 The admonitions of his 
protector and Arminius’s assiduous dedication in studying the Holy Scriptures bore fruit 
in a pious life with the mission of honoring God.68 Unfortunately, Arminius lost his 
human supporter and counselor when Aemelius suddenly died of  “an unexpected 
calamity.”69 Abruptly, Arminius was left to face the harshness of life without a family, 
sponsor, or economic support. But despite all these calamities and trials, Arminius 
survived. Brandt, a remonstrant theologian and historian, described in emotional terms 
the divine intervention in favor of Arminius; “the great and ever blessed God, the never-
failing father of the orphan, did not leave the youth, now in his 15th year, to pine in the 
hopeless grief into which he had been plunged by the loss of so beloved a benefactor.”70  
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God favored Arminius one more time with a new patron. Rudolph Snellius 
(1547–1613), a famous mathematician, linguist, and a fellow countryman of Arminius, 
became Arminius’s new benefactor and continued to provide him with excellent 
education at the University of Marburg and later at the new University of Leiden (from 
1576 to 1582). 71 He most probably exercised his influence to find support for Arminius 
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Nevertheless, years later, Arminius mentioned Melanchthon as one of the great 
Reformers that was in agreement with his position on predestination. See Decl. Sent., in 
Works, 1:642. Probably Arminius was not influenced theologically by Melanchthon 
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his own library. See Stanglin, Arminius on Assurance of Salvation, 84n47. 
As soon as Arminius learned about the new university in Leiden, founded by 
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in his studies at Geneva and Basel. Snellius introduced Arminius to the philosophical 
thinking of Peter Ramus as well as to the study of mathematics and astronomy.72  
Once he had completed his studies at Leiden, Arminius obtained the support of 
the powerful senators and pastors of Amsterdam and the financial patronage of the 
merchants’ guild. With the financial support of the people of Amsterdam, Arminius 
began his studies at the University of Geneva under the well-known theologian and 
disciple of Calvin, Theodore Beza.73  Thus, Arminius’s education took place at several 
respected European institutions of the sixteenth century. By all accounts he was very 
successful in his studies and gained the recognition of his teachers and fellow students. 
The long years of studies under well-known professors trained Arminius ably in topics 
ranging from “dialectic, rhetoric, mathematics, and physics”74 to classical languages, 
biblical studies, exegesis, theology, philosophy, and the church fathers.75 He 
distinguished himself by his keen power of logical analysis and clarity of biblical 
exposition. As a result of both his diligence in study and natural intellectual power, 
Arminius concluded his studies fully prepared for a life of pastoral ministry and teaching.  
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Bangs came to speculate that Arminius’s association with the merchants’ guild 
resulted not only in financial support for his studies, but later also provided him with a 
good marriage to Lijsbet, the daughter of the influential merchandizer Laurens Jacobsz 
Real.76 They eventually had a family of twelve children, of whom only nine reached 
adulthood.77  
One could ask, how did Arminius obtain the patronage of such powerful and 
wealthy people? A probable answer is that Arminius was born into a middle-class family 
with connections within the social strata of the merchants. In other words, Arminius was 
not a member of a noble family, but neither was he one of the poor peasants of the land. 
By the end of the sixteenth century in the Netherlands, merchants had positioned 
themselves as a dominant commercial power, a significant political influence, and a 
prominent economic force. They had the financial means to help their protégés to 
navigate without financial need education or any other enterprise.78 Certainly, Arminius’s 
loss early in life had the potential to jeopardize his future and education; however, 
patrons rescued him by contributing to the necessities of life and school.79 Throughout his 
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century to the end of the seventeenth, Arminius’s lifetime. See Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch 
Primacy in World Trade 1585–1740 (New York: Oxford, 2002), 12–79. 
79 Brant states that Arminius’s mother enjoyed a network of friends that helped 
her to raise her children to the point that they did not suffer shortages or needs. See Brant, 
The Life of Arminius, 13. 
 57 
life until he was able to take care of himself, his patrons supplied him with a wide array 
of social, financial, and political resources.80  
Student Life: Theological Influences 
Carl Bangs has traced the theological influences on Arminius’s religious studies. 
Because little can be said with certainty about Arminius’s studies at the St. Jerome 
School and in Marburg, I focus here on his years at Leiden, Geneva, and Basel. During 
the Dirck Volckertz Coornhert crisis, Arminius was a student at Leiden, where a mix of 
moderate Calvinist theologians like Johann Kolmann and Guilhelmus Feugueres and 
strict Calvinist like Lambertus Danaeus were teaching and ministering.81 Feugueres did 
not support the Reformed overemphasis on the doctrine of predestination and God’s 
sovereignty, at least not in Beza’s terms.82 In addition, historical evidence seems to 
suggest that Beza’s supralapsarian view of salvation did not find great support either in 
Holland or in other Low Countries.83 For instance, important Dutch ministers like Albert 
Hardenberg, Clemente Martenson, and John Isbrandtson publicly resisted the 
introduction of the theology of Geneva in Holland.84 Bangs says that “from the very 
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beginning of the introduction of Reformed religion in the Low Countries . . . the milder 
views of the Swiss cantons were in evidence.”85 This does not necessarily mean that they 
were radically anti-Calvinist. Arminius was evidently in contact with their ideas and their 
kind of moderate Calvinism and was most probably influenced by them while he was 
maturing his own theological thinking. 
In Geneva, Theodore of Beza surely exercised theological influence on 
Arminius.86 Beza was very directive and intentional in selecting both the professors and 
the theological and biblical contents of the curricula at the Academy.87 For instance, by 
the time Arminius arrived at the Academy, many of Beza’s doctrinal and polemical 
works like Tabula praedestinationis of 1555 and Tractiones theologicae of 1570–1582 
had already been published and were critical sources of reading and study by all students 
under his supervision. Indeed, in these writings he systematically defended his view of 
unconditional and absolute predestination and that view later “became the normative 
view for late-sixteenth-century Calvinists.”88 For it to attain a normative role in the 
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Reformed tradition would have been unlikely if it were not for the great influence he had 
on his students who later expanded his ideas. Arminius’s reaction and response to Beza’s 
doctrine of predestination demonstrates his profound familiarity with the ideas of his 
former teacher.  
Theological Writings 
Scholars, however, have given more detailed attention to the influence of the 
theologians that Arminius actually had at hand in his library and those whom he 
specifically quoted in his writings. While Muller seems to me to overemphasize the 
influence on Arminius of Catholic scholars like Aquinas and Molina,89 Stanglin and 
McCall point to a wider spectrum in Arminius’s theological influences.90 The theological 
works of church fathers like Augustine and Jerome, medieval scholars like Peter 
Lombard and Aquinas, and predecessor Reformers like Melanchthon and Calvin were 
available to Arminius while he was preparing his lectures and writings. I found that 
Arminius used their ideas and in some cases their conclusions, but that he did so only 
after establishing considerable support for those ideas and conclusions in Scripture. For 
instance, Arminius’s view on election as the result of God’s foreknowledge of human 
acceptance of grace is akin to Augustine’s early view on the topic. At the same time, 
                                                
89 Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, 31–39; Muller, “Arminius and the 
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Arminius strongly rebuked his sources for affirming concepts “which are not found in the 
Scriptures, and which demand prolix explanation, lest they be drawn into an occasion of 
blasphemy and heresy.”91 
Yet, what does the eclecticism of Arminius’s sources indicate? Was Arminius a 
Molinist, scholastic, humanist, Thomist, Melanchthonian, or Calvinist? Yes and no. It 
seems to me that Arminius as a great theologian was constructing his system of theology 
solidly on his reading of the Bible and at the same time drawing support from different 
theological sources. In this he was not radically different from his contemporaries and his 
teachers. For instance, his interest in Aquinas seems to be similar to the interest of his 
former teacher Beza. Instead of looking for Thomistic conclusions, their interest is in 
Aquinas’s method and structures for the formulation of theology.92 For that reason, 
reducing Arminius to the conclusions and even methodologies of a specific tradition or 
theologian seems to me to be a misrepresentation of the true nature of his theology. To 
my mind, he was more a theological erudite than a humanist, more of a Biblicist than a 
Molinist.93  
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Professional Life: Pastor and Professor  
Arminius dedicated most of his twenty-one years of professional life to pastoral 
ministry. This means that before all else he was a pastor. He began to preach at the 
Church of Amsterdam on February 7, 1588 and finished his pastorate on April 15, 
1603.94 Obviously, common pastoral duties like presiding at baptisms, marriages, 
funerals, and making pastoral visits remained day-to-day activities of his life. But he was 
also frequently commissioned to take on special duties like representing the Church at 
national events, exercising leadership in national synods, improving the Church order, 
calling new pastors, and overseeing financial and administrative matters.95 This 
demonstrates that Arminius was an able pastor, and during years of faithful clerical work, 
gained the admiration and support of his congregation and leaders. However, his role as 
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95 Bangs, Arminius, 155. 
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preacher and apologist, as well as a compassionate pastoral caregiver particularly marked 
his ministry.  
He was a gifted and popular preacher. Preaching was so central to his ministry 
that even when he became a professor at Leiden, Arminius continued to preach in Leiden 
churches.96 In his sermons, he gave distinctive attention and preeminence to the 
exposition of Scripture over dogmatic teachings. He felt called to “publish, preach, 
interpret and expound” the Word of God as well as to carefully “distinguish and 
discriminate it from [other] words or writings” even those of “the Church Universal.”97 If 
Arminius’s extant writings are any indication, the preaching of God’s grace, mercy, and 
love for sinners as presented in the Gospel likely were central to most of his sermons and 
writing. Yet he also attended to the law as a way to stir up the consciences of his listeners 
regarding their sinful condition and their need to repent and submit to God’s grace. From 
the beginning of his ministry, says Bangs, in his sermons Arminius was “dealing with 
grace and predestination” as well as divine election and human responsibility.98  
Arminius was genuinely and personally involved in the pastoral care he offered. 
He frequently visited his members to discipline, to encourage faith, and to show 
compassion for the sick. Records of his pastoral work show that, for example, he 
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ministered to a woman who was disavowing her Reformed faith, corrected an adulterer, 
and worked for the reconciliation of two belligerent believers.99  
As a man of sorrow, Arminius’s previous experience of loss enabled him to 
minister with great compassion to those who were suffering. He himself had experienced 
the agonizing loss of his whole family and later carried to their graves in his own arms 
the inanimate bodies of three of his children.100 During an outbreak of bubonic plague in 
Amsterdam, Arminius’s pastoral compassion was exemplary; he took care for the sick, 
most of whom were from the unprivileged and poor population, and imparted assurances 
of salvation to those who were confronting imminent death.101 As in his preaching, 
Arminius believed that in pastoral care the crucial thing was to call humans to “a decisive 
choice for or against the offered salvation” in the Gospel.102  
Confronting heresy during his pastoral career frequently occupied Arminius’s 
attention. Sometimes he was asked to do the job; other times he pushed himself to take it 
on. He was an astute and skillful apologist competent in using Scripture and the extensive 
tradition of Church doctrine, practice, and theology. For instance, he several times 
remonstrated with Goosen Michelsz Volgelsangh—though to no avail—to neutralize 
biblically and theologically his anti-Trinitarian and anthropomorphist views of God. 
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Ironically, it was in relation to his responsibilities to respond to some dissenting teachings 
that he called his own orthodox beliefs into question. According to Bertius, when 
Arminius was appointed to respond to the anti-Supralapsarian teaching of the ministers of 
Delf, Aren Cornelisz and Reynier Donteklok, after careful biblical consideration 
Arminius changed his views on divine election and the role of human will.103 
Consequently, he came to agree with his opponents concluding, according to Bertius, that 
“the decree of God, in respect to Predestination, was, out of men already created and 
fallen, to elect those who would answer, by the true obedience of faith, to the call of 
God.”104 This opinion Arminius avidly sustained and defended throughout the rest of his 
ministry.  
Recent scholarship has disputed Bertius’s account, affirming instead that 
Arminius was already a free will and anti-predestinarian thinker when he was appointed 
as a pastor in Amsterdam. A brief consideration should be given to these contrasting 
claims in this narrative of Arminius’s life. Bangs speculates that Arminius was called to 
confront these ministers because the consistory and the pastors already had some 
suspicions of Arminius’s orthodoxy on the topic of predestination. If that was the case, 
this task would have given him the opportunity to reveal his real sentiments or 
understanding on this issue. He concludes that “there is no clear evidence that Arminius 
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had ever accepted Beza’s doctrine of predestination and its concomitants” and Arminius 
never made a declaration “of having undergone a theological transition.” Bangs goes 
even further to affirm that “Arminius was not in agreement with Beza’s doctrine of 
predestination when he undertook his ministry at Amsterdam; indeed, he probably never 
had agreed with it.”105 W. Stephen Gunter passionately defends Bangs’s conclusions, 
asserting that Arminius’s religious influences in his early years were more Catholic than 
Protestant and that Arminius, before being under the influence of Beza, was in contact 
with Melanchthon’s view on predestination in Marburg.106 In a more careful and cautious 
tone, Stanglin and McCall assert that “it is just as likely that Arminius, as an heir of the 
early Dutch Reformation, always held a sort of conditional predestination.”107  
I think that significant evidence likely points to the accuracy of Bertius’s account 
of the history. I do not find logical and/or practical the reasons for Bertius’s need to 
fabricate this account of Arminius’s doctrinal development. It seems more probable than 
not that Arminius was deeply influenced by and even accepted a sort of unconditional 
view of predestination. First, because while we know little about Arminius’s early years 
of education and his theological views on those days, his preparation for pastoral ministry 
occurred in the stronghold of the Reformed predestinarian view under the strict 
supervision of Beza. Indeed, Beza never complained of Arminius holding any 
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unorthodox view on predestination. Furthermore, it is well known that Beza gave 
Arminius his support for pastoral ministry, and Beza was not known to recommend and 
endorse his students casually. We also do not have any idea of Arminius’s theology until 
his initial writings appeared around 1590.108 For these reasons, in his recent popular 
treatment of Arminius, Rustin E. Brian states that “Arminius certainly learned Beza’s 
theology while in Geneva. There is evidence of other students who strongly objected to 
Beza’s thinking, but it cannot be proved that Arminius was in that camp during his early 
days as a student at Geneva.”109 
Second, Arminius as a candidate for the pastoral office in Amsterdam was closely 
examined by the ministers, all of whom where Calvinist. Obviously, such a doctrinal 
examination would have included his views on predestination. If he was not in agreement 
with the Reformed doctrine of predestination, how would he have passed the exam?  
Third, Franciscus Gomarus strongly opposed Arminius’s appointment to the 
professorship at Leiden. However, after examining Arminius, Gomarus came to the 
conclusion that Arminius’s views at the time were Reformed and that the two men would 
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be able to work together.110 It seems that at the time, for Gomarus, it was sufficient that 
Arminius disavowed the views of Prosper Desidaeus [a pseudonym used by Faustus 
Socinius] and Pelagius. Gomarus affirmed that “he felt himself satisfied, and that his 
interpretation [Arminius’s interpretation of Romans 7,] such as it was, might be 
tolerated.”111 
Fourth, Gunter quotes a letter of Arminius dated February 7, 1597, in which 
Arminius confessed that for “no less than seven years he had been ‘highly doubtful’ 
(anxie dubito, lit: anxiously doubtful) about Beza’s predestination.”112 Yet Gunter is 
somehow inconsistent, for later in his account he affirms that Arminius struggled with 
Beza’s predestination “since at least 1590.”113 The letter seems to favor Bertius’s account 
rather than Bangs’s and Gunter’s for the following reasons: First, the time frame 
coincides with Bertius’s report of the year, 1590, in which Arminius came to a different 
conclusion. Second, “to be doubtful” or “struggling” does not necessarily mean that 
Arminius had a conditional view of predestination. It could likely signify that although at 
the time he shared Beza’s view on predestination, he had critical questions about the 
doctrine of unconditional election. Moreover, if the reading of the ministers “settled 
nothing,” as Clarke concludes, it evidently challenged his assumed presuppositions on 
predestination, because Arminius expressed his confusion about the matter and later 
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studied to ascertain the truth.114 In sum, it is possible that Bertius is wrong about 
Arminius’s changing his view immediately after reading and studying the mentioned 
pamphlet. However, he is right in connecting Arminius’s questioning of his position on 
predestination with his reading of that pamphlet. In any case, by the time he wrote to 
Uytenbogaert, Arminius was fully defending a conditional view of election and 
predestination.  
Finally, historians of the Reformation in Netherlands believe that if Arminius was 
not actually influenced by Coornherts and other “libertarians,” they surely shared 
“interest and cooperation” in critical areas of doctrine after 1590. They infer this from the 
interesting history of Arminius supporting Theodor Herberts’s Gouda Catechism.115 In 
summary, from my point of view the real question is: Why did Arminius agree to write 
refutations against a view that he already held and in that manner jeopardize his pastoral 
position and put himself at odds with the leadership of the Reformed Church? A probable 
answer is that Arminius, if not at the time a Supralapsarian, was at least a moderate 
Calvinist. Clarke puts it like this: “if asked for his opinion, he would probably have 
answered in the words of his church’s confessional standards, the Belgic Confession and 
the Heidelberg Catechism. In this sense he might loosely have been described as a 
‘Calvinist.’”116 His history after the fact demonstrates that he openly and honestly 
expressed and defended his points of views without fear. If this is not the case, then 
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Arminius actually had a deceptive character that successfully fooled everyone for a 
significant period of time. 
While I consider Bertius’s account a more plausible explanation of Arminius’s 
theological development, once Arminius became doubtful about the Reformed view of 
predestination, he surely had a rich background from his early studies and theological 
influences, on the basis of which he could relate to a more conditional view of election. 
As Bangs argues, Arminius in his early formative years became acquainted with the 
works of St. John Chrysostom, Basil the Great, Athanasius, Melanchthon, and 
Erasmus.117 As a result, Arminius was under the influence of theological writers who 
shared a positive view of the role of human freedom of will in salvation while 
maintaining the anticipation and centrality of God’s grace. One could speculate, as Bangs 
and other argue, that these early studies had an important influence on Arminius’s 
theological thinking and helped him to transition more easily from his Reformed position 
on election to a positive view of God’s prevenient grace and the consequent role of 
human freed will.  
Arminius completed the rest of his professional life teaching theology and Sacred 
Scripture at the University of Leiden. He joined the faculty of theology of Leiden early in 
June of 1603 after great controversy, manifest opposition, and detailed examination.118 
Although some of his detractors tried to stop students from listening to Arminius,119 he 
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rapidly gained the respect and admiration of most of his students.120 Arminius 
intentionally directed his students to focus on the Holy Scripture as the main and most 
reliable source for constructing theology. He also encouraged them to construct biblical 
doctrines that were valuable and practical for the Christian life rather than focus on the 
speculative aspects and conclusions of Christian theology. Yet this obviously does not 
mean that he encouraged them to ignore other theological sources from the tradition of 
the Church, like the Church Fathers and reformers like Calvin.121  
In summary, while during his professorship Arminius was constantly surrounded 
by controversy and false accusations that even involved students, he was a successful 
professor who dedicated the last years of his life to preparing pastors for the Reformed 
church in Europe.  
The Final Days: Controversies and Death  
The final years of Arminius’s life were full of suffering, illness, and 
controversies. He continually needed to appear at conferences to confront accusations 
that he was teaching heresies, mistreating students, and advising the reading of Catholic 
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philosophers and scholars.122 It is precisely during these final years that he wrote his 
Declaration of Sentiments in which he rejected in a clear, precise, logical, and succinct 
way the doctrine of particular redemption or predestination in all its theological 
manifestations.123 It is interesting to note Arminius’s theological maturity in his appeals 
to historical, theological, biblical, and practical arguments to defend his views. For 
instance, in order to highlight the inaccuracies of predestination, Arminius focuses on 
anthropological reasons that demonstrate that the constitution of humans as those created 
in God’s image is capable of knowledge, holiness, freedom of will, and enjoyment of 
eternal life.124 He finally declared his beliefs in front of the magistrates and people of the 
States of Holland sometime shortly after October 20, 1608. In the midst of such 
controversies, stressful events, and bitter opposition he fell ill of tuberculosis, whose 
initial symptoms he had experienced as early as 1604. 
Arminius breathed his last on October 19, 1609. He finally encountered rest from 
a life “satiated with toils and afflictions.”125 It seems appropriate to close this summary of 
Arminius’s life by quoting Bertius’s eulogy: “There lived a man, whom it was not 
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possible, for those who knew him, sufficiently to esteem; those who entertained no 
esteem for him are such as never knew him well enough to appreciate his merits.”126 
Images and Self-Image of Arminius 
Arminius’s life, person, character, and ideas have spawned positive as well as 
negative evaluations. This section does not discuss the great range of scholarly 
misrepresentation of Arminius’s theology; rather, it attempts to portray the kind of man 
that people have perceived Arminius to have been as well as the kind of images that 
Arminius had of himself.127  
On the one hand, there are those who evidently demonstrate a great sympathy and 
appreciation for Arminius’s person and work. Before the controversy erupted, from his 
student years on, his professors had favorable opinions of him. For instance, Theodore of 
Beza noted that Arminius enjoyed “an apt intellect” able not only to understand but most 
importantly to discriminate among ideas.128 It is important to note that Beza especially 
highlighted Arminius’s personal virtues of piety and diligence.129 Similarly, John James 
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Grynaeus, professor of sacred literature at Basel, says that Arminius had the “gift of a 
discerning spirit” manifested in theological and biblical discussions and expositions.130 
Grynaeus also commended him for living “a life of piety and temperance.”131  
After the controversy, his sons and daughters, contemporaries and colleagues, and 
even some adversaries described the Christian and personal character of Jacobus 
Arminius as irreproachable, mild in spirit, pious, judicious, honest, and candid.132 Like 
some of his professors, many other persons also regarded Arminius as intellectually 
brilliant and profoundly learned. For instance, Mattias Martinius (1572–1630),133 
professor of Bremen and delegate at the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), testifies that 
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Arminius appeared to him “a man who truly feared God, of the deepest erudition, 
uncommonly well versed in theological controversies, and powerful in the Scriptures.”134  
It is important always to pay attention to the opinion of family members to truly 
understand a person. Although in some cases such opinions obviously could be biased, 
they express in some measure the values and images transmitted by a father or mother to 
their children. Arminius’s children evidently held their father in great esteem. They 
viewed their father as a man committed “to the practice of a Christian life, and thus that 
piety and the fear of the divine Majesty uniformly breathed”135 in all his personal, 
academic, and pastoral works. It seems to me particularly remarkable that his children 
specifically emphasized the Christian character of their father over any other personal or 
intellectual characteristics.  
A more personal and sympathetic view comes from Hugo Grotius’s 
commemorative poem Elegy on Arminius. Grotius depicts Arminius as a “scrutator altae 
veritatis” (‘searcher of the profound truth’) gifted with a “sublime pectus, anima feta 
doctrinae” (‘distinguished heart, soul full of doctrine’) that contrasts with the 
“semicaecae . . . turbae” ([ignorant multitude] or ‘half-blind crowds of people’) of his 
time.136 Moniek van Oosterhout believes that Grotius wrote the poem “out of sympathy 
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for Arminius and his ideas.”137 She also notes that the poem depicts Arminius “as a 
sympathetic man who strove for a sympathetic ideal in an indefatigable manner.”138 
Similarly to Grotius, Joseph Justus Scaliger, one of Arminius’s colleagues at Leiden and 
a respected scholar, opined that “Arminius est vir maximus” (Arminius is the greatest 
man).139 Although it is not possible to know whether Scaliger was referring here to 
Arminius’s character or to his intellectual virtues, obviously he did not consider Arminius 
a mediocre scholar or characterless person. It is possible that Scaliger viewed Arminius 
as “a seeker, a doubter”140 completely imbued in the spirit of ecclesia reformata, semper 
reformanda. Most recently, orthodox Calvinist theologian Charles Hodge described 
Arminius as a “man of learning, talents, attractive accomplishments, and exemplary 
character” and even tried to distance Arminius from the most liberal opinions of his 
successors.141  
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On the other hand, however, we find hostile opinions regarding Arminius’s 
character, theology, and life. I will summarize them using three principal images of 
Arminius. First, Petrus Plancius (d. 1622) regarded Arminius as a Pelagian heretic.142 In 
the same vein, years later, James Murdock called Arminius the father of a heretical sect 
and a teacher and fabricator of novel theology.143 Murdock thus perceived Arminius as an 
insensitive scholar only interested in promoting his own theological agenda. Accusations 
of heresy in the sixteenth century were not only dangerous; heretics were rhetorically and 
personally construed as servants of errors, as possessed by the devil, as destroyers of the 
social order, and as “wicked hypocrites within the flock of the good.”144 This attitude 
reflected not only the approach of Roman Catholic inquisitors toward heretics, but also 
the way in which some Protestant leaders reacted against opponents. According to 
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Mirjam van Veen, to depict heretics as under the influence or possession of evil spirits 
was an integral part of the medieval narrative of heresies and was effectively used to 
antagonize opponents during the sixteenth century.145 Therefore, identifying Arminius as 
a heretic was an effective way to diminish the influence of his person and of his 
theological conclusions. 
Second, another repeated image of Arminius is that of a traitor of the Reformed 
cause who secretly served the interests of Rome.146 His opponents used Arminius’s 
journey to Rome before returning to his pastoral responsibilities to accuse him of secretly 
holding sympathies for Roman Catholic theology.147 For instance Gomarus, while using 
the same Catholic scholastic sources, unfairly identified Arminius’s theology with the 
Catholic teachings of Biel and Molina, among other Catholic scholars.148  
Third, perhaps Arminius’s delay in clearly and publicly expressing his opinions 
led Gomarus to picture him as a cunning deceiver who in public maintained an opinion 
while secretly teaching perilous heresies. I. Schöffer concludes that for Gomarus, 
“Arminius was a cowardly twister.”149 However, in his Declaration of Sentiments 
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Arminius makes clear that his delay in responding about his beliefs was not an attempt to 
deceive about the real content and intentions of his teachings and opinions on 
predestination. Rather, he was trying to maintain the ecclesiastical and governmental 
order, protect his reputation from evidently biased requests, avoid unfair process, and 
avert disruption in the churches and universities by those improperly presenting his 
ideas.150  
Nevertheless, the notion that Arminius was a blatant liar or at least an 
unintentional deceiver has continued to be disseminated, sometimes consciously and in 
other instances unconsciously. Some have noted, for instance, the uncompleted picture 
that Bradley and Muller present about Arminius’s use of catholic sources. Bradley and 
Muller say that historians “must recognize that documents can and sometime will 
intentionally or unintentionally stand in the way of clear understanding of their author’s 
mind.” They regard Arminius as a classic example of such a conclusion, saying that 
Arminius’s statement that he never recommended Catholic writers to his students 
“mask[s] his significant appreciation and use of the writings of Tomas Aquinas, Francis 
Suárez, and Louis Molina—all scholastics, and the latter two, Jesuits,” In this case, they 
transmit the wrong perception that Arminius was trying to hide his personal interest and 
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reading of these authors. These kinds of assumptions effectively perpetuate the image of 
Arminius as a deceiver.151  
In reality, Arminius in a letter to Ubbo Emminus denied “having recommended 
reading Bellarminus [Cardinal Robert Bellarmine] or any Roman Catholic author to my 
students.”152 However, this was not an attempt to “mask” his own personal reading of 
such writers. He was just making clear that if his students were reading Catholic scholars, 
it was not under his direction or by his recommendation. This seems a more truthful 
explanation, because when necessary he openly quoted Bellarmine, Aquinas, and other 
Jesuits in his own writings. Sometimes, he agreed with their conclusions, at other times 
he fiercely opposed their teachings. In the same letter to Emminus he affirms: “Thomas, 
Scotus and the entire flock of scholastics, however they may excel philosophically, are 
blinder than bats in their exegesis of Scriptures, as I have frequently demonstrated, 
shedding light on their ignorance to deprive them of any authority.”153 This demonstrates 
                                                
151 Bradley and Muller, Church History, 36–37, 50; see also Muller, “Arminius 
and the Scholastic Tradition,” 266. In any case, Arminius was not the only professor in 
Leiden who appreciated and even recommended medieval Catholic scholars to their 
students. Narrating the first one hundred years of Leiden University, Elfriede Hulshoff 
Pol concludes that “Gomarus accuses Arminius of introducing Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, 
and Bellarminus into Leiden, to which Bertius was able to reply that they had been 
favored at Leiden long before Arminius’ arrival. Although no one can have known better 
than Bertius that the works in question were available in the Library, it is noticeable that 
he does not say so outright but in the less exact terms ‘were in vogue,’ adding that 
Franciscus Junius had also recommended them to the young students,” Elfriede Hulshoff 
Pol, The First Century of Leiden University Library (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 
1975), 436. 
152 Arminius, “Letter to the Groningen rector Ubbo Emminus, dated 18 May 
1608” quoted in Eric H. Cossee, “Arminius and Rome,” 81. 
153 Quoted in Cossee, “Arminius and Rome,” 81. 
 80 
that while he shows appreciation for the philosophical work of the scholastics, at the 
same time he was completely unenthusiastic regarding their exegetical and theological 
methods and conclusions.  
Unfortunately, these images of  him as a heretic, traitor, and deceiver especially 
vilify Arminius’s integrity and Christian character. However, not all that his opponents 
had to say about him were insults. Interestingly, Arminius’s antagonists never questioned 
his intellectual and Christian aptitudes, for example his “ingenuity, acuteness, and 
piety.”154 
Although recent interpreters of Arminius have not paid close attention to 
Arminius’s image as a person, and have instead tended to emphasize his intellectual 
capacities and theological work, it could be said that a more balanced image of him is 
now prevalent thanks to recent studies of Arminius’s life and work. F. Stuart Clark views 
Arminius not as a combative scholar, but as a reluctant theologian with a modest opinion 
of his own ideas, as one open to suspending judgment about controversial aspects of 
theology, and willing to change his points of view when evidence demanded it.155 
Stanglin and McCall say that he was a man who always fearlessly defended his opinion 
but that he did so with “political circumspection.”156 However, they argue that he was 
neither a saint nor a malicious heretic. Similarly James D. Douglas affirms, “a mild-
tempered man, Arminius nonetheless spoke his mind in controversy” and passionately 
                                                
154 Murdock, Mosheim’s Institutes, 838. 
155 Clarke, The Ground of Election,12. 
156 Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 19. 
 81 
defended his views.157 In sum, the new image of Arminius portrays him as an irenic 
thinker, but one who did not hide from controversy and even to some extent sought it out.  
The foregoing is how Arminius’s professors, friends, opponents, and interpreters 
perceived him. How did Arminius view himself? I do not pretend here to develop a 
complete self-image of Arminius, but I do intend to highlight some aspects of how 
Arminius viewed himself as person, Christian, and theologian.  
Primarily, Arminius viewed himself as a Christian, specifically a faithful 
Reformed Christian. Traces of his own image of Christian character can be found 
throughout his writings. On the one hand, Arminius expressed a teachable and docile 
spirit, open to being corrected by the Scriptures and by reason. He promised always to 
conduct himself “with equanimity, moderation, and docility” in the spirit of one “being 
taught.”158 In a letter to Drusius, one of his teachers at Leiden, he stated great 
appreciation for those who were open to changing their opinions when sufficient 
arguments had been presented.159 In this context he was said to be a friendly person who 
longed to have “amicable and fraternal conferences” with all divines about any biblical 
and theological issues.160 On the other hand, although he showed openness to maintaining 
friendly relationships and to changing his opinions, he made it clear that he had strong 
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ideas and opinions, which he was not ready to give up easily without a compelling 
reason. This is obvious in the frequent use of expressions like “I am of the opinion,” “I 
am still of the same opinion,” “I am enabled to affirm,” “I am prepared to maintain this 
very thing,” and so forth. All this illuminates Arminius’s self-image of his character and 
personality. It is also interesting to note his descriptions of a good minister of God. He 
shows great appreciation for qualities of character like “prudence, moderation of mind, 
and patient  endurance of labors, infirmities, [and] injuries.”161 To the modern reader, the 
description might only be a construction of the ideal minister, but it seems to me that 
Arminius was evidently describing his own ministry and character. This seems obvious 
from his frequent call for prudence when considering biblical and theological evidence.  
As a theologian and pastor, Arminius viewed himself as a faithful exponent of the 
Holy Scriptures. He also believed that he was a loyal minister of the Reformed Church 
and its declarations of faith, the Heidelberg Catechism and the Belgic Confession. He 
wrote to Hippolitus A. Collibus that “I have never taught anything, either in the church or 
in the university, which contravenes the sacred writings that ought to be with us the sole 
rule of thinking and speaking [Holy Scriptures], or which is opposed to the Belgic 
Confession or to the Heidelberg Catechism.”162 Interestingly, he used the confession and 
the catechism as sources not only in agreement with his own point of view, but also as 
opposing the predestinarian views of his opponents. Some have seen this reality as a 
bigger inconsistency of Arminius because he himself called for a revision of the Church’s 
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doctrinal standards. However, an analysis of his arguments in favor of the revision 
demonstrates that his call to reform the confession and the catechism was in order to 
achieve, first, precision and clarity and avoid some ambiguities in the text as well as to 
improve the languages with a more biblical tone,163 and second, to call attention to the 
Holy Scriptures as the only norma of doctrine and faith.  
Arminius boldly declared that “no writing composed by men,—by one man, by 
few men, or by many,—(with  the exception of Scripture,) is either αὐτοπιστον, ‘credible 
of itself’ or αξιόπιστον, ‘of itself deserving of implicit credence,’ and, therefore, is not 
exempted from an examination by means of the Scriptures.”164 Indeed, making the 
Scripture the ultimate rule only when it is interpreted by the standards of the human 
confessions embodies the tyrannical attitude of the traditional church. As Henk van den 
Belt puts it: “For Arminius the autopistia of Scripture safeguards the liberty of the 
biblical exegete and theologian from the authority of the human confessions.”165 
Assuming this position Arminius submitted himself, all other interpreters, and the Church 
to the supreme and ultimate authority of Scriptures.  
Arminius’s Theological Method 
It seems necessary to consider Arminius’s theological method before we finish 
the present historical review of his life and work. Arminius maintained a high view of 
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Scripture as the inspired word of God and as the infallible, authoritative, and sufficient 
rule of Christian faith and life. Evidence of this is his statement that the Holy Scriptures 
contain “the rule of our faith, charity, hope, and of the whole of our living. For they are 
given for doctrine, for reproof, for instruction, for correction, and for consolation; that is, 
that they may be the rule of truth and falsehood to our understanding of good and evil to 
our affections, either to do and to omit, or to have and to want.”166 Here Arminius 
expresses his total commitment to the sola scriptura principle of the Reformers. He also 
saw the necessity to read the whole of Scripture, supporting the tota scriptura principle. 
He said that faith could not have existence without regarding the “Scriptures of the Old 
and the New Testament” as divinely inspired and containing “the sum of the Law and the 
Gospel.”167 In the following analysis, we will see that he also maintained the principle of 
prima scriptura, yet giving a place to other sources of truth to have, at least, an ancillary 
role in biblical interpretation.  
So how might we define Arminius’s biblical hermeneutic? I identify Arminius’s 
theological method as a biblical theology that is informed by a careful exegetical 
approach to Scripture and analysis of the theological tradition of the Church. First, 
Arminius would say that biblical teaching should be discovered in the literal reading of 
the Bible, the “signs,” that is, in the words of Scripture, but most precisely in the 
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“[sensus] meaning” of those words.168 The task of interpretation is a critical one to be 
made by experts such as pastors and teachers trained in “languages and divine things.”169 
Similarly, Arminius says that hermeneutics is an approach to the biblical doctrine and 
text that demands an interpreter “who is well skilled in the two sacred languages, has a 
perfect knowledge of all tradition, [and] has perused with the closest attention the 
writings of all the great Doctors of the Church.”170 Throughout his writings, Arminius 
time and again emphasizes the importance of familiarity with the biblical languages when 
analyzing Scripture as well as having an understanding of the history of theological 
constructions.171  
For instance, an analysis of his interpretation of Romans 7 shows the consistency 
with which he applied this method. He divided his study into five parts. The first part is 
an exegetical approach to Romans 7 done almost verse by verse that carefully considers 
the context of the passages, the crucial words and terms, the syntactical connections, and 
even the inter-textual significance of the texts. The second to the fourth parts are a 
thorough presentation of evidence in favor of his exegetical conclusion from the early 
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church fathers, medieval theologians, and contemporary reformers. The final part 
responds to several objections and presents Arminius’s conclusions.  
Second, Arminius also examined several theological or doctrinal topics following 
not so much an exegetical approach to particular texts, but rather a canonical analysis of 
Scriptures. In such instances, he presents some specific propositions and then proceeds to 
prove them, first, by referring to specific passages of Scripture, and second, by arguments 
and reasons deduced from the biblical passages.172 Such topical analysis frequently 
follows the Aristotelian framework of the four causes — the formal, material, efficient, 
and final. It is precisely in this methodology that Arminius shows his use of the scholastic 
method in theological conceptualization. I have found that this theological method is 
common throughout his Orations and Public and Private Disputations. In these cases, 
Arminius exhibits a great ability to present logical and syllogistic arguments in favor of 
his conclusions. Obviously, this second approach should not be completely disassociated 
from the previous one. Frequently, Arminius combined both approaches in his biblical 
and doctrinal conceptualizations. Recently, Jeremy Dupertuis Bangs noted this 
combination of logic, syllogism, and biblical languages in Arminius’s interpretation of 
Scripture. According to Dupertuis Bangs, this is especially present in Arminius’s use of 
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Jacomo Zabarella’s methodology of composition (deductive reasoning) and resolution 
(inductive reasoning).173 Dupertuis Bangs affirms that Zaberalla’s approach gave 
Arminius and other Protestants scholars at the time “a way to test Scripture against 
Scripture in order to determine the right interpretation without dependence on papal 
authority and Catholic tradition.”174 
In conclusion, Arminius’s theological method was scholastic, complex, solid, and 
systematic. Scriptures played a major role in his alternative understanding of divine 
election, grace, and human freedom of will. At the same time, he followed a 
methodological approach analogous to that of his contemporaries in his discovery of the 
biblical truth.175 What was particular to Arminius’s hermeneutics was the Christological 
focus that he used in the reading of Scripture within the features of the scholastic method.  
Summary and Conclusion 
Arminius’s life and work is a fascinating history of struggles, sufferings, success, 
and controversies at the intersection of his pastoral and academic career. Although he 
experienced atrocious events during his childhood, he succeeded in his intellectual life 
and ministry with the help of influential benefactors. These benefactors provided 
financial and emotional support to the young student, thus enlarging his circle of 
influence and opportunities. For this reason, Arminius enjoyed what was at the time a 
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rare privilege to study at the finest centers of education of his days under well-known 
Protestant scholars. Despite the controversies, Arminius developed a fruitful pastorate in 
Amsterdam, and won the appreciation of his parishioners for his pastoral care and 
preaching. Likewise, all accounts seem to indicate that he was also a great teacher 
capable of transmitting his love for the Holy Scriptures and Christian theology to his 
students. Sadly, he died in the middle of the controversy without witnessing the outcome 
for which he had worked so long: a general council of the Reformed Church in the 
Netherlands to resolve in a frank and Christian manner the dissension regarding the 
doctrine of predestination. In addition it seems to me that what likely pained him most to 
leave unresolved at his death was the accusation of heresy made against him. 
His historical context was a turbulent and volatile one. Political, religious, and 
social struggles marked his pastoral and theological work. However, Arminius was able 
to navigate the turbulent waters. He built political connections with powerful individuals 
in the government like Oldenbarnevelt. This raises the question: How much did his 
political connections help Arminius to avoid the formal condemnation of the Reformed 
Church in the Netherlands? Even if it was not crucial, it was surely helpful. He also 
managed to profit theologically and doctrinally from the different religious groups of his 
age. At the same time, he remained critical of many of the Papal teachings and some of 
the Anabaptist ideas. However, the differences between his own theology and religious 
tradition were not for Arminius a reason to persecute and condemn the religious 
sentiments of other individuals. He consistently advocated for some kind of religious 
tolerance and acceptance of others’ views. 
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Arminius’s character developed under the supervision of pious professors and 
friends. His humility, kindness, integrity, piety, and gentleness helped him to confront 
controversies and sometimes dishonest accusations with a Christian spirit and peaceful 
manner. When his adversaries lacked real arguments and devolved into making virulent 
ad hominem attacks against him, he did not respond in the same way but remained 
focused on the biblical, theological, and logical reasons that supported his opinions. This 
does not mean that he was a perfect human being. On some occasions he delayed 
responding clearly about his theological positions, and for that reason some of his 
contemporaries believed that he was a deceitful hypocrite. However, it seems more 
probable that he told the truth while explaining his reasons as an attempt to avoid 
controversies. Surely he did not desire to divide the Reformed church. Indeed, he always 
spoke as a faithful pastor and theologian of the Reformed confession.  
Through his theological contributions Arminius desired to promote a faithful 
reading of Scripture, a biblical defense of God’s character of love and goodness, and a 
way for all human beings to open their hearts to the divine work of salvation. Though he 
read the Bible for its plain meaning, at the same time he also promoted a hermeneutic that 
carefully considered the sensus of the biblical words. Besides that, he always welcomed 
the theological contributions of scholars from different times and traditions. However, he 
cautiously compared the conclusions of those theologians with the biblical claims. For 
instance, this approach allowed him to accept some of Augustine’s conclusions, but at the 
same time to critique unwarranted assertions of the famous church father. His anti-
predestination sentiments were not those of an isolated thinker. He was an integral part of 
a wider context of free will thinkers and opponents of Calvin and Beza’s 
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conceptualization of double predestination. Certainly, he did not radically reject 
predestination and divine election, but he constructed a view that was consonant with the 
tradition of early thinkers and his own understanding of the Holy Scriptures.  
Historical studies about Arminius have received renewed impulse and success in 
recent years. As Stanglin says, there remains however the necessity to translate the 
historical research into theological and doctrinal conceptualizations in conversation with 
the historical Arminius and his writings.176 This is key because Arminius’s theological 
and biblical influence extended beyond Wesley and the Methodists to “many Christians 
today.”177 For instance, many in my own Seventh-day Adventist tradition are somehow 
unaware of Arminius’s influence on our theology. Yet one key church source affirms 
that: “While Seventh-day Adventists do not formally identify themselves as Arminians, 
the general Arminian point of view has come to characterize their doctrine.”178 It is 
precisely from a stance of systematic and doctrinal conversation that this dissertation tries 
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to make a contribution by providing a study of Arminius’s doctrine of prevenient grace in 
discussion with Arminius’s person and writings.
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE  
OF PREVENIENT GRACE 
Introduction  
In modern theological thought, the doctrine of prevenient grace is typically 
identified with the doctrinal views of Jacobus Arminius. Certainly, Arminius used the 
concept of prevenient grace extensively for his soteriological conceptualizations, yet he 
was neither the creator nor the unique promoter of prevenient grace. Rather, this 
theological concept has a history in the development of Christian doctrine since 
Augustine used it in his controversy with Pelagius in the fifth century. The principal aim 
of this section is to trace the history of the doctrine of prevenient grace from Augustine to 
Arminius’s own time. It will give a brief overview of the development of the concept of 
prevenient grace before Arminius. 
First, the study explores the doctrine of prevenient grace in Augustine within the 
Pelagian controversy. Second, it attends to the principal conceptualizations of that grace 
during the time of the medieval church. Then, it focuses on the Protestant Reformers, 
especially Philip Melanchthon and the Anabaptist preachers. The similarities and 
differences as well as the significance of the concept of prevenient grace will be shown 
for the theology of  each group. This section does not primarily claim that Arminius was 
directly influenced by all these previous conceptualizations. Yet it provides some of the 
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sources that likely influenced Arminius in his own theological understanding of 
prevenient grace. 
The Beginning of the Christian Concept  
of Prevenient Grace  
In Augustine of Hippo the theological conceptualization of prevenient grace 
found its primary interpreter. For this reason, any consideration of the beginning point of 
the development of prevenient grace has to consider Augustine. Therefore, in this section 
I pay attention to the contributions of Augustine to the doctrine of prevenient grace, 
especially in his anti-Pelagian writings.  
Saint Augustine of Hippo 
Augustine was born in Thagaste, North Africa in 354 A.D. A combination of an 
acute power of reasoning, uncommon intellectual capacity, excellent academic 
preparation, and mystical conversion to Christianity gave Augustine the necessary skills 
to become a theological genius. As a church apologist he antagonized Arians, 
Manicheans, Donatists, and Pelagians during his long career as a bishop.1 This study 
examines his concepts of salvation, which were mostly constructed in the stormy 
                                                
1 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (New York: Dorset, 1986), 35–
45; 340–375; Eugene TeSelle, Augustine (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2006), 1; Mary T. 
Clark, Augustine (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), 1–12; William A. Sumruld, 
Augustine and the Arians: The Bishop of Hippo’s Encounters with Ulfilan Arianism 
(Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1994), 62–84; Louis Sébastien, The Life of 
Augustine: Childhood to Episcopal Consecration 354–396, trans. Frederick Van Fleteren 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 210–216; Warren T. Smith, Augustine: His Life and 
Thought (Atlanta, GA: Knox, 1980), 55–59, 123–139. 
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controversy with Pelagius, paying special attention to the doctrine of prevenient grace. 
Augustine was the first significant Christian articulator of this doctrine.  
For Augustine, the doctrine of prevenient grace plays an essential role in 
preserving what he regarded as a critical concept of Christianity: the idea of God’s 
initiative in the salvation of humanity. This doctrine arose in consideration of the role of 
human will in relation to God’s grace in the work of salvation before and within the 
Pelagian controversy.2 This connection makes it important to consider the teaching of 
Pelagius concerning freedom of will and grace before discussing Augustine’s 
conceptualization of the doctrine of prevenient grace.  
According to Pelagius, a strongly moralist British monk, human beings enjoy a 
natural freedom of will. Freedom of will, for Pelagius, is an original endowment in 
human nature, a gift of God’s grace at creation.3 Consequently, humans have the natural 
ability to accomplish the divine will expressed in the commandments by their own choice 
and power. In this manner, Pelagius assumed the negation of the doctrine of original sin 
as well as the doctrine of total depravity.4 In his commentary on Romans, Pelagius 
                                                
2 J. Patout Burns, “Prevenient Grace” in Encyclopedia of Early Christianity ed. 
Everett Ferguson (New York: Garland, 1990), 753–754; Dennis R. Creswell, St. 
Augustine’s Dilemma: Grace and Eternal Law in the Major Works of Augustine of Hippo 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 71–76. 
3 Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory the 
Great (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 448–449; Robert E. Evans, Pelagius: 
Inquiries and Reappraisals (New York: Seabury, 1968), 92–95; Juan B. Valero, Las 
bases antropológicas de Pelagio en su tratado de las Expositiones (Mardrid, España: 
Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontifica Comillas, 1980), 183–198; 311–325. 
4 Theodore de Bruyn, “Introduction,” in Pelagius’s Commentary on St Paul’s 
Epistle to the Romans, trans. Theodore de Bruyn (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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insisted that “Adam killed only himself.”5 In this manner, he discredited the concept of 
original sin affirming that human sin is not the result of an inherited polluted nature from 
Adam, but the result of human imitation of Adam’s offense.6 Likewise, he questioned a 
supposed depravity in humans insisting that they “are whole . . . not affected with an 
inescapable controlling sinful nature to which they are powerless because of Adam’s 
sin.”7  
Though weakened by the constant practice of sin, human will is completely 
capable of accepting, rejecting, and performing both evil and good. In other words, the 
power of will is a natural, inalienable, and gratuitous gift of God, but to will and fulfill 
spiritual and moral good remains the role of individuals.8 Pelagius stated: “we must 
                                                
1993), 23. Bruyn says that Pelagius rejected the concept of the transmission of guilt as 
well as the concept of the transmission of a natural inclination to sin. Sin is transmitted 
only by example. Adam provided that sinful example. For a discussion on Pelagius’s 
view on original sin see also B. R. Rees, Pelagius: A Reluctan Heretic (Wolfeboro, NH: 
Boydell, 1988), 56, 76. 
5 Pelagius, Pelagius’s Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, trans. 
Theodore de Bruyn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 94. 
6 John Ferguson, Pelagius (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and Sons, 1956), 54. 
7 Pelagius, On Nature, trans. and recons. Daniel R. Jennings, Patristic in English, 
accessed March 21, 2017, http://www.seanmultimedia.com/Pie_Pelagius 
_On_Nature.html. §19. 
8 Pelagius, Defense of the Freedom of the Will, trans. and recons. Daniel R. 
Jennings, Patristic in English, accessed March 21, 2017, http://www.seanmulti 
media.com/Pie_Pelagius _Defense_ Of_ The_Freedom_ of_The_Will.html. §72–74. 
Pelagius defended his view by separating “ability,” “volition,” and “actuality” in the 
human actions. The ability is the natural power of will implanted in humanity by God at 
creation, the volition and the actuality belong naturally to individuals. The first is a gift of 
God’s grace, the latter are the exercise of human own nature and power. God’s grace 
should be recognized by the “ability” to do good, while humans have only the “actuality” 
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understand that it is of us not to sin, but yet that the ability to avoid sin is not of us [but of 
God] . . . [yet] inasmuch as not to sin is ours, we are able to sin and to avoid sin.”9  
Consequently, for Pelagius, grace as a natural endowment from creation and an 
external help plays a role in overcoming sin, but further grace does not have a salvific 
role in human redemption.10 Humans rightly merit praise or blame according to their free 
decisions and actions. In classical Pelagian soteriology human beings are capable of 
looking to God and choosing the spiritual good without any internal aid or influence.  
For Pelagius, therefore, there is neither room nor need for God’s prevenient grace 
as an internal healing power necessary for regeneration and liberation of human freedom 
of will. However this does not mean that grace is not essential in Pelagius’s soteriology, 
                                                
to do good. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper One, 1978), 
358. 
9 Pelagius, On Nature, §50. Pelagius recognized in every human action three 
elements: “posse,” “velle,” and “esse.” The “posse (power)” is already present in our 
nature as an ability granted by God; the “velle (desire)” is present in our will; finally, the 
“esse (realization)” is the actual realization of the action. Then, humans have the power 
“not to sin” because they have received from God the ability “to avoid sin.” Properly 
using their will they are able reach the realization of the action, that it is “to sin” or “to 
avoid sin.” 
10 It is possible to divide the meanings of grace for Pelagius into two main groups. 
First, grace is preexistent in the human soul as a natural endowment of freedom of will by 
the act of creation. Second, grace is God’s external help to sinners present in the law of 
Moses, the life and teaching of Christ, the forgiveness of sins by Christ’s death and 
merits, and God’s teachings and revelations. In this last meaning of external grace, he is 
most probably referring to the Holy Scriptures as well as the life of Jesus. He says, “we 
do not, as you think, confess the grace of God consisting only in the law, but also in the 
help of God. God helps us through his teaching and revelation, in that he opens the eyes 
of our hearts, in that he makes clear to us the things to come lest we be occupied in things 
of the present, in that he exposes the snares of the devil, in that he enlightens us with the 
manifold and unspeakable gift of heavenly grace,” see On Free Choice, quoted in Evans, 
Pelagius, 110. 
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only that grace always operates externally. For Pelagius, there are divine persuasions; 
there are the requirements and threats of the law, and there is the Holy Spirit calling, 
inviting, appealing, and admonishing. However, humans overcome sinful habits by 
actualizing their natural free will in response to the external admonitions of grace. 
Consequently, the problem in Pelagius’s understanding of grace lies primarily not in his 
negation of grace or his understanding of external grace but in the relation of human free 
will to grace; and more precisely in his understanding of the consequences of Adam’s 
fall. It seems safe to say that the problem with the concept of grace in Pelagius’s 
soteriology is limited to his rejection of the internal operation of grace. For instance, 
Arminius succinctly describes Pelagian heresy as the teaching that “with the exception of 
the preaching of the Gospel, no internal grace is required to produce faith in the minds of 
men.”11 Consequently, Pelagius rejected a role for an internal healing of grace because 
humans by creation enjoy flawless free will as a gift of grace. Therefore, Adam’s fall did 
not represent a disruption of this natural gift. Humans are born without a polluted will, 
and without tendencies toward sinful habits. They have in front of them two models: the 
model of Adam’s sinful actions and the model of grace in the life and teachings of Christ. 
Their unblemished will is able to follow any model without God’s direct assistance or 
evil instigation. On the one hand, they sin freely and without internal necessity. On the 
other hand, they obey and follow the path of salvation by their own decision. 
                                                
11 Quest. V, in Works, 2:66. 
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One question remains before finishing with Pelagius’s teaching on free will and 
grace. According to Pelagius, do humans need the precedence of grace for salvation? I 
think the answer is yes, for although there is no necessity of prevenient grace as an 
internal healing power, there is a necessity of the anticipation of grace as an external 
model of life and perfection. For Pelagius, external examples of sinful habits stimulate 
the commission of sin in humans; likewise external grace in the preaching of the law and 
the life of Jesus excites the human will by exhortation, imitation, association, or example 
to accept salvation and follow these models of sinlessness of life. Thus, for Pelagius 
grace is indeed to some extent prevenient to human will, although an external version 
only.12  
Pelagius’s conclusions were abhorrent to Augustine. Augustine believed that due 
to original sin (which he described as a disease, a bondage or enslaving power, and a 
guilt), every human is born with a disposition to sin that is impossible to overcome by 
human power. While for Pelagius sin is a wicked act, a wrongful action, and human pride 
in contempt of God,13 for Augustine sin is a corruption or a malady within human nature. 
It is from this reality that humans, as a massa damnata [mass of damnation], become 
propagators and perpetrators of immorality. Because they are not able to liberate 
themselves, sin becomes an enslaving power that maintains individuals under continual 
bondage of  concupiscence.14 The result is guilt, actual and original. Guilt is not just an 
                                                
12 See Ferguson, Pelagius, 170–175. 
13 Pelagius, On Nature, §17, 31–32. 
14 TeSelle, Augustine, 41. 
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inner feeling of unworthiness or regret, but a legal/judicial state before God for willful 
participation and original co-responsibility in Adam’s sin.15  
From the beginning Augustine deconstructed Pelagius’s teaching of an 
unblemished freedom of will. Unlike Pelagius, Augustine believed that humans are 
completely alienated from God, their will is perverted, and their liberty is compromised 
under slavery, servitude, and the necessity of sin. Augustine states that: “vanished by the 
sin into which it fell by its volition, nature has lost liberty.”16 While the guilt acquired by 
original sin is easily removed by baptism, the actuality, slavery, and servitude of sin and 
the corruption-depravation of human free will is impossible to avoid without the special 
grace and intervention of God.  
In such a miserable situation, for Augustine, grace cannot be restricted to external 
aid, as Pelagius had suggested, but is a mandatory inward work of the Spirit to overcome 
sin. 17 Augustine exalts God’s grace throughout his writings. The first action of God 
toward sinful humanity occurs through prevenient grace. Prevenient grace, according to 
Augustine, could be properly summarized in two main points:  
                                                
15 Augustine understood that Paul in Romans pointed to this reality explaining 
that the expression “in whom . . .” means that in Adam “all sinned.” 
16 Augustine, De perfection justiciae hominis 4.9, in Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers (NPNF). ed. Philip Schaff, trans. P. Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, rev. Benjamin 
B. Warfield., vol. 5: Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings (New York: Christian Literature 
Company, 1887, reprint, 2012), 161. 
17 Augustine rejects Pelagius’s assumption that imitation of Christ’s example is 
sufficient to overcome human sinfulness. He states “it is not simply the imitation of His 
example which makes men just, but His grace which regenerates men by the Spirit,” 
Augustine, De pecc. merit. et remiss 1.5.19, NPNF, 22. 
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First, it is the anticipation of God’s actions to rescue people from eternal 
perdition. Before any human movement toward God, says Augustine, God moves toward 
humans. In this manner, Augustine assures us that grace precedes human freedom of will. 
Thus, salvation begins by God’s direct initiative. Explaining in one of his sermons the 
encounter of Zaccheus with Jesus, Augustine noted, “Zaccheus was seen, and saw; but 
unless he had been seen, he would not have seen. For ‘whom He predestinated, them also 
He called.’ In order that we may see, we are seen; that we may love, we are loved. ‘My 
God, may His pity prevent me!’”18 Augustine points to the prevenient nature of God’s 
grace elsewhere in his writings. God, he says, “anticipates us that we may be healed . . . 
he anticipates us that we may be called . . . he anticipates us that we may lead godly lives 
. . . because without Him we can do nothing (Psalm 59:10).”19 Augustine discusses the 
precedence of God’s grace to the will of humans in terms of operative [prevenient] grace 
(operante charitatem) and cooperative [subsequent] grace (cooperante charitatem). He 
speaks of God  
who prepares the will, and perfects by his co-operation what He initiates by His 
operation[.] He works in us that we may have the will [prevenient grace], and in 
perfecting works with us when we have the will [subsequent grace]. He operates, 
therefore, without us, in order that we may will [prevenient grace]; but when we will, 
and so will that we may act, He co-operates with us.20 
                                                
18 Augustine, “Zacchaeus” Sermon 174, in “Sermons,” The Works of Saint 
Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, trans. Edmund Hill and ed. John E. 
Rotelle (New Rocelle, NY: New City, 1992), 259–261. 
19 Augustine, De natura et gratia 35; NPNF, 133.  
20 Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, 17.33; NPNF, 458. “Et quis istam etsi 
parvam dare coeperat charitatem, nisi ille qui praeparat voluntatem, et cooperator 
perficiens. Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operator; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut 
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Augustine’s own struggles with sin and conversion show him the need for the 
prevenient and the always working grace of God. His Confessions witness to God’s 
converting grace and anticipate Augustine’s unwillingness and resistance to accept the 
call of salvation. B. B. Warfield summarizes Augustine’s experience, pointing out that, 
“his own experiences in his long life of resistance to, and then of yielding to, the drawing 
of God’s grace, gave him a clear apprehension of the great evangelic principle that God 
seeks men, not men God, such as no sophistry could cloud.”21 Likewise, J. Patout Burns 
asserts that “the congruous vocation, as illustrated in Augustine’s narrative of his own 
conversion, works upon an individual’s prior disposition, thereby moving him to make 
the decision which God intends.”22 
Second, prevenient grace is a gracious gift of God. Augustine states that grace “is 
not rendered for any merits, but is given gratis, on account of which it is also called 
grace.”23 Because grace is given gratis preceding any meritorious human actions, 
prevenient grace is anti-merit.24 Humans in their sinfulness and corruption, massa 
                                                
faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur: tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante 
cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus.” 
21 B. B. Warfield, “Introduction to Augustine’s Anti-Pelagian Writings.” in 
NPNF, xxi. 
22 J. Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace 
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1980), 47. For more on Augustine’s view on prevenient 
grace see, Moi Kieng Ting, Augustine’s and Wesley’s Concepts of Prevenient Grace: A 
Comparative Study (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert, 2010), 20–35. 
23 Augustine, De natura et gratia 3; NPNF, 122. 
24 Livia Bud says that Augustine always affirms the gratuity of grace in relation to 
both, human will and actions. She states: “Sant'Agostino affermava la gratuità della 
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damnata, do not deserve God’s grace and love (Romans 5:15), but solely condemnation 
and rejection. Consequently, grace could exclusively be granted by God’s free decision, 
love, and mercy.25  
After describing the preventive and free nature of prevenient grace, Augustine 
begins to discuss the mode of operation. Prevenient grace, he says, operates by the work 
of the Holy Sprit both internally/individually and externally by the Church. In this 
manner, prevenient grace is related to the illumination of the Holy Spirit in human beings 
sometimes by the preaching of the Scriptures and sometimes by internal callings to 
prepare their will for conversion and repentance.26  
On the one hand, faithful to his neo-platonic commitments supported by his 
reading of the Bible, he states that grace is an inwardly healing substance that works 
                                                
grazia in rapporto con le azioni (usando il testo di Paolo, dove si afferma l‟impossibilità 
di agire conformemente alla buona volontà). In tutti i passaggi fino qui troviamo questa 
menzione, che la grazia viene concessa senza nessun merito anteriore delle azioni, da 
questo punto in poi, però, lui affermerà la gratuità anche in rapporto con la volontà. 
Affermerà in maniera insistente la gratuità in relazione ad ogni tipo di merito. E questo 
nel senso della citazione delle parole di San Paolo: “Che cosa mai possiedi che tu non 
abbia ricevuto?” Livia Bud, “Sant'Agostino e il rapporto tra libero arbitrio e grazia” 
Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies 3, no. 4 (2011): 25. 
25 See Creswell, Augustine’s Dilemma, 71; Anthony Dupont, Gratia in 
Augustine’s Sermones ad Populorum During the Pelagian Controversy (Leiden, the 
Netherlands: Brill, 2013), 76. 
26 Eleuterio Elorduy describes the grace of conversion in Augustine in this 
manner: “La teoría de la iluminación comunicada por Dios a la inteligencia humana, unas 
veces en forma de predicación, otras veces en llamamientos internos, es una prueba 
manifiesta del congruismo natural y sobrenatural empleado en la economía de la gracia 
que abarca tanto el orden moral como el de la vida inmanente del alma.” Eleuterio 
Elorduy, “San Augustín y Suárez: El doctor de la gracia,” Augustinus 16 (1971): 34. 
 103 
within individual humans’ hearts.27 He states in his treatise On Forgiveness of Sins and 
Baptism that “our turning to God is not possible, except He rouses and helps us.”28 A 
human person, says Augustine, receive[s] “the Holy Ghost, by whom there is formed in 
his mind a delight in, and a love of . . . God. The free gift, he may conceive an ardent 
desire to cleave to his Maker, and may burn to enter upon the participation in that true 
light. Now, in order that such a course may engage our affections, God’s ‘love is shed 
abroad in our hearts’ . . . through the Holy Ghost, which is given to us.”29  
On the other hand, mainly using the Scriptures, Augustine also pointed to the 
external nature of grace. Grace as an external influence resonates, convinces, and draws 
humans to God’s offer of salvation.  According to Augustine, external incentives on 
human perceptions will work by “evangelical exhortation” of the Church and “the 
commands of the law.”30 Then, the preaching of the Word and the Law rebukes humans 
of their frailties and advises them of their necessity of God’s grace.31 This is important 
                                                
27 According to J. Patout Burns, Augustine accepted the Plotinian concept of 
grace as an inward and dwelling influence within the human soul because he also found 
sufficient evidence in the Scriptures to support it. He frequently quoted in support 
Romans 5:5 and 1 John 4:7, 17 to evidence the concept of grace as an inward healing 
power working within the human soul. See Burns, “Grace” in Augustine Through the 
Ages: An Encyclopedia, Allan D. Fitzgerald, ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 
392. 
28 Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione, et de baptismo parvulorum, 
2.31, NPNF, 56. 
29 Augustine, De spir. et litt. 3.5; NPNF, 84–85.  
30 Augustine, De spir. et litt, 34.60; NPNF, 110. 
31 Ibid. 
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because at this point Augustine concurs with Pelagius that the preaching of the Gospel 
and the commandment of the law have a role as external means of prevenient grace to 
make humans willing to believe. However, unlike Pelagius, Augustine strongly refuses to 
limit grace to these external aids. Grace is primordial to any human actions because God 
“in all things prevents [precedes] us with His mercy.”32 
Prevenient grace results in a series of spiritual effects that lead humans to 
salvation. Prevenient grace liberates, empowers, and heals human freedom of will. 
Augustine assures that “by grace the healing of the soul from the disease of sin”33  and 
the “cure of the will” occurs, resulting in the establishment of the freedom of will.34 So, 
for Augustine, freedom of will is clearly not the result of nature, but the result of grace. 
Despite the corruption of the human will, prevenient grace gives humans a new 
supernatural predisposition that prompts the will before an individual ever wills. Then, 
grace frees, heals, and enables human free will, not only enlarging a person’s area of 
choice but by substituting the evil desires with a system of good choices. God’s 
omnipotent will and operating grace is not irresistible, but congruous and effectual.35 God 
knows beforehand that the “human will” will freely consent to what He proposes for it, 
and He sets everything to accord with that.  
                                                
32 Augustine, De spir. et litt, 34.60; NPNF, 110. 
33 Augustine, De spir. et litt. 30.52, NPNF, 106. 
34 Ibid. 
35 TeSelle, Augustine, 43–44; John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 133. 
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Another important spiritual effect of prevenient grace is faith. According to 
Augustine, prevenient grace moves human freedom of will toward faith. Because grace 
has already liberated free will, it is now able to exercise faith. Faith, like free will, for 
Augustine is therefore a gift of grace. God’s prevenient grace is the indispensable key 
that enables depraved persons to become spiritually alive again and believe in God. 
Augustine states that “by faith [comes] the acquisition of grace against sin, by grace the 
healing of the soul from the disease of sin, by the health of the soul freedom of will, by 
free will the love of righteousness.”36 Although faith is the source of grace and it is “in 
our own power,”37 Augustine scripturally clarifies that “there is no power but comes from 
God (Rom 13:1).” Then, everywhere in his writing, Augustine emphasizes that faith is 
rightly regarded as a gift of grace. Quoting two passages of Paul in 2 Timothy 4:7 and 1 
Corinthians 7:25, Augustine concludes that “even faith itself cannot be had without 
God’s mercy, and that it is the gift of God.”38 
Prevenient Grace in the Theology  
of the Medieval Church 
An informed overview of the concept of prevenient grace in the theological 
development of the Medieval church is necessary to show how the Augustinian doctrine 
of prevenient grace was inherited, used, and synthetized by the Medieval theologians. In 
                                                
36 Augustine, De spir. et litt. 30.52; NPNF, 106. 
37 Ibid., De spir. et litt. 54; NPNF, 107. 
38 Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio 17,7, NPNF, 450. See also “The spirit of 
grace, therefore, causes us to have faith,” 28.14.  
 106 
this section, I consider the contributions to the conceptualization of the doctrine of 
prevenient grace from the Second Council of Orange to the Council of Trent. Attention to 
the conciliar documents is important because they better show how the medieval church 
as a whole viewed the concept of prevenient grace in their soteriological constructions 
rather than the opinion of particular theologians. Nevertheless, I also consider the 
contributions of important medieval theologians like Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, 
Gabriel Biel, and some contemporaries of Arminius like Louis de Molina.  
Prevenient Grace after the Pelagian Controversy:  
The Second Council of Orange  
It seems important first to consider at least briefly the controversy about grace and 
free will around the Pelagian controversy after Augustine. Specifically I would like to 
pay attention to the Second Council of Orange (529 AD) that used the concept of 
prevenient grace to counteract the teaching of John Cassian (360–435 AD). Jaroslav 
Pelikan argues that the reaction of Cassian and his followers against Augustine resulted 
because they perceived that Augustine’s theology “glorified grace by belittling nature and 
free will” destroying human “responsibility.”39 Consequently, Cassian’s main intention 
was not to destroy grace, but to defend a proper role in salvation for the freedom of 
human will.  
Adolph Harnack claims that Cassian completely supports God’s grace as “the 
foundation” of human salvation. Cassian believes that “grace is absolutely necessary in 
                                                
39 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of 
Doctrine, vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition 100–600 (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1971), 320. 
 107 
order to reach final salvation,”40 because without “God’s help . . . human weakness 
cannot accomplish anything that has to do with salvation.”41 However, when Cassian 
comes to consider the beginning of faith, grace is overshadowed by the will of man. 
Harnack summarizes Cassian’s view explaining, “the beginnings of the good resolves, 
good thoughts, and faith—understood as the preparation of grace—can be due to 
ourselves.”42  
As a result, grace is not critical at the beginning of salvation. For Cassian, 
therefore, the initial movement toward faith should be found within the human free will 
before grace pours into the human soul. For Cassian, indubitably, “Adam and Eve’s fall 
had entailed corruption and inevitable sinfulness on the whole race. But with a free, 
though a weakened, will, there also remained a certain ability to turn to the good.”43 
Cassian refused to endanger in any sense the ability of human will to seek God and 
perform what is spiritually and morally good. 
However, in his exposition on 1 Tim 2:4, and similar passages like Mt 18:14, 2 
Sam 14:14, Ezek 33:11, and Mt 11:28, Cassian came close to an understanding of 
                                                
40 Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1899), 5:247. 
41 John Cassian, “The Conferences of John Cassian,” in Sulpitius Severus, Vincent 
of Lérins, John Cassian, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace; trans. E. C. S. Gibson, vol. 11 (New 
York: Christian Literature Company, 1894), 424. 
42 Harnack, History of Dogma, 5:247. For further exposition of Cassian’s doctrine 
of grace see, Owen Chadwick, John Cassian (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), 110–136. 
43 Harnack, History of Dogma, 5:248. 
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prevenient grace. He stated that when God's “goodness sees in us even the very smallest 
spark of good will shining forth, which he himself has struck as it were out of the hard 
flints of our hearts, he fans and fosters it, stirs it up, and nurses it with His breath.”44 He 
further explains that “when [God] sees in us some beginning of good will,” he 
immediately “enlightens it and strengthens it and urges it on towards salvation, increasing 
that which He Himself implanted or which He sees to have arisen from our own 
efforts.”45 Even more precise is his remark in his thirteenth polemical Conference in 
which he describes the necessary balancing of the farmer's work and the rain to produce a 
copious harvest:   
From which we clearly infer that the initiative (initia) not only of our actions but also 
of good thoughts comes from God (ex deo esse principium), who inspires us with a 
good will to begin with, and supplies us with the opportunity of carrying out what we 
rightly desire: for ‘every good gift and every perfect gift cometh down from above, 
from the Father of lights,’ (James 1:17) who both begins what is good, and continues 
it and completes it in us, as the Apostle says: ‘But He who giveth seed to the sower 
will both provide bread to eat and will multiply your seed and make the fruits of your 
righteousness to increase.’ (2 Cor 9:10) But it is for us, humbly to follow day by day 
the grace of God (gratiam dei) which is drawing (adtrahentem nos) us.46 
Obviously, these passages show the preeminent role that Cassian attributed to 
God’s grace. A concept of prevenient grace in Cassian’s theology could be defended 
using these pieces of his writings. However, a better understanding of Cassian's whole 
argument in his Conferences seems to indicate that he did not necessarily defend a 
                                                
44 Cassian, “The Conferences,” 425. 
45 Ibid., 426. 
46 Cassian, Conferences 2.13.3. See Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum 
Latinorum, Iohannis Cassiani Opera, vol. 24 (Vindabonae: Apvd C. Geroldi Filium 
Bibliopolam Academiae, 1886), 363–364. 
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preeminence of grace over the human free will role in salvation, but a balanced view that 
notes the necessity of grace in every human effort for salvation.47 Grace, for Cassian, 
therefore, is not prevenient, anticipating human freedom of will, neither is grace always 
preceded by human good will, but it is more properly coexistent with freedom of will.48  
                                                
47 Rebecca Harder Weaver argues that “Cassian has unequivocally stated the case 
for the necessity of grace from beginning to end of the process of salvation.” His main 
interest “was to maintain both grace and the freedom of will,” Divine Grace and Human 
Agency:A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
1996), 111–112. Similarly, A. M. C. Casiday writes that Cassian “baldly asserts that 
God’s grace, not human free will, is responsible for ‘everything which pertains to 
salvation—even faith,” Tradition and Theology in St John Cassian (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 102–103. 
48 Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History of Doctrines (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 1952), 1:369. See Cassian, Conferences 2.13.11, 12, 13. See also Weaver, Divine 
Grace and Human Agency, 112; Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society, 114–116. The 
synergistic nature of the relation of grace and free will from the beginning to the end of 
salvation in Cassian’s theology is most properly understood in the context of Chadwick’s 
suggestion that for Cassian the human experience after the fall is not a state of total 
depravity and original sin demanding the action of a preparatory grace in order to accept 
God’s offer of salvation, but instead is a continual “strife between flesh and spirit,” 114. 
Boniface Ramsey interprets Cassian slightly differently. He argues that Cassian by the 
end of his work completely dissolves the relationship between grace and free will that he 
previously had defended in a more balanced way. Ramsey suggests that this is the result 
first of the tradition to which Cassian is appealing, Church fathers like Athanasius and 
Basil, “in which grace was often not prominently or even explicitly discussed,” and 
second, of his monastic ideals that looked to the prominence of grace in Augustine’s 
theology as detrimental to the role of human effort in salvation. It seems to me that in 
Ramsey’s opinion the only logical conclusion from Cassian’s writings is that free will 
always precedes the gift of grace. I think that such a conclusion is true for some of 
Cassian followers, but if we take into account all of Cassian's writings we recognize that 
he worked strenuously to maintain a synergistic view of free will and grace from the 
beginning to the end of the work of divine redemption. See Boniface Ramsey, “John 
Cassian and Augustine,” in Grace for Grace: The Debates after Augustine and Pelagius, 
ed. Alexander Y. Hwang, Brian J. Matz, and Augustine Casiday (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 129–130. 
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Although Cassian and his followers gave more attention to the role of grace in 
salvation than Pelagius, unfortunately they nonetheless failed to conceptualize clearly in 
their theology of salvation the concept of prevenient grace. Perhaps Faustus of Riez, 
Cassian’s follower and most distinguished theological defender, makes clear such a 
failure, emphatically asserting in his treatise De gratia that “God awaits the human will, 
so that there may be an equitable reward in the case of willing.”49 It is this view that 
centuries later was labeled as semi-Pelagianism, because it defends a soteriology in 
which the beginning of faith arises first from the powers and abilities of individuals, with 
God’s grace only subsequently rewarding such individual willing.  
It is mainly in response to this view that the Second Council of Orange (529 AD) 
emphasized the role of prevenient grace in the onset of faith. Ralph W. Mathisen writes 
that even the doctrines of sin and human freedom of will were discussed only as “they 
related to prevenient grace.”50 The seventh and eighth capitula of the council cursed any 
teaching that supported the view that “through the vigor of nature, without inspiration of 
the Holy Spirit, it was possible to think or choose anything related to salvation or to be 
saved,” and “that some could gain grace . . . through free will.”51 The anathematization of 
                                                
49 Faustus of Riez, De gratia, 1.18; 2.12. 
50 Ralph W. Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles, Prevenient Grace, and the Second 
Council of Orange,” in Grace for Grace: The Debates after Augustine and Pelagious, ed. 
Alexander Y. Hwang, Brian J. Matz, and Augustine Casiday (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 215. 
51 The summaries of the Council of Orange articles have been taken from 
Mathisen, 214–219. These articles are quoted in Mathisen, 214. I here provide the full 
quotation from the original Latin documents of the Council: (7) “Si quis per naturae 
uigorem bonum aliquid, quo ad salutem pertinit uitae aeternae, cogitare, ut expedit, aut 
 
 111 
these teachings that elevated nature and free will over God’s preceding grace opened the 
way to strong affirmative statements in favor of a proper view of the reception of divine 
grace.  
Most of the conciliar statements relate to prevenient grace, but capitula 14, 20, 
and 23 deserve our special attention: 
(14) “No one who is miserable is freed from any misery except for one who is 
anticipated by the mercy of God (misericordia praevenitur).”  
(20) “Man is capable of nothing good without God.” 
(23) “When they do what they wish in accordance with divine will, even if they 
do what they do willingly, nevertheless it is [because] the will of Him by whom what 
they wish is prepared and commanded [by God’s prevenient grace].”52  
                                                
elegire siue salutari, id est euangelicae, praedicationi consentire posse confirmat absque 
inluminatione et inspiratione Spiritus sancti, quit dat omnibus suautatem in consentiendo 
et credendo ueritati, heretico fallitur spiritu, non intellegens uocem Dei in euangelio 
dicentes: Sine me nihil potestes facire (Ioh 15:5), et illud apostoli: Non quod idonei 
sumus cogitare aliquid a nobis quiasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est (II Cor 
3:5).” and (8) “Si quis alius misericordia, alios uero per liberum arbitrium, quod in 
omnibus, qui de praeuaricationem primi hominis nati sunt, constat esse uisiatum, ad 
gratiam baptismi posse uenire contendit, a recta fide probatur alienus. His enim non 
omnium liberum arbitrium per peccatum primi hominis adserit infirmatum aut certe ita 
laesum putat, ut tamen quidam ualeant sine reuelatione Dei mysterium salutis aeternae 
per semit ipsos posse conquirere. Quod quam sit contrarium, ipse Dominus probat, qui 
non aliquos, sed neminem ad se posse uenire testator, nisi quem Pater adtraxerit, sicut et 
Petro dixit: Beatus es, Simon Bariona, quia caro et sanguis non revelauit tibi, sed Pater 
meus, qui in caelis est (Matt 16:17); et apostulus: Nemo potest dicere Dominum Iesum 
nisi in Spiritu sancto.” in Caroli de Clerq, Corpus christianorum, Series Latina, Concilia 
Galliae, A. 511–A. 695, vol. 148A (Tvrnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 
1963), 57–58. 
52 Quoted in Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 215–216. See the Latin text:  
(14) “Nullus miser de quantacumque miseria liberator, nisi qui Dei misericordia 
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The Council firmly supported the concept of prevenient grace and insisted that the 
beginning of salvation is impossible without the direct intervention of God’s mercy and 
the work of the Holy Spirit. Interestingly, Mathisen argues that the Council claimed to 
gain support from the “ancient father”; however, an analysis of the documents 
demonstrates that they instead firmly grounded their conclusions on prevenient grace on 
Scriptural authority.53 For the Council, the Holy Scripture teaches the anticipation of 
God’s grace to human will in passages like Psalm 78:8; 58:11.  
In addition, the Council also stressed the gratuity of grace, quoting scriptural 
passages like Galatians 2:21 and Ephesians 4:8. Because prevenient grace anticipates 
human responses, logically it has to be gratis, a gift. Capitula 16 affirms that “no one 
should glory in what he seems to have as if he had not been given it,” and capitula 25 
remarks that “to love God is completely a gift of God.”54 In this respect the Council 
decisively allied itself with Augustine's stance on the free nature of grace. In connection 
                                                
praeuenitur, sicut dicit psalmista: Cito anticepit nos misericordia tua, Domine (Ps 78:8), 
et illud: Deus meus, misericordia eius praeueniet me (Ps 58:11).” 
(20) “Nihil boni hominem posse sine Deu. Multa Deus facit in homina bona, quae 
non facit homo, nulla uero facit homo bona, quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat homo.” 
(23) “De uolumtate Dei et hominis. Suam uolumtatem homines faciunt, non Dei, 
quando id agunt, quod Deo displacit; quando autem ita faciunt, quod uolunt, ut diuinae 
seruiant uolumtati, quamuis uolentes agant, quod agunt, illius tamen uolumtas est, a quo 
et praeparatur et iubetur, quod uolunt,” CCL 148A, 59–61. 
53 Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 216–217. 
54 Quoted in Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 216. See “Prosus donum Dei est 
diligere Deum,” CCL 148A, 62. 
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with this the Council made clear the unique and indispensable role of grace in salvation, 
strongly affirming that, “no one can be saved except through the mercy of God.”55 
A final implication may be drawn from the passages of the conciliar documents. 
The Council closely related baptism with the reception of grace and the liberation of the 
will.56 In this manner, the Council advocated in favor of an ecclesiological operation of 
prevenient grace. In their teaching on the freedom of the will, the Council affirmed the 
corruption and inability of the will to save itself, the anticipation of grace, and the role of 
baptism in restoring human free will. In the Definitio fidei the council states: “Because of 
the sin of the first man, free will has been so damaged and weakened that no one 
afterward can either love God as is fitting or believe in God or do for the sake of God that 
which is good, unless grace and divine mercy has anticipated him.”57 Then the Council 
comes to affirm the central role of baptism expressing that “this grace [prevenient grace] 
is not embodied in the free will of all who desire to be baptized, but is granted by the 
generosity of Christ” and “has been received through baptism.”58 Similarly, the Council 
                                                
55 Quoted in Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 216. See “Neminem nisi deo 
miserante salvari,” CCL, 148A, 60.  
56 Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 218. 
57 Quoted in Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 217: “Quod per peccatum primi 
hominis ita inclinatum et adtinuatum fuerit liberum arbitrium, ut nullus postea aut 
diligere Deum sicut aportuit aut credere in Deum aut operari propter Deum quod bonum 
est possit, nisi eum gratia misericordiae diuinae praeuenerit,” CCL 148A, 62. 
58 Ibid. “Quam gratiam etiam post aduentum Domini omnibus, qui baptiszari 
disiderant, non in libero arbitrio habere, sed Christi nouimus simul et credimus largitate 
conferri,” CCL, 148A, 62. 
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in capitula 13 affirms, “the free will lost in the first man cannot be restored except 
through the grace of baptism.”59  
One could speculate that this operation of prevenient grace in order to restore free 
will through the sacrament of baptism is restricted to infants because if baptism is the 
means to obtain the prevenient grace of God, then how and who or what draws 
unbelievers to the sacrament? The Council responds by clarifying that at least in 
believer’s baptism God also anticipates human willingness to do what is right—in this 
case to accept the church's mediation of the sacrament of baptism. The Council of Orange 
states that in every case, even when the good impulse of the human heart prompts a 
person to devotedly seek baptism devotedly, it is God who “first inspires both our faith 
and our love for him.”60 
The Medieval Theologians and  
the Council of Trent 
Medieval theologians felt the necessity to balance theological ideas present in 
Augustine’s writings. In Augustine, we encounter both a high view of grace and a high 
view of sin. As we have seen, for Augustine, humans after the fall are characterized by 
sinfulness; indeed, they are not able not to sin (non posse non peccare). He found the 
solution to this depravity in the sovereign prevenient grace of God, which irresistibly 
overcomes human infirmities. By introducing the concept of prevenient grace in his 
                                                
59 Quoted in Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 215.   
60 Quoted in Mathisen, “Caesarius of Arles,” 218: “et fidem et amorem sui prius 
inspirat,” CCL 148A, 63.  
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controversy against Pelagius, Augustine set the trajectory for the use of this idea in the 
discussion on free will and God’s grace for the future generations.  
Peter Lombard (c. 1096–1160) asserts that the loss of the freedom of will is the 
most serious effect of Adam’s original sin.61 The solution to this problem, Lombard 
recognizes, is God’s prevenient grace that enables human free will. In book 2, distinction 
27 of his Sentences, Lombard says, “And that prevenient grace, which is also a virtue, is 
not the use of free choice, but rather the good use of free choice comes from it. It is ours 
from God, not from ourselves.”62 According to Lombard, by this prevenient grace “the 
will of man is bathed so as to germinate and produce fruit, that is, it is healed and 
prepared to will the good, according to which the grace is called operating . . . and [this] 
grace is not unsuitably termed ‘virtue,’ because it heals and aids the infirm will of 
man.”63 Then, Lombard makes prevenient grace necessary and precedent to the voluntary 
act of human will.  
Fesko believes that Lombard defends a creational view of prevenient grace. He 
seems to argue that for Lombard prevenient grace is a providential and natural faculty 
                                                
61 See Marcia L. Colish, “Peter Lombard,” in The Medieval Theologians: An 
Introduction to Theology in the Medieval Period, ed. G. R. Evans (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2001), 175. 
62 See Dist. XXVII.7, in Peter Lombard, The Sentences, vol. 2,  On Creation, 
trans. Guilio Silano, (Toronto: PIMS, 2008), 136. 
63 Dist. XXVII.2, in Sentences: On Creation, 133. For Lombard operating grace is 
also a term to refer to prevenient grace. For him, by prevenient grace “the will of man is 
freed and prepared to will the good,” see Dist.XXVI.8, in Sentences: On Creation, 130. 
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with which God created human beings.64 However, it is important to note that Lombard 
links prevenient grace with virtue.65 Virtue, for Lombard, is an uncreated habit of the soul 
infused by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Analyzing Lombard’s question on the source 
of salvific love, Steven Ozment concludes that for Lombard human beings are “saved by 
an uncreated, not created habit, by uncreated, not created, love, by the Holy Spirit within, 
not an acquired talent he can call his own.”66 Likewise, Lombard believed in an 
uncreated, not created prevenient grace. It is the infused working of the Holy Spirit in the 
soul. Lombard’s emphasis on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the salvific working of 
prevenient grace and love in some ways sets the Protestant trajectory for this concept in 
contrast with the majority of medieval scholastic voices. Ozment says that Luther sided 
with Lombard67 and, as we will see, Arminius also had a strong emphasis on an uncreated 
prevenient grace as the internal work of the Holy Spirit in the human soul.  
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) was reluctant to assume entirely the Augustinian 
idea of total depravity. Using Bede’s interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan, 
he assumed that not all man's powers were destroyed by the sin of Adam. For Aquinas 
the principal consequence of original sin was a usurpation of powers where the “lower 
                                                
64 Fesko, “Arminius on Facientibus,” 357–358. 
65 See Dist. XXVII.7, in Sentences: On Creation, 136. 
66 Stephen Ozment, The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious 
History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1981), 31. 
67 Ozment, The Age of Reform, 31. 
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powers” usurped the good of nature.68 As a result “all the powers of the soul are left, as it 
were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which 
destitution is called wounding of nature.”69 Therefore, for Aquinas human nature is 
evidently damaged and wounded but not totally corrupted. Therefore, Aquinas’s view of 
the effects of sin on human nature should be described more in terms of weaknesses or 
fragilities than in terms of total corruption.  
Gregg R. Allison claims that for Aquinas “the greatest disruption that sin caused 
in people is their loss of orientation toward seeking God as their greatest goal.”70 Aquinas 
continually stated that humans could not turn from sin to God using only their own 
capacities.71 He quoted John 15:5, “without Me, you can do nothing,” to demonstrate that 
reality as an essential Christian truth.72 However, this does not mean that humans do not 
                                                
68 “The natural inclination to virtue, finally, is diminished by sin. Actions generate 
an inclination to similar actions, as we said in Q. 51, Art. 2, and the inclination to one of 
two contraries is bound to be diminished by an inclination to the other. Now sin is the 
contrary of virtue. The good of nature which consists in the inclination to virtue is 
therefore bound to be diminished by the very fact that a man sins.” 1.2.85.1, 1:967. For 
Aquinas the lower powers represent among others the free will or the power of choice of 
humans. The “good of nature” represents human reason or intellect. 
69 Ibid. “Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there 
is a wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order to the good, there is a 
wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is 
a wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the 
delectable, moderated by reason, there is a wound of concupiscence.” 
70 Gregg R. Allison, Historical Theology: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 352. 
71 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (ST). trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947), 1.2.109.1–10. 
72 Ibid., 1.2.109.8. 
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have the power to turn to God, but that their powers are so weak that they need an 
external help–the grace of God.73  
Aquinas calls this enabling grace habitual or prevenient grace. But before 
considering the operation and nature of prevenient grace in Aquinas, it is important to 
highlight that he does not accept an ontological division of divine grace. Aquinas only 
affirms a proper division regarding its effects.74 Then, what is said about prevenient grace 
is also applicable to all effects of grace in his writing; that is to co-operating or 
subsequent grace.  
 Thus for Aquinas, prevenient grace “moves the soul inwardly or inspires the 
good wish.”75 Without this grace humans by themselves cannot know salvific truth, do 
any good, love God above all things, fulfill the moral commandments of the law, and 
deserve eternal life.76 Aquinas clearly stated that the “preparation of the will” for 
                                                
73 Thomas P. Harmon, “The Sacramental Consummation of the Moral Life 
According to St. Thomas Aquinas,” New Blackfriars 91, no. 1034 (2010): 466. 
74 ST, 1.2.11.2 – 3; 1:1137–1338. In Aquinas’ exposition on these effects of grace, 
these effects continually interchange within them. For instance, the effect of the grace 
that heals the soul is prevenient in relation with the second effect “to desire good.” But, 
the effect “to desire good” although subsequent in relation with the first, it is prevenient 
in relation with its posterior, the third effect of grace “to carry into effect the good 
proposed.” This Augustinian emphasis could be also found in his assertion that “grace, 
inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient with respect to the second, 
and inasmuch as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first 
effect,” ST, 1.2.111.3. 
75 ST, 1.2.109.6. 
76 ST, 1.2.109.1–5. 
 119 
salvation “cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace.”77 This grace is a divine 
infusion working within human nature in order to heal human infirmities and 
corruptions.78 Mark Ellingsen affirms that for Aquinas and other Scholastic theologians 
infused grace is “a kind of substance in the faithful,”79 which moves the corrupted will of 
humans toward God. According to Aquinas, this infused grace of God is a gratuitous gift 
and not a virtue, merit, or a power naturally present in the soul.80 Quoting Psalm 83:12, 
Aquinas emphasizes that grace is a gift that “surpasses every capability of created 
nature.”81  
However, we should understand the operation of prevenient grace in Aquinas’s 
theology within the context of his Aristotelian philosophy. In this discussion, two aspects 
of Aristotle’s philosophy are central for Aquinas. First, for Aquinas, although the 
ultimate source of grace is divine, grace as an infused medicine “is in the soul as a reality 
                                                
77 ST, 1.2.109.6. 
78 Aquinas divided his Treatise on Grace into six great parts with six questions on 
(1) the necessity of Grace, (2) the definitions of the grace of God, (3) the division of 
grace, (4) the cause of grace, (5) the effects of grace, and (6) the necessity of merits (see 
1.2.109 –114). Aidan Nichols describes grace in Aquinas’ writings as a “divine energeia 
enabling the creature not only to perceive (as revelation) but to do (as salvific relevant 
action) what of itself it could neither do nor perceive,” Discovering Aquinas: An 
Introduction to His Life, Work, and Influence (Grand Rapids, MI: Eermans, 2002), 105. 
79 Mark Ellingsen, Reclaiming Our Roots: Martin Luther to Martin Luther King 
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity, 1999), 36. 
80 ST, 1.1.110.2–4. 
81 ST, 1.2.112.1. 
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connatural to man.”82 This means that habitual or prevenient grace is a natural 
endowment in human beings. However, this natural gift should not be confused with a 
substantial or intrinsic reality. Rather, grace is an accidental reality in the soul. Aquinas 
says, “every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a 
part of the nature, even as matter and form are called substance. And because grace is 
above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental 
form of the soul.”83 Then, humans by habitually using the accidental existence of 
prevenient grace in their soul are capable of voluntarily becoming spiritual beings.    
Second, Aquinas in his Treatise On Grace continually emphasized the role of 
God as the prime mover and the initial and unique cause of grace. He is now appealing to 
Aristotelian causality. According to Eric Luijten, Aquinas’s view of motion implies three 
principal elements: “the motion of the one who moves, the motion of the one who is 
moved, and the completion of the motion: the arrival at its end.”84 As a result, for 
Aquinas, God “the absolutely primary mover”85 moves the will of humans, then the will 
of humans moves along with God, and finally God completes the motion with the 
forgiveness of sin and the justification of the sinner. In this case, grace is always present, 
but humans need to exercise the gift of grace continually.  
                                                
82 Ozment, The Age of Reform, 32. 
83 ST,  1.2.110.2. 
84 Eric Luijten, Sacramental Forgiveness as a Gift of God: Thomas Aquinas on 
the Sacrament of Penance (Utrecht, the Netherlands: Peeters Leuven, 2003), 75 
85 ST, 1.2.109.6. 
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In this manner, the effects of prevenient grace are to move the will of humans to 
God and to heal human infirmities. These effects of prevenient grace return the human 
faculties to their proper and original state making it possible to choose God, His offer of 
salvation, and perform Christian virtues. Through this divine cooperation humans may 
attain perfection, desiring the good, carrying into effect good works, persevering in the 
faith, and finally reaching celestial glory.86 It is in the exercising of this connatural 
prevenient grace that humans will cooperate with God and consequently they can call 
their good works a merit of their own. Stephen Ozment clearly resumes Aquinas’s 
teaching in this aspect: “With the infusion of supernatural grace an individual receives 
the essential foundation, an initial disposition, basic instruction, as it were, in how to 
order his life in obedience to God. He must still exercise the grace he has received in 
order to become “expert” in the art of loving God and man.”87 
In summary, prevenient grace produces the first spiritual effects and turning 
toward God in humans in the process of salvation. For Aquinas, God’s prevenient grace 
as a connatural infusion in the human soul moves and heals the will in order to overcome 
the infirmities introduced by sin. It follows that human beings, exercising and using 
freely their freedom of will, cooperate with the grace of God. Thus, Aquinas 
accomplished the difficult theological task of maintaining the primordial role of God’s 
grace in salvation while at the same time preserving the necessity of human willing 
reception of God’s offer of salvation. 
                                                
86 ST, 1.2.109.6.  
87 Ozment, The Age of Reform, 32–33. 
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Gabriel Biel (1420–1495) conveyed Aquinas’s conclusion on a connatural 
prevenient grace to its logical implications. For Biel, although it is a free divine gift, 
prevenient grace is a natural endowment of the human soul. This providential prevenient 
grace erodes the consequences of original sin. This natural endowment is universally 
present in the human soul correcting the infirmities of the will. Humans, therefore, enjoy 
an undamaged freedom of will capable of spiritual and moral good, prepare themselves 
for further reception of grace, and obey God’s commandments.88 This prevenient grace, 
however, is not sufficient for achieving ultimate salvation, but only to prepare for faith 
and demonstrate worthiness of receiving further assistance from God. For this strongly 
synergistic view of salvation, Biel became the target of Protestant reformers like Calvin 
and Luther, especially against his [in]famous axiom: Facientibus quod in se est Deus non 
denegat gratiam. This means that humans, for Biel, could attain salvation by a congruous 
working of grace and free will. The greatest problem with Biel’s conceptualization of 
prevenient grace or love is that although it is not “a human task insofar as it is God alone 
who can infuse it in us; but we are responsible for the preparation and the later 
preservation” of salvific grace and love.89 Arminius, we will see, like Luther will 
disprove Biel’s conclusions of a natural prevenient grace as well as a human preparation 
for grace.  
                                                
88 See Gregory Graybill, Evangelical Free Will: Phillip Melanchthon’s Doctrinal 
Journey On the Origins of Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 41. 
89 Heiko A. Oberman, Dawn of the Reformation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1992), 114. 
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Finally, it is vital to pay attention to an important figure who just preceded 
Arminius’s time, Louis de Molina (1535–1600), who is one of the medieval theologians 
that most extensively used the concept of prevenient grace in his writings. He paid 
attention to the concept of prevenient grace because of the preeminent consideration that 
the Council of Trent gave to this idea. At this point, it seems useful to consider briefly the 
discussions of Trent before paying attention to Molina’s conceptualization of prevenient 
grace.  
The Council of Trent (Concilium Tridentinum), after decades of open opposition, 
negotiations, political struggles, and war, finally met in its first session on December 13, 
1545.90 During the theological discussions, the conciliar fathers focused on answering 
objections, mainly on Scripture and soteriology, raised by the Reformers. The concept of 
justification proved to be challenging for the theologians in the Council, because there 
were among the participants sympathizers of Luther’s forensic views on justification.91 
Such sympathizers wanted to hold the Catholic traditional view on the role of human and 
meritorious works in salvation while at the same time integrate some of Luther’s 
teachings. Thus, it is not surprising that the Council returned to the Augustinian concept 
                                                
90 A. G. Dickens, The Counter Reformation (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), 
107–108; John W. O’Malley, Trent: What Happened at the Council (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 49–76; Guiseppe Alberigo, “Trent, Council of” in The 
Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, Hans J. Hillerbrand, ed. (Oxford, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 173; Michael A. Mullet, The Catholic Reformation (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 30–31. Mullet went on to speculate that the chief opponent to a 
Council was the Pope himself. Indeed, by the time of the Reformation, the Papacy had 
already developed a significant aversion to conciliar claims. 
91 Woodbridge, Church History, 212. 
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of prevenient grace, at least in the justification of adults, to achieve such a balance. It is 
essential to explore the Decree Concerning Original Sin and the Decree Concerning 
Justification to understand Trent’s contribution to the concept of prevenient grace.  
The Council carefully avoided clearly defining the nature of original sin. It 
limited itself to saying, first, that original sin is; second, that sin is transmitted by 
propagation as a result of the rebellion of Adam against God; third, that the loss of 
holiness and justice, guilt, and death are the drastic effects of original sin.92 Finally, that 
although human freedom of will “was by no means extinguished,” it is “weakened in its 
power and [is] downward bent.”93 In this condition, humans are by nature powerless to 
liberate themselves from the power of Satan and death.94  
At this point the Council recognized that humans are in need of God’s grace as a 
remedy for restoration, regeneration, and help. It is obvious that the Council understood 
that prevenient grace came to humans in different ways and times. On the one hand, 
during infant baptism, prevenient grace works as an infused power that regenerates, 
remits the guilt of original sin, and makes the soul “innocent, immaculate, pure, guiltless, 
and beloved by God.”95  On the other hand, prevenient grace in adults works as a helping, 
quickening, calling, illuminating power of the Holy Spirit persuading human beings to 
                                                
92 H. J. Schroeder, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent: Original Text 
with Translation (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book, 1941), 21–22. 
93 Trent, 30. 
94 Trent, 30. 
95 Trent, 23. 
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“turn themselves from the fear of divine justice to consider the mercy of God.”96 The 
Council clearly declares, 
the beginning of that justification is to be derived from the predisposing grace 
(praeveniente gratia) of God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation 
(vocatione), whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they are called; that 
so they, who by sins were alienated from God, may be disposed through His 
quickening (excitantem) and assisting (adjuvantem) grace, to convert themselves to 
their own justification, by freely assenting (assentiendo) to and co-operating 
(cooperando) with that said grace.97 
In this manner, the Council understood that prevenient grace is not an integral part 
of justification, but only the initial preparation for justification. In other words, for the 
conciliar theologians, prevenient grace prepares the soul for the subsequent work of 
justification. For that reason, the effects of prevenient grace are limited to producing hope 
and trust in God’s mercy, to quicken the wounded freedom of the will, to love God as the 
source of all justice, to move the soul against the desire of sin and rebellion, to repent, 
and finally to resolve to receive baptism.98 The Council believed that the effects of 
                                                
96 Trent, 31–33. 
97 Trent, 31–32. The Latin Version of Chapter V in the Decree Concerning 
Justification is: “Declarat praetera, ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per 
Christum Jesum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab ejus vocatione, quia 
nullis eorumexsistentibus meritis vocantur, ut qui per peccatta a Deo aversi erant, per ejus 
exitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad covertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem, 
eidem gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando, disponantur, ita ut tangente Deo cor 
hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem neque homo ipse nihil omnino agat, 
inspirationem illam recipiens, quipped qui illam et abjicere potest, neque tamen sine 
gratia Dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate possit. Unde in sacris 
litteris cum dicitur: ‘Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos,’ libertatis nostrae 
admonemur; cur respondemus: ‘ Convertere nos Domine ad te, et convertemur,’ Dei nos 
gratia praeveniri confitemur,” Trent, 310. 
98 Trent, 34–35. 
 126 
prevenient grace dispose humans toward God and the desire for a new life in conformity 
to the divine law as it is expressed in passages like Hebrews 11:6; Matthew 9:2; 28:19; 
Mark 2:5; Acts 2:38; and 1 Kings 7:3.  
There are some points to underline in the Council’s understanding of the doctrine 
of prevenient grace. First, the Council recognizes that prevenient grace is granted to 
human beings as a gift of God. There is no human merit involved in the reception and 
resulting effects of prevenient grace in the believers. Second, the Council insisted on the 
resistible operation of prevenient grace, at least to adults. Human beings must cooperate 
with prevenient grace in order to receive its benefits. The Council’s active synergistic 
view of salvation grants equal emphasis to God’s prevenient grace and human freedom of 
will. Such a reality can be perceived in the biblical texts on which the Council relied. 
Citing Zacharias 1:3, the Council strongly supports human liberty (libertati nostra) and 
the freedom of will power of humans “to convert themselves to their own justification” 
and to turn “themselves from the fear of divine justice.” Prevenient grace, therefore, is 
only a concurrent instrument with the freedom of will. Although by pointing to 
Lamentations 5:21 the Council emphasizes the necessity of God’s prevenient grace 
(gratia praeveniri) as the prime “vocation, quickening, helping, and illumination” of the 
Holy Spirit,99 it defended an equal participation of the human will in the work of 
conversion. Therefore, for the Council, the cooperation of the human will with God’s 
                                                
99 Trent, 32. 
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prevenient grace is not limited to the acceptance (assentiendo) of God’s proposition of 
salvation; rather, it implies a meritorious work on the part of the believer. 
Molina defends the Council’s view on the role of prevenient grace in human 
salvation. Indeed, he continually refers to the Council as his authority on prevenient 
grace.100 For Molina, prevenient grace is an instrument of the Holy Spirit to prevent 
[precede], excite, draw, and invite the human freedom of will to believe, hope, love, and 
repent.101 It is not possible to attain salvation without this unmerited prevenient and 
exciting grace of the Holy Spirit.102 This particular assistance works not only in the will 
but also in the intellect of the individuals. Then, prevenient grace illuminates the human 
                                                
100 Luis de Molina, Concordia del libre arbitrio con los dones de la gracia y con 
la presciencia, providencia, predestinación y reprovación divinas, trans. Juan Antonio 
Hevia Echevarría (Oviedo, España: Pentalfa, 2007), 72, 79, 322, 323, 326–328. There are 
limited sources that analyze the concept of prevenient grace in Molina’s writings. Kirk R. 
MacGregor’s biography on the life and work of Molina barely touches on the concept of 
prevenient grace. Although he quotes Molina affirming, “free will is not sufficient 
without prevenient grace,” he does not completely develop the implications of the will 
and the prevenient grace as equal cause of accepting divine salvation in Molina’s 
soteriology. I believe that in many instances for Molina prevenient grace is only a passive 
agent of conversion in the hands of human freedom of will. This means that I found more 
emphasis on the role of free will than on the role of prevenient grace in Molina’s 
conceptualization. See MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 70–71; 72n117. 
101 “Afirmanos que la gracia previniente a través de la cual el Espíritu previene, 
excita, atrae e invita al arbitrio del adulto a realizar los actos de creer, tener esperanzas, 
amar y arrepentirse, es un instrumento a través del cual el Espíritu Santo concurre de 
modo eficiente e influye con el propio arbitrio sobre la producción de estos actos, cuando 
el arbitrio consiente con esta gracia e influye y coopera con ella en estos actos,” 
Concordia, 326–327. 
102 “Ciertamente, no depende de ningún mérito, ni de ningún vigor, que, por estas 
disposiciones, recibanos la gracia preveniente, sino que, cada vez que se nos otorga, 
únicamente se nos confiere . . . en virtud de los méritos de Cristo, del don de Dios y, por 
ello, de manera absolutamente misericordiosa,” Concordia, 82. 
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understanding to assent with the articles of faith and, at the same time, invites the will to 
live according to the assent of faith.103 In this manner, Molina assumes the preceding role 
of the preaching, teaching, and reading of the Word and the teaching of the Church to the 
divine infusion of God’s prevenient grace. To this point, it is clear that for Molina, 
similar to the Council, the role of prevenient grace is limited to that of an assisting 
instrument to the human will and understanding in the beginning of the process of 
believing and understanding.104   
In this manner, Molina assumes a human free will and understanding able to 
cooperate with the assistance of prevenient grace. Certainly for Molina the human will is 
wounded and the intellect clouded, but they are essential agents to the act of believing 
and faith. Molina elsewhere defends the idea that the prevenient grace of God 
accomplishes nothing without the consent of human free will. This means that the 
effectual working of prevenient grace is not coming before [preceding] but simultaneous 
[concurrent] with the freedom of will. The following passages illustrate how Molina 
presents the equal concurrence of the freedom of will and prevenient grace:  
                                                
103 “Pero como la voluntad no necesita de la gracia previniente en menor medida 
que el entendimiento y como también depende de su libre mandato que el entendimiento 
asienta a los artículos de fe, ciertamente, por medio de un movimiento no menos especial, 
la gracia previene e invita a la voluntad a ordenar el asentimiento de la fe,” Concordia, 
80.  
104 “De aquí se sigue que la gracia que antecede al primer acto [de creer] no sea 
un don habitual sino una iluminación del entendimiento y una moción y afeción de la 
voluntad por auxilios particulares, que cesan en cuanto aparece el primer acto de creer,” 
Concordia, 80.  
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The supernatural assenting of faith depends in an efficient manner simultaneously as 
much on God, through his internal vocation and prevenient grace, as on the free will 
that consents and freely cooperates” with God.105   
We should not merely attribute to prevenient grace that some who listen to the Gospel 
becomes believers and others do not, but also we must have a place for the free will 
of each individual, which means a person having at his/her disposal the help of grace 
that a sinner might or not be converted.106  
Although God does not distribute the gift of prevenient, exciting, and cooperative 
grace to come to Christ according to the qualitative use of free will and the expected 
cooperation of the adult, but only according to His will, yet the voluntary cooperation 
derived of the free will that the adult naturally possesses . . . depends on such an 
adult, with one or more helps, coming to Christ here and now.107  
Because our will is free—when God touches the will and incites it by prevenient 
grace—to give consent or rejection and by it to consummate or not the act of 
believing, of having hope and of repenting, certainly it is evident, in the first place, 
that our free will and the prevenient grace are two parts of one total cause of the act of 
believing, of having hope and of repenting in the required venue to reach salvation. 
Secondly, each one of these acts depends on both the influence of the free will and of 
the prevenient grace.108 
                                                
105 “El asentimiento sobrenatural de la fe depende simultaneamente de modo 
eficiente tanto de Dios, a traves de su vocacion interna y su gracia previniente, como del 
libre albedrio que consiente y coopera libremente en este asentimiento,” Concordia, 85. 
106 “No sólo debemos atribuir a la gracia previniente que algunos de los que 
escuchan el Evangelio se conviertan y otros no, sino que también debemos dejar un lugar 
al libre arbitrio de cada uno, del que depende que, teniendo a su disposición el auxilio de 
la gracia, un pecador se convierta o no,” Concordia, 99. 
107 “Aunque Dios no distribuya los dones de gracia previniente, excitante y 
cooperante para llegar a Cristo según la cualidad del uso del libre albedrío y de la 
cooperación prevista del adulto, sino tan sólo según su voluntad, sin embargo, de la 
cooperación libre del propio arbitrio que el adulto posee de manera innata . . . depende 
que el adulto, con unos y otros auxilios, llegue a Cristo aquí y ahora,” Concordia, 103. 
108 “Como nuestro arbitrio es libre—cuando Dios lo toca y lo incita por medio del 
auxilio de la gracia previniente—para otorgar su consentimiento o su rechazo y, por ello, 
realizar o no el acto de creer, de tener esperanzas o de arrepentirse, ciertamente, es 
evidente, en primer lugar, que nuestro libre arbitrio y la gracia previniente son dos partes 
de una sola causa total del acto de creer, de tener esperanzas o de arrepentirse del modo 
 
 130 
On this basis, Molina also sees prevenient grace as a divine intervention in those 
who arduously prepare themselves for grace. In this case, Molina is not completely at 
odds with Biel’s Facientibus. He clearly says that God is willing to confer prevenient 
grace on those who “attempt” or “are ready to attempt” to use the “natural strengths” of 
their free will.109 For Molina this preparation to receive God’s prevenient grace, even 
though unmerited, depends “in great measure on the free will of who will receive [it] and 
the impulse of the Church and its ministers.”110 This ecclesiological and robust 
synergistic emphasis of prevenient grace seems to concede to the human freedom of will 
equal meritorious accomplishment to the prevenient grace of God in the working of 
salvation.    
Elsewhere Molina assumes that humans could freely use their freedom of will 
with the assistance of prevenient grace to reach salvation. Molina closely follows 
Aquinas in this aspect, limiting prevenient grace to an accident in the soul that God uses 
to guide humans to him.111 So for Molina, similar to Aquinas, prevenient grace exists in 
                                                
requerido para alcanzar la salvación y, en segundo lugar, que cada uno de estos actos 
depende del influjo tanto del libre arbitrio como de la gracia previniente,” Concordia, 
304. 
109 “Cuando quiera que el libre arbitrio, en virtud de sus fuerzas naturales, intente 
o esté presto a intentar todo aquello que está en sí mismo—tanto en realación a lo que 
hay que aprender y abrazar en materia de fe, como en relación al dolor de los pecados 
para alcanzar la justificación—, Dios conferirá la gracia previniente o los auxilios con 
objeto de que el hombre obre como es necesario para alcanzar su salvación,” Concordia, 
87, 88, 99. 
110 Concordia, 99. 
111 Concordia, 304–305. 
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the human soul just as any other accident, like the potential of becoming a swimmer or a 
musician, exists in an individual. This accidental nature of prevenient grace is so central 
for Molina that he believes that prevenient grace is part of the process of salvation only 
because God has sovereignly decided to follow this method of a mutual concurrence 
between human will and prevenient grace. However, God as primary cause, if he wished, 
could lead the human freedom of will to salvation without mediating the role of 
prevenient grace.112 It seems to me that Molina used the concept of prevenient grace to 
avoid the charge of Pelagianism and at the same time to make human freedom of will 
central in his soteriology without negating God’s sovereign work.   
Prevenient Grace in the Theology of  
the Protestant Reformation  
A consideration of the way in which an individual turns away from sin to grace 
and submission to God was a central focus of the Reformers. In this context, the role of 
human will and God’s sovereign grace increasingly become a point of contention. On this 
topic, Martin Luther and John Calvin shared similar views, namely that later 
developments came to a more rigid and limited understanding of the role of free will in 
the work of salvation. They emphasized God’s sovereign grace and human weakness to 
do something to receive salvation to the point that it appears that humanity is only a 
passive agent in the whole process of redemption.  
                                                
112 See Concordia, 247–248. 
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Martin Luther 
Martin Luther in his most important treatise on the topic of grace and free will, 
The Bondage of the Will, clearly stated that the role of humans in salvation is to recognize 
humbly that “salvation is utterly beyond [their] own powers, counsel, will, and works, 
and absolutely depending on the will, counsel, pleasure, and work of another, that is, of 
God only.”113 I think that Arminius would not have dissented with this statement if 
presented in the context of human spiritual inability. Nevertheless, because it is in the 
context of a strict view of God’s sovereign and necessary will in predestination, surely he 
would have argued against it. Luther said that God knows “nothing by contingency, but 
that he foresees, and does all things according to His immutable eternal, and infallible 
will.”114 Luther defended this view even before he started the Reformation. In this 
Commentary on Romans, Luther stated that divine providence or predestination is the 
unique foundation “from which it originally comes that one believes or not, is rid of sin 
or not rid of it.”115 God, therefore, offers salvific grace in a sovereign, irresistible, and 
limited way to those who have been elected for eternal salvation, while he leaves behind 
the rest in eternal condemnation. More importantly, in this view of predestination, for 
Luther, “our depraved will” does not participate, not even in the acceptance of the grace 
of God.  
                                                
113 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. Henry Cole (Lexington, KY: 
Legacy, 2011), 21. 
114 Ibid., 13. 
115 Martin Luther, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, trans. J. Theodore 
Mueller (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 1976), xxiii–xxiv. 
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Arminius possessed several books by Luther, among them, Luther’s Commentary 
on Galatians and the treatise on free will, de Servo Arbitrio.116 For this reason, it is quite 
surprising and intriguing that Arminius mentioned Luther as one of the great theologians 
that opposed predestination.117 Assuming that Arminius actually read Luther’s de Servo 
Arbitrio, how is it that he concluded that Luther rejected or modified his views on 
predestination? One could speculate that Arminius refered to his knowledge of 
Lutheranism from the Formula of Concord and Melanchthon’s writings, and 
consequently assumed that Luther at that time believed in a similar idea. Unfortunately, 
Arminius did not offer any evidence to support his assertion.  
However, I believe that we can speculate that Arminius noted in Luther’s treatise  
two aspects of God in relation to salvation: the “revealed God” and the “hidden God.”118  
The revealed God of Scripture, for Luther, must be the focus of human beings. God 
revealed in Jesus and the Scripture is the paramount evidence of God’s will to impart 
salvation and restore humanity to His image. Luther relegates predestination, the work of 
the hidden God, to a secondary plane, encouraging his readers to “worry first about Christ 
and the Gospel,” along with recognizing personal sin, and the grace of God.119 In this 
context, Luther clearly explained that the revealed God desires that “all men should be 
                                                
116 C. O. Bangs, The Action Catalogue of the Library of J. Arminius: A Facsimile 
Edition with an Introduction (Utrecht, the Netherlands: Hes, 1985), 14, 18. 
117 Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 128; Decl. Sent. in Works 1:642. 
118 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 50–51. 
119 Luther, Commentary on Romans, xxxiv. 
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saved,” and “comes to all by the word of salvation.”120 He came to affirm further that the 
frustration of God’s desires is not the fault of God, but the rejection by the human will. 
However, even in this case he made clear that the human will needs the irresistible action 
of God in order to accept that salvation.121 Luther wondered why everyones’s will is not 
overpowered by God; however, he thinks that the motive remains unrevealed in the 
“hidden God” of predestination.  
Arminius surely would have found some inconsistency in Luther’s 
conceptualization of predestination. He might even have thought that Luther was open to 
some participation of the will given his concept of the “revealed God.”122 In any case, 
Arminius was certain that Lutherans during his lifetime did not agree with Calvin on the 
concept of limited grace. While further studies are necessary to establish to what degree, 
if any, Luther changed his view on predestination, Arminius was completely sure that 
Phillip Melanchthon had clearly departed from the teaching of unconditional 
predestination. In the next section, I will consider Melanchthon’s teaching on prevenient 
grace as a possible source of Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace. However, before 
                                                
120 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 51. 
121 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 51. He says: “But why that Majesty [God] does 
not take away or change this fault of the will in all, seeing that, it is not in the power of 
man to do it; or why he lays that to change the will, which the man cannot avoid, it 
becomes us not to inquire.” 
122 For Arminius, different than Luther, God’s will is clearly revealed in Scripture. 
Arminius believed that to say that there is a “hidden” and a “revealed” will in God 
amounts to affirms that “there are two wills in God, contrary to each other.” Then, he 
concluded that if there is something “hidden” in God, it is not His will, but His 
knowledge of those whose who will be save or will be damned. See, Rom. IX, in Works, 
3:505–506; Gomarus Exam., in Works, 3:556–558. 
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considering Melanchthon, it seems to be important to review briefly what I consider 
Calvin’s rejection of prevenient grace.  
John Calvin 
John Calvin also emphasized the primacy of God’s sovereign grace. I will not 
spend time describing Calvin’s position on this topic because his conceptualizations on 
irresistible grace, free will, and predestination are, I think, well known. Rather, I will 
briefly discuss Calvin’s understanding of the concept of prevenient grace as a healing and 
irresistible power to restore and more precisely to recreate the will.  
Calvin clearly affirmed the anticipation of grace to the human will in salvation. 
For him—and I would say for Arminius—it cannot be otherwise because the depravity of 
the will is so profound that it “cannot move and act except in the direction of evil.”123 It is 
this depraved will that is in need of conversion. Calvin returned to Philippians 1:6 in 
order to explain not only the initiation of conversation but the whole process, all the way 
to the final result. He wrote: “God begins the good work in us by exciting in our hearts a 
desire, a love, and a study of righteousness.”124 This most certainly is language akin to 
the concept of prevenient grace, and I think that Arminius would completely embrace it. 
Nevertheless, Calvin did not stop at this point. He continued by affirming that a more 
precise reality is that God works “by turning, training, and guiding our hearts unto 
                                                
123 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), 181. 
124 Ibid., 182. 
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righteousness, and he completes this good work by confirming us unto perseverance.”125 
Note that Calvin immediately changes from a language of gentle persuasion, akin to the 
concept of prevenient grace, to a language of overpowering grace that inevitably and 
without human approval concludes in the perseverance of grace. Surely Arminius would 
have disagreed with this view. As we will see, Arminius believes that between the 
“exciting” work of grace and the fulfillment of the work resulting in perseverance in 
faith, human acceptance of the gift of salvation was a most central part in the process of 
salvation.  
Thus, Calvin did not believe that prevenient or preventing grace gives human 
beings the opportunity to accept the salvific work of God. He rejected the teaching that 
the will “once it is prepared, . . . performs a part in acting.”126 Rather, he believed that 
preventing grace irresistibly “corrects, or rather destroys, our depraved will, and also 
substitutes a good will from himself.”127 There is no human participation. He makes that 
clear, affirming: “Inasmuch as it is prevented [preceded] by grace, I have no objection to 
your calling [free will] a handmaid; but inasmuch as when formed again, it is the work of 
the Lord, it is erroneous to say that it accompanies preventing grace as a voluntary 
attendant.”128 In sum, for Calvin, the human will is sovereignly “formed again” from its 
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total depravity and death, but it does not have any role in accepting the preventing grace 
of God once it has been freed.  
In this respect, we will find in the works of Phillip Melanchthon and the 
Anabaptist preachers a more positive view on the role of human will in salvation after the 
work of prevenient grace. I will turn now to consider their conceptualization of this topic.  
Phillip Melanchthon  
A central and controversial aspect of Phillip Melanchthon’s theology is his 
understanding about the participation of human beings in the work of conversion.129 His 
                                                
129 For a complete account of Melanchthon’s views on the relationship between 
God’s grace and human freedom of will, see articles IV, V, IX, X, XV. Phillip 
Melanchthon’s three causes of conversion and his latter rejection of predestination and 
divine determinism in salvation evidence his synergistic soteriology. Early in 1521, 
Melanchthon sided with Luther in the controversy with Erasmus. It is possible to read in 
his work a strong view of determinism and predestination in salvation. However, the 
influence of Erasmus guides Melanchthon to consider carefully the early Church Fathers 
like Basil of Caesarea, Chrysostom, and Gregory of Nazianzus. The influences of these 
early theologians appears in the 1526 Loci Communes edition, in which Melanchthon 
divides the human freedom of will into temporal and spiritual spheres, and restricts the 
captivity of the will to the spiritual realm. By 1535, with the publication of the Loci 
Communes and Commentary on Romans, we see a definitive, clear, and final rejection of 
deterministic predestination as well as the acceptance of a role for human free will in the 
spiritual realm. This freedom of will in spiritual matters is however restricted to the 
acceptance of salvation and always under the influence and support of the Word 
(Scriptures) and the Holy Spirit. 
Nevertheless, Melanchthon scholars are divided on this issue. On the one hand, 
several scholars suggests a discontinuity in Melanchthon’s understanding of the role of 
free will in salvation from a strict view of predestination to a synergistic view of God’s 
grace and human freedom of will. See James William Richard, Philip Melanchthon: The 
Protestant Preceptor of Germany 1497–1560 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898); E. 
P. Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought: The Doctrines of Christ and Grace, 
the Trinity, and the Creation (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1983); Timothy J. Wengert, 
“Philip Melanchthon and the Origins of the ‘Three Causes’ (1533–1535): An 
Examination of the Roots of the Controversy over the Freedom of Will” in Irene Dingel, 
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polemical statement about the three causes of conversion has created much debate among 
scholars down to the present day. In the 1535, 1543, and 1559 editions of Loci 
Communes Melanchthon writes about the three causes in conversion, namely “the Word, 
the Holy Spirit and the Will which assents to and does not contend against the Word of 
God.”130  
                                                
Robert Kolb, Nicole Kuropka, and Timothy J. Wengert, Philip Melanchthon: Theologian 
in Classroom, Confession, and Controversy (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2012); Gregory B. Graybill, Evangelical Free Will: Philipp Melanchthon’s 
Doctrinal Journey on the Origins of Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Oliver K. Olson, Matthias Flacius and the Survival of Luther’s Reform (Wiesbaden, 
Germany: Harrasswitz, 2002); Clyde L. Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2008); Robert Stupperich, Melanchthon, trans. Robert H. 
Fisher (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965). On the other hand, other scholars believe that 
Melanchthon’s view did not undergo any change regarding this topic. They argue that 
Melanchthon always supported Luther’s view. See Michael Rogness, Melanchthon: 
Reformer without Honor (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1969); H. Ashley Hall, Philip 
Melanchthon and the Cappadocians: A Reception of Greek Patristic Sources in the 
Sixteenth Century (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2014); Timothy J. 
Wengert, Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon’s Exegetical 
Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
130 Phillip Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes 
1543, trans. J. A. Preus (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1992), 43; see also Phillip 
Melanchthon, The Chief Theological Topics: Loci Praecipui Theologici 1559, trans. J. A. 
O. Preus, 2nd ed. (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 2011), 61, 63. Lutheran leaders and 
scholars expressed their opposition to Melanchthon’s synergism in the Lutheran Formula 
of Concord (1577). They affirmed that in conversion “through the preaching and the 
hearing of His Word, God is active, breaks our hearts, and draws man, so that through the 
preaching of the Law man learns to know his sins . . . and experiences genuine terror, 
contrition and sorrow. . . and through the preaching of the holy Gospel. . . there is kindled 
in him a spark of faith which accepts the forgiveness of sins for Christ’s sake.” Evidently, 
this declaration accentuated the unique role of divine agency through the Spirit and the 
Word negating any role to the human freedom of will. However, it seems to me that the 
declaration is broad enough to permit interpretations that could grant a role to the human 
will, at least in the acceptance of salvation. 
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In this way, Melanchthon clearly suggests that humans have a role in conversion. 
However, according to Melanchthon, human participation arises from God’s grace and 
not from human nature or ability. Like Luther, Melanchthon supported a radical view on 
the total corruption, moral inability, and spiritual perversity of human beings. In its 
natural condition without the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the human heart “is in 
darkness, it most ardently loves itself, seeks its own desires and wishes nothing but carnal 
things and despises God.”131 This is because sin, says Melanchthon, eroded the natural 
powers, leaving human nature “very weak.”132 At this point, Melanchthon came to 
distinguish the impact of sin on human’s faculties. While human capacities of 
understanding—like the intellect, the power to distinguish between good and evil, and the 
power to comprehend the teaching of the law—were clouded but not lost; the “good 
virtues in the heart and will,” namely, the love of God, the trust in God, and the true fear 
of God, were completely lost.133 In such a condition, humans are incapable of returning to 
God and performing spiritual good. Melanchthon made this point absolutely clear:  
When we speak about this great ruin of human powers, we are talking about free will, 
for man’s will and heart are wretchedly imprisoned, impaired, and ruined, so that 
inwardly man’s heart and will are unlike the divine law, offensive and hostile to it, 
and man cannot by his own inward natural powers be obedient.134 
                                                
131 Loci, 52. 
132 Phillip Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes 
1555, translated by Clyde L. Manschreck (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1965), 
52. 
133 Loci 1555, 52–53. 
134 Loci 1555, 52. In the 1559 edition, he added: “The mind of the unregenerate is 
filled with doubts about God, their hearts are without true fear of God, without true trust, 
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Melanchthon discovers this reality not only in the daily evidence from the 
“outward behavior” of the unregenerate, but more precisely, from the internal evidence of 
the Word of God. In the testimony of the Word of God, Melanchthon affirms, it “is 
certain that men [human beings] do not have the freedom to overcoming [the] depravity 
which is born within us.”135  
The Role of Human Will  
Melanchthon, however, did not believe that humans are passive agents in the 
work of conversion. He states, “we should not think that a man is a piece of wood or a 
stone, but as we hear the word of God, in which punishment and comfort are put forth, 
we should neither despise nor resist it.”136 Undoubtedly, for Melanchthon, the will of man 
in conversion either resists the divine actions like Pharaoh and Saul, or freely assents like 
David in his conversion.137 “For the will could disregard the Word of God, as Saul did of 
his own free will. But when the mind, hearing and sustaining itself, does not resist or 
indulge in hesitation, but with the aid of the Holy Spirit tries to assent, in this contest the 
will is not idle.”138 It is precisely in this context that He adjoins the three causes: The 
Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will.  
                                                
and they have enormous desires to act against the law of God,” Loci Praecipui, 59. 
135 Loci Praecipui, 59. 
136 Loci 1555, 60. 
137 Loci Praecipui, 62. 
138 Ibid., 61. 
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He quoted from Chrysostom and the biblical record to support his view. 
According to Melanchthon, Chrysostom assured that “God draws man, however, he 
draws the one who is willing, not the one who resists,”139 and the biblical record in 
Revelation 3:20 and the parable of the lost son (Lk 15:11–32) clearly show that divine 
agency expects a human response to the invitation to salvation. He further said about the 
role and balance between God’s aid and human response, “the Son of God will be with 
us, come to us, and will give us aid, because he knows our misery,” but “only let us not 
push him away, but ask him for help”140 (Heb 13:21; Col 1:9, 10). 
The Prevenient Grace of God 
Melanchthon, however, finally came to qualify the participation of human beings 
in the work of salvation. He continued supporting the necessity of an initial, previous, 
and necessary work of the divine grace before any human capacity to respond to or 
accept salvation. He openly reverted to the doctrine of prevenient grace to explain the 
relation between the Word, the Holy Spirit and human freedom of will. Melanchthon 
affirmed that good spiritual works “arose out of preceding [prevenient] grace and 
assenting will.”141  Before the positive answer of the human will, Melanchthon affirmed 
                                                
139 Loci 1555, 60. 
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141 Loci Praecipui, 61. Melanchthon refers here to the ancient view of Christian 
theologians like Basil and Chrysostom, “Veteres dixerunt: Praecedente gratia, comitante 
voluntate, bona opera fieri,” Philip Melanchthon, Philippi Melanthonis Opera Quae 
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that “God has previously turned us, calls, warns, and helps us.”142 Thus, in this manner, 
he manifestly articulated the concept of prevenient grace in his theology of conversion in 
that he primarily exalted the central role of the Holy Spirit as the “divine motion in 
us.”143  
He stated, “God is not received where the Holy Spirit has not first enlightened and 
kindled the understanding, will, and heart.”144 Explaining 1 Corinthians 2:11, 
Melanchthon concludes: “the natural man knows not the Spirit of God, that is, if God is 
not present in our natural power, in our heart and soul . . . if we are not comforted by the 
gospel and Holy Spirit.” Likewise, Ephesians 4:24 suggests that the “Holy Spirit is not a 
lazy being; he kindles light and fire in the soul and heart in such a manner that the soul 
and heart also possess a better knowledge of God and an initial love and longing for 
Him.”145 In this manner, Melanchthon argued, “God both made the beginning in them 
and will further strengthen them.”146 His doctrine of prevenient grace, therefore, is 
strongly pneumatological.  
                                                
142 Ibid., 61. “Deus antevertit nos, vocat, movet, audivat,” Melanthonis Opera, 
658. 
143 Loci 1555, 162. The centrality of the Holy Spirit’s role in conversion, in the 
beginning of Christian life, and in salvation is widely present in Melanchthon’s 
soteriology. He states, without the work of the Holy Spirit “in our hearts, there is not true 
faith, and comfort and love to God. (Romans 8:9, 16; John 15:5; Galatians 4:6),” Loci, 
60. 
144 Loci 1555, 52. 
145 Loci 1555, 60. 
146 Loci 1555, 60. Melanchthon quotes several biblical passages to support his 
conclusions. For instance, Luke 11:9, 13; Mark 9:24; and Romans 8:26. 
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Melanchthon further believed that the work of the Holy Spirit through prevenient 
grace is made possible by the Scriptures. For him, the Holy Spirit uses the preaching of 
the gospel and the law to awaken the sinner to accept and receive God’s grace.147 In this 
manner, the teaching and preaching of the Holy Scriptures becomes a central element in 
the work of prevenient grace. He assured the reader, “God is present in this comfort. He 
is active, through the external word, and kindles faith in the heart. But these are all 
together – the external word, contemplation of the external word in us, and the Son of 
God, who works through the external word, manifests the eternal Father, speaks to the 
heart, and gives the Holy Spirit, which produces love and joy in God.”148 Melanchthon 
consistently maintained the anticipation of God’s prevenient grace in the work of the 
Holy Spirit and the Word to human willingness. In the following quotation, he explains 
this reality:  
Concerning free will we have said elsewhere that since in conversion our will must be 
moved by the Word of God, this Word must certainly be heard, and since with the 
Word of God the Holy Spirit does His work, raising up and helping our hearts, we are 
to sustain ourselves with faith. Nor should we idly indulge in mistrust or vices against 
conscience, nor trouble the Holy Spirit, but rather give assent to the Word of God and 
follow the Holy Spirit. In this spiritual struggle we feel that our will in contending 
against doubt and other vices is not idle.149 
In this sense, Melanchthon speaks of a freedom of grace or freed will enabled by 
the power of the Holy Spirit and the message of the Word of God. There should be no 
doubt that Melanchthon refers to prevenient grace here because Martin Chemnitz (1522–
                                                
147 Loci 1555, 154–155. 
148 Loci 1555, 158–159. 
149 Loci Praecipui, 169. 
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1586), a balanced Lutheran theologian, makes it clear in his commentary on 
Melanchthon’s De Humanis Veribus Seu De Libero Arbitrio. He states: “The things 
which have been said about prevenient, preparatory, and operating grace have this 
meaning, that the initial stages in conversion are not ours, but God—through the Word 
and divine inspiration—goes before us, moves and impels our will. After this movement 
of the will has been accomplished by divine power, then the will is not purely passive, 
but, moved and aided by the Holy Spirit, it ceases to resist and assents and is co-operative 
(synergos) with God.”150 
Another important aspect of Melanchthon’s doctrine of grace and freedom of will 
is the universality of grace. He clearly states that “the promise is universal and in God 
there are not conflicting wills.”151 For this reason, prevenient grace is the universal 
working of the Holy Spirit in the human heart. For Melanchthon the reason why some 
people accept while others reject God’s offer of salvation is not to be found in an obscure 
counsel of divine election, but in the lively relationship of human free will, the Word, and 
the Holy Spirit. He advises that when considering Christian conversion and the remission 
of sin, “questions about predestination should be laid aside.”152 He subsequently states, 
“the preaching of repentance pertains to all people, so the promise of grace is universal 
                                                
150 Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, trans. J. A. O. Preus, vol. 1 (St. Louis, MO: 
Concordia, 1989), 249. 
151 Loci Praecipui, 63. 
152 Ibid., 168. 
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and brings reconciliation to all.”153 For him, the “universal statements” in biblical 
passages like Matthew 11:28, John 3:16, Romans 3:22, 11:32, and 1 Timothy 2:4 
undoubtedly affirm the universality of the “promise of grace.”154 
To conclude, Melanchthon understood the work of prevenient grace as the 
conjoined work of the Trinity, especially the Holy Spirit and the Scripture that 
universally empowers and kindles the human will. More specifically, prevenient grace is 
the work of the Holy Spirit as agent of salvation working through the preaching of the 
gospel and law to cleanse the heart, to destroy the natural enmity of humans against God, 
and to empower the will to accept the offer of salvation. Then, conversion is finally made 
possible by the free response of human beings, because for Melanchthon the necessary 
assistance of God’s grace does not erode the necessary working of the human will. 
Certainly, according to Melanchthon, the axiom “praecedente gratia, comitante 
voluntate” speaks of the necessary prevenient work of the Holy Spirit and the Word, but 
also that “the will follows and does not resist.”155 
Although more studies and careful analysis of Melanchthon’s and Arminius’s 
works needs to be done, Melanchthon could be regarded as the most important influence 
in Arminius’s conceptualization of prevenient grace.  
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Radical Reformers  
The radical reformers preached with greater emphasis on “the experience of 
regeneration (being “born again”) by the Spirit of God over forensic justification.”156 
Such at times overemphasis could result in a misleading identification of the Anabaptist 
preachers with Pelagian and semi-Pelagian soteriology. However their equal emphasis on 
God’s prevenient grace demonstrates Anabaptist dependence on grace as the primary 
source of human salvation. Certainly, Anabaptist preachers did not use the precise words 
“prevenient grace.” However, it is clear that they considered conversion to be the 
synergistic work of the Holy Spirit and the free response of human freedom of will.  
The theology of Balthasar Hubmaier, the greatest Anabaptist theologian of the 
first generation, clearly resembles the concept of prevenient grace.157 Hubmaier 
emphasizes that before faith and individual conversion, the Holy Spirit moves human 
beings toward God by “an inner illumination . . . through the Word of God.”158 The 
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two forms, outwardly and inwardly. The outward drawing occurs through the public 
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process of salvation begins with an “inward spiritual rebirth and regeneration.”159 
Regeneration is necessary because in the “fall, grace and freedom were to such a degree 
obscure and lost that, without an especial and new grace of God, man could not know 
what was good or evil.”160  
Then, the illumination of the Holy Spirit through the Scriptures restores the 
human free will, regenerating its lost “perception of good and evil in the sight of God.”161 
Hubmaier’s theology of prevenient grace and the resulting capacity of human freedom of 
will to accept God’s offer of salvation as the beginning of Christian life is clearly 
described in his treatise On Free Will. He points out that the soul in its natural power is 
“blind and uncomprehending” of heavenly things, but after regeneration through Christ, 
the soul  
has been awakened by the Word of God–jolted, warned, and led by the Heavenly 
Father through his comforting, his threatening word, his promise, his benefits, his 
punishments, and all other means; made whole through his dear Son; also enlightened 
through the Holy Spirit . . . thereby the soul now again comes to know what is good 
and what is evil. It has recovered its lost freedom.162  
                                                
proclamation of his holy gospel . . . the inward drawing is this, that God also illuminates 
the person’s soul inwardly, so that it understands the incontrovertible truth, convinced by 
the Spirit and the preached of the Word,” quoted by Snyder, Anabaptist History and 
Theology, 88. 
159 Snyder, Anabaptist History and Theology, 75. 
160 Balthasar Hubmaier, On Free Will, in George Huntston Williams ed., Spiritual 
and Anabaptist Writers (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962), 128. 
161 Hubmaier, On Free Will, 128. 
162 Ibid., 124. 
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Hubmaier concludes his synergistic view of salvation by affirming that after such 
regeneration the soul “can freely and willingly be obedient . . . choose the good . . . and 
reject and flee from evil” or follow after the flesh.163 He advises believers about the 
necessary consent of the freed will with God’s grace because God “created you without 
your aid, but he will not save you without your aid.”164 
Hubmaier’s understanding of the doctrine of prevenient grace is by no means a 
novel contribution among the Anabaptist preachers. Indeed, it was the common 
consensus of most of the Anabaptist writers. Hans Hut and Hans Denck, similar to 
Hubmaier, emphasize an order of salvation that begins with coming to faith by the 
hearing of the Word under the influence of the Holy Spirit.165 Denck, in his treatise 
Divine Order, elaborates a synergistic view of salvation. He clearly depicts prevenient 
grace by affirming: 
[God] gives everyone the change, grace and strength to be converted (Mt 19:26). The 
light which is the invisible Word of God shines into the hearts of all men who are 
born into the world [this is a clear reference to John 1:9]. For God has been in the 
                                                
163 Ibid., 124. 
164 Ibid., 125. What I criticize about Hubmaier is the extent of the regeneration, 
for he proposes that the work of the Holy Spirit is a complete restoration of the will to the 
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165 Hubmaier, Denck, and Hut believe that after the internal work of the Holy 
Spirit the order of salvation entails human repentance, water baptism, and Christian 
sanctified life. See Snyder, Anabaptist History and Theology, 67–72. 
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world from the beginning and he gives everyone who will accept it free choice to 
become a child of God and to inherit the kingdom of the Father (Jn 1:12).166   
Evidently, Denck believes that free choice in salvation is not the result of nature, 
but it is the result of God’s prevenient grace.  
Likewise, Conrad Grebel, Michael Sattler, Peter Riedemann, Pilgram Marpeck, 
Dirk Phillips, Menno Simons, and other Anabaptist preachers agree that the new birth 
occurs by the internal prevenient work of the Holy Spirit through the preaching of the 
Word.167 For instance, Arnold C. Snyder concludes that Michael Sattler’s soteriology is 
akin to a long history of Christian theology of God’s prevenient grace and “calling and 
man’s subsequent response.”168  
In sum, the Anabaptist view on conversion involves a synergistic soteriology. In 
such cooperation with grace, Anabaptist preachers emphasized an active and strong 
pneumatology as well as a positive and optimistic anthropology. Then, regeneration and 
new birth is the result of God’s prevenient grace by the Holy Spirit and the “yieldedness” 
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trans. Edward J. Furcha and Ford Lewis Battles (Pittsburgh, PA: Pickwick, 78–79.  He 
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of the will to God.169 Snyder qualifies the Anabaptist understanding of human 
participation in conversion by pointing to the spiritual concept of yieldedness, giving up, 
or stopping striving; here he refers to the German word Gelassenheit that surprisingly 
refers to “‘the doing’ that is ‘doing nothing.’”170 In other words, human participation in 
conversion is restricted to the free acceptance of God’s salvific gift in Christ.  
Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that prevenient grace has a long history in Christian 
theological conceptualizations of salvation. Prevenient grace, therefore, is a concept well 
integrated into soteriological ideas in Christianity. Augustine introduced the term in his 
controversy with Pelagius primarily to indicate the priority of God’s grace in salvation 
before human will and actions. According to Augustine, prevenient grace is a free gift of 
God’s love mediated to individuals through the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit 
that likewise works through the work [agency or instrumentality?] of the Church in 
preaching and teaching the Scriptures. Augustine further taught that prevenient grace 
heals and empowers the will making it possible for humans to respond to God’s offer of 
salvation, and resulting in faith and salvation.  
In close harmony with Augustine, the Second Council of Orange decided to use 
the doctrine of prevenient grace to counteract the so-called Semi-Pelagian teaching of 
John Cassian and his followers. For the Council, prevenient grace is the priority of God’s 
                                                
169 See Snyder, Following in the Footsteps of Christ, 40–41. 
170 Ibid., 41. 
 151 
mercy before human willingness to accept the divine offer of salvation. Prevenient grace 
is a gratuitous gift obtained by the internal work of the Holy Spirit in the human heart. 
This anticipatory divine grace restores human free will. Therefore, it precedes human 
faith and good will toward spiritual life, leading humans to accept baptism and a life of 
sanctity. At this point, the Council is unclear about the role of baptism in prevenient 
grace. The Council affirms both that prevenient grace leads to the acceptance of baptism 
and that prevenient grace is obtained at the moment of baptism.  
Although the Fathers did not explain this apparent contradiction, it is possible to 
think that they were referring to the different experiences of adults and children in the 
sacrament of baptism. While prevenient grace anticipates the decision of baptism in adult 
believers, it is received by children at the moment of baptism. Another important point to 
note in the deliberations of the Council is that the Fathers did not follow Augustine by 
affirming that God’s grace could be resisted and totally rejected by individuals. 
Prevenient grace works in advance in the human soul, but the human will must concur 
with the actions, calls, and offers of the Holy Spirit in order to reach the desired end of 
salvation.  
Thomas Aquinas used the doctrine of prevenient grace in many instances like 
Augustine. However, there are some differences. Aquinas accepted that prevenient grace 
is the priority of divine action before a person’s first response to God. However, he 
believed that prevenient grace was not limited to the beginning of conversion, but that it 
works throughout the whole process of salvation. This is akin to his understanding and 
acceptance of the Aristotelian principle of the first mover; namely, that every movement 
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first needs a mover. Thus, divine prevenient grace is the antecedent or first mover of all 
other effects of divine grace.  
The Council of Trent turned from Aquinas’ attention to the concept of prevenient 
grace as the starting point of conversion in the experience of mature individuals. The 
Conciliar Fathers described the role of prevenient grace in Augustinian terms. Prevenient 
grace is the initial point of justification thanks to the helping, quickening, and 
illuminating power of the Holy Spirit that heals and empowers the will. However, unlike 
Augustine, the Council contested that prevenient grace is not an integral part of 
justification. In their understanding, prevenient grace is limited to being a preparative 
work for justification. Another important difference between the Council and Augustine 
and Aquinas is the assertion of the Conciliar theologians that humans are able to resist the 
work of prevenient grace. For Augustine, though prevenient grace is not irresistible, it is 
nonetheless intrinsically efficacious and infallible.   
Melanchthon, like Augustine, strongly affirms the initiatory role of God’s grace in 
human salvation. Prevenient grace, according to Melanchthon, is the work of the Holy 
Spirit illuminating the human understanding, will, and heart. It also empowers and heals 
the human freedom of will and gives individuals the power to accept God. The Holy 
Spirit works especially through the preaching and teaching of Scripture and produces 
faith, love, and joy in God. Melanchthon also stressed the point that prevenient grace 
does not erode the decision of human free will. The will must follow the divine initiative 
and grace.  
While in Aquinas and Melanchthon, and most probably in Augustine as well, 
prevenient grace is a historical one-time experience, for the Anabaptist preachers, it  
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consists of a continual and providential act of God. Like Augustine, the Anabaptist 
preachers regard prevenient grace as the internal illumination of the Spirit through the 
Word of God. Prevenient grace restores the human’s lost perception of good and evil and 
bestows the freedom of will to follow the spiritual good. Humans have a role in accepting 
God’s grace, but the Anabaptists made clear that such a role consists in “doing nothing,” 
that is, not resisting the pull of God’s preventing grace.  
In certain ways, Catholic and Protestant theologians describe prevenient grace in a 
similar manner. All of them point to the anticipatory and gratuitous nature of prevenient 
grace. They also point to the empowering and healing role of prevenient grace upon the 
human freedom of will. Likewise, they agree that prevenient grace is the work of the 
Holy Spirit that illuminates the heart by an internal call and the external appeal of 
Scriptures. However, Melanchthon and the Anabaptist preachers’ view on the synergistic 
role of prevenient grace differs from that of Aquinas and the Conciliar theologians, and 
both differ with Augustine’s view.  
First, Augustine does not accept a synergistic view of the working of prevenient 
grace. For Augustine, prevenient grace is always effective at overcoming the human 
freedom of will. Aquinas and the Conciliar fathers have an active synergistic view of 
prevenient grace, in which the human will should cooperate with the existing measure of 
grace that it has. Differently, Melanchthon and some of the Anabaptist preachers have a 
passive synergism in which the role of free will is limited to the acceptance of salvation 
or to offering no resistance to the appeals of the Holy Spirit.
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CHAPTER 4 
 PREVENIENT GRACE IN ARMINIUS’S THEOLOGY I 
Introduction 
The doctrine of prevenient grace is not a secondary idea in Jacobus Arminius’s 
soteriology, but a central theme that pervades every aspect of Arminius’s doctrine of 
grace. This chapter discusses the nature of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology. It 
looks for the definition and nature of prevenient grace, and then offers a definition of the 
concept of prevenient grace and explores the nature of this divine grace. It also discusses 
the operation of divine prevenient grace in the human heart. It proposes that according to 
Arminius, prevenient grace as the working of the Holy Spirit operates not only externally 
but also internally in the human heart. The chapter, however, begins by considering the 
kind of human being that is in need of prevenient grace according to Arminius. The 
necessity to consider first the sinfulness of humanity underlines the reality of the human 
impossibility of finding a solution to the problem of sin. It is an individual desperately in 
need of regeneration for whom Arminius believed prevenient grace was the primary and 
most urgent solution.  
Prevenient Grace: The Need for Regeneration  
One of the most common charges against Arminius’s theology is that he negated 
original sin and the total depravity of human beings. This is obviously untrue. John 
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Wesley, a pro-Arminian theologian, clearly states that “no man that ever lived, not John 
Calvin himself, ever asserted original sin . . . in more strong, more clear and express 
terms, than Arminius has done.”1 This conclusion could be one expected from a 
sympathizer of Arminius,2 but William Cunningham and R. C. Sproul, both prominent 
Calvinist theologians, admitted Arminius’s orthodoxy in this respect. Cunningham states 
that “the statements of Arminius himself, in regard to the natural depravity of man . . . are 
full and satisfactory.”3 In a similar way Sproul asserts that "Arminius not only affirms the 
bondage of the will, but insists that natural man, being dead in sin, exists in a state of 
moral inability or impotence. What more could an Augustinian or Calvinist hope for from 
a theologian?”4 It therefore seems important to review Arminius’s doctrine of total 
depravity to understand the nature and place of the concept of prevenient grace in his 
theology.  
                                                
1 John Wesley,  The Question, What is an Arminian? Answered, quoted in 
Benjamin Myers, Milton’s Theology of Freedon (Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 2006), 
139–140, n114. 
2 See for instances, R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 141–146; Bangs, Arminius, 
337–340; James Meeuwsen, “Original Arminianism and Methodistic Arminianism 
Compared,” The Reformed Review, vol. 14, no. 1 (September, 1960): 21–23. 
3 William Cunningham, Historical Theology: A Review of the Principal Doctrinal 
Discussions in the Christian Church Since the Apostolic Age (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1863), 2:389. 
4 R. C. Sproul, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Books, 1997), 128. 
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Human Beings in Need of Prevenient Grace:  
Original Sin and Total Depravity 
Arminius recounts with particular attention and deeply Scriptural perception the 
depraved condition of all humanity since the fall. As a natural and spiritual result of the 
sin of Adam, all humans have an inherited depraved nature, a depravity that extends to all 
human faculties. In such a condition, humans are totally devoid of moral and spiritual 
capacities, making their minds completely blinded to all spiritual matters. Arminius 
acknowledges the pervasive effects of Adam’s original sin upon his offspring, stating that 
“the whole of this sin, however, is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the 
entire race and to all their posterity, who, at the time when this sin was committed, were 
in their loins, and who have since descended from them by natural mode of propagation, 
according to the primitive benediction: For in Adam ‘all have sinned.’ (Romans 5:12)”5  
As a result of this inherited sinful nature, Arminius enlists several actual 
conditions of humans as sinners pointing specifically to the extent of corruption in each 
of the faculties of human beings. Concerning human reason and spiritual life Arminius 
states that “the mind of man, in this state, is dark, destitute of the saving knowledge of 
God, and, according to the Apostle, incapable of those things which belong to the Spirit 
of God; (1 Corinthians 1:18, 24, 2:14, Romans 1:21 -22, Ephesians 4:17-18, 5:8, Titus 
                                                
5 Pub. Disp. VII, in Works, 2:156. 
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3:3.)”6 Therefore, humans are “devoid of original righteousness and holiness (Romans 
5:12, 18–19).”7  
Arminius not only pointed out the darkness of human mind that affects human 
understanding and knowledge, he also called the attention to the carnal nature of reason. 
Quoting 1 Corinthians 3:3, he links the carnality of reason with the enslavement of reason 
to the desires, passions, and commands of the flesh.8 Therefore, for Arminius, a carnal 
reason represents the offspring from where all human evil actions spread and where the 
constant fight against the work of the Spirit occurs, according with Galatians 5:17. This 
means that Arminius would reject any understanding of human depravity that describes 
human reason as untouched by sin.  
Human affections are equally depraved, Arminius states: “to the darkness of the 
mind succeeds the perverseness of the affections and of the heart, according to which it 
hates and has an aversion to that which is truly good and pleasing to God; but it loves and 
pursues what is evil (Romans 8:7, Jeremiah 13:10, 17:9, Ezekiel 36:26, Gen 6:5, 8:21, 
and Matthew 15:19).”9 As a result, all humans “are by nature children of wrath” (Eph 
2:3).10 
                                                
6 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:192. 
7 Pub. Disp., VII, in Works, 2:157. 
8 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:653. 
9 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:193. 
10 Pub. Disp., VII, in Works, 2:156. 
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The corruption of human affections particularly wounded the human freedom to 
will. Arminius clearly stated that “the free will of human being towards the true good is 
not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and weakened; but it is also imprisoned, 
destroyed, and lost.”11 Consequently, freedom of will is not only sick, but it is completely 
dead and unable to perform true good. It is evident that Arminius desired to be as clear as 
possible to avoid misunderstandings regarding his position on human free will. For that 
reason, he recalls Augustine, affirming that in every given situation corrupted individuals 
will misuse their freedom of will to choose evil. He states, “all unregenerate persons have 
freedom of will, and a capability of resisting the Holy Spirit, of rejecting the proffered 
grace of God, of despising the counsel of God against themselves, of refusing to accept 
the gospel of grace, and of not opening to Him who knocks at the door of the heart; and 
these things they can actually do, without any difference of the Elect and of the 
Reprobate.”12 Therefore, humans are actually free, but free only to do spiritual evil and 
oppose God’s purpose.  
Human brokenness extends to the internal power or disposition toward the good 
and right. Humans experience “the utter weakness (impotentia) of all the powers to 
perform that which is truly good, and to omit the perpetration of that which is evil, in a 
due mode and from a due end and cause, (Matthew 7:18, 12:34, John 6:44, Romans 8:7, 
                                                
11 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:192. 
12 Art. XVII, in Works, 2:721. 
 159 
7:5, 6:20, 2 Timothy 2:26.)”13 Quoting Romans 3:10–19 Arminius concludes that humans 
are truly “dead in sin.”14 
Arminius’s concept of total depravity underlines the idea that human sinfulness 
separates us from God. In such a condition and depravity, humans are completely unable 
to oppose their sinful nature sinning necessarily and yet willingly. Furthermore, 
individuals cannotnot and do not want to restore the separation existing between them 
and God. They are unwilling and unable to seek for spiritual things or attain 
righteousness and holiness. Arminius comes to agree with the biblical record that human 
imagination “is only evil continually” (Gen 6:5). Therefore, all humanity is “obnoxious to 
condemnation, and to temporal as well as to eternal death.”15  
Having dealt with the actual, discouraged, and most probably permanent  
condition of human beings, Arminius insists that we must look with hope to Christ. 
Christ, the mediator between humans and God, has opened a way of salvation by 
providing a substitute, mediator, and liberator in Christ Jesus—who has made atonement 
for our sins.16 In this manner, Arminius situates the solution to human brokenness 
completely outside of human nature, human effort, and human will.   
                                                
13 Pub. Disp. XI, in Works, 2:193. 
14 Ibid, 2:194. 
15 Pub. Disp., VII, in Works, 2:156–157. 
16 Arminius clearly states the hopeless condition of humanity, while at the same 
time pointing to a way of solution in Christ. He says, “with these evils they would remain 
oppressed for ever, unless they were liberated by Christ Jesus.” Pub. Disp., VII, in 
Works, 2:157. 
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Arminius was in complete agreement with Article 14 of The Belgic Confession, 
which insists that “humans are nothing but the slaves of sin and cannot do a thing unless 
given to them by heaven.”17 What Arminius opposed was the Reformed solution of an 
irresistible working of divine grace. Rather, he proposed prevenient grace as the solution 
to the infirmity of will. Although the powers of the will “are not only debilitated and 
useless” or “have no power whatever,” Arminius argues that they could be “assisted and 
excited by divine grace” resulting in regeneration and freedom.18 With this in mind, I will 
turn to the analysis of the concept of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology, as for 
Arminius prevenient grace is the solution that counteracts the evilness of human nature.  
The Nature of Prevenient Grace  
A definition of prevenient grace in Arminius’s writings is critical in order to 
understand the role and centrality of this doctrine in his theological conceptualization of 
salvation. However,  it seems important first to discuss Arminius’s understanding of 
grace before turning to define the more specific qualities of prevenient grace.  
Three Main Concepts of Grace  
Arminius describes grace using three main concepts: he writes of grace as a 
divine attribute, an infused gift, and continual assistance. First, Arminius understands 
grace primarily as an attribute of God that is significantly manifested in the salvation of 
                                                
17 Arthur C. Cochrane, ed., Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2013), 198. 
18 Pub. Disp., VII, in Works, 2:192. 
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sinners. Grace is, first and foremost, the divine solution to human sinfulness. For that 
reason, he defines grace as an unmerited divine disposition or favor “towards poor 
miserable sinners.”19 Because of grace, God willingly communicates “his own good” and 
kindly love to his “creatures, not from merit or debt.”20 Arminius connects grace as a 
divine attribute directly with two other divine affections—goodness and love.21 As a 
result, for Arminius it is because of God’s goodness and love that mercy is extended 
“toward creatures that have sinned.”22 At this point Arminius returns to Romans 5:8 and 
Ezekiel 16:6 to argue that even sin could not stand as an “obstacle” between God’s love 
and his creatures. The greatest demonstration of grace is to be found in God’s loving gift 
of his only Son (John 3:6), a sacrifice for the sin of the whole world. This divine gracious 
action opens a way for humans to obtain three gifts of grace: eternal life, justification, 
and adoption as sons and daughters of God.23  
Second, Arminius also adds that grace is an infusion of  a “holy disposition” to 
incline human will and actions toward “good desires.”24 Arminius closely relates this new 
spiritual disposition to regeneration and preparation for conversion. It is by this grace that 
                                                
19 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
140.  
20 Pub. Disp., VI, in Works, 2:131. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
140. 
24 Ibid., 141. 
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the Holy Spirit stirs up human hearts to accept the gospel of redemption. This infused 
grace as divine gift and healing power renews the human will, understanding, and 
affections. As we will see, this description of grace is closely related but not limited to 
the initial or prevenient grace of God. The continual infusion of grace goes beyond 
conversion because the gifts of “faith, hope and love” are also infused into those 
regenerated by the Spirit.25 By the fruit of the Spirit the believers are able to “think, will, 
or do anything that is good.”26 In this way, Arminius does not limit the concept of grace 
to a mere divine attribute and attitude, but also expands it to refer to an active and 
personal participation of the Holy Spirit in the inward life of believers. Indeed, with the 
concept of the infused nature of grace, Arminius once more finds occasion to remark on 
the impossibility of regarding grace as a human achievement, accrediting it solely to 
God’s mercy and work. 
The nature of the “infusion” of grace in Arminius has been widely discussed. 
Frederic Platt, reading Arminius through the lens of Aquinas, believes that the internal 
work of the Holy Spirit in Arminius’s theology is “regarded as a kind of quasi-
metaphysical substance or energy.”27 Similarly, Howard Slaatte asserts that for Arminius 
the Spirit (here I think he is likewise referring to grace) is “seemingly regarded as a kind 
                                                
25 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
140.   
26 Ibid. 
27 Frederic Platt, “Arminianism” in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. J. 
Hasting (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 1:810. 
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of quasi-metaphysical substance or energy.”28 By contrast, Hicks contends that infusion 
is just a reference to “the personal presence of the Spirit.”29 Bangs, similar to Hicks, 
asserts that “grace is not a force; it is a person, the Holy Spirit.”30 Likewise, F. Stuart 
Clarke rejects any identification of grace with a “quasi-independent property,” arguing 
that for Arminius grace is the Holy Spirit’s benevolent influence and work.31 In a similar 
tone, Mark A. Ellis contends against the notion of grace as a force or energy, affirming 
instead that for Arminius grace is “the Holy Spirit.”32 
I believe that Arminius uses the word “infusion” to refer to the inward 
illumination of the Holy Spirit in human hearts. For Arminius, this influence is not 
transmitted by an impersonal power, but through the personal conviction of the Holy 
Spirit. Some evidence supports such a conclusion. First, Arminius continually relates the 
work of grace to the work of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, he believes that to resist grace is to 
resist the Holy Spirit. Later in this chapter, I will discuss further the role of the Holy 
Spirit in the divine work of grace. However, it seems important here to present clear 
evidence that Arminius rejected the concept of infusion as a metaphysical power in the 
                                                
28 Howard Slaatte, The Arminian Arm of Theology: The Theologies of John 
Fletcher, First Methodist Theologian, and his Precursor, James Arminius (Washington, 
D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), 54. 
29 Hicks, “Theology of Grace in . . . Jacobus Arminius,” 50. 
30 Bangs, Arminius, 343. 
31 Clarke, The Ground of Election, 77. 
32 Mark A. Ellis, “Simon Episcopius’s Doctrine of Original Sin,” (PhD diss., 
Dallas Theological Seminary, 2002), 108. 
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soul. In his Apology against the Thirty One Articles, Arminius disproved the concept of 
habitual grace as a substance poured “into all those to whom the gospel is preached.”33 
Instead, Arminius understood grace in this context as the “assistance of the Holy 
Spirit.”34 In this example, it is evident that Arminius rejected the concept of grace as an 
infusion of a metaphysical force. For Arminius, it is rather the presence and the influence 
of the Holy Spirit.  
Second, although the Latin words for infusion have a varied range of meaning, the 
semantic meaning of influo and infundo have the potential to go both ways. They can 
refer to something flowing or pouring in (an impersonal force/energy or medicine) as 
well as a personal influence showing in or influencing another personal identity (instilling 
ideas and feelings).35 Also, the reading of Arminius’s understanding of “infused grace” 
depends more on the reader’s metaphysical understanding of “grace.” It is possible, 
therefore, to read Arminius as evoking the medieval Catholic metaphysical understanding 
of grace as a power or energy that comes from God, but which, at the same time, can be 
manipulated by the church to be poured into the soul of the believer. Alternatively, it is 
also possible to read Arminius against the Protestant understanding of grace as referring 
to the action of God through the Holy Spirit. I think that Arminius more probably is not 
following Aquinas’s concept of infused grace, as Slaatte and Platt suggest, but instead 
                                                
33 Apology., Article VIII, in Works 1:763–764. 
34 Ibid., 1:764.  
35 P. G. W. Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), 904 – 905. Arminius commonly used the word infundo, see for instances Opera, 
122, 145.  
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that he agrees with his fellow Reformer theologians even when he uses scholastic 
categories in his construction of theology. 
Slaatte’s view imagines a disconnection between the person and the work of the 
Holy Spirit, a disconnection not present in Arminius’s theology. Taking Platt’s and 
Slaatte’s conclusions to their logical end would mean that for Arminius grace as a quasi-
divine substance operates somewhat independent of the actions of the Holy Spirit. 
However, it is Arminius himself who in his writings continually and widely equates grace 
with the actions of the Spirit. Therefore, it seems more fitting to read the concept of 
“infusion” of grace in Arminius’s writing as a reference to a personal, salvific, and 
relational Spirit-to-human relationship. For Arminius, God does not operate through an 
“impersonal force or energy,” but through a person, the Holy Spirit, who establishes a 
genuine friendship with the believers. While for Aquinas grace needs a sacrament to be 
transmitted, for Arminius a sacrament is not necessary, only the action of the Spirit.  
However, it is still likely that Arminius is influenced by Aquinas in understanding 
“infused grace” as the work of the Holy Spirit shown in and influencing the life of a 
believer. This is because Aquinas also relates divine grace as the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit or divine love in the human heart. Although it is almost inevitable sacramentally 
and metaphysically to understand Aquinas’s concept of infused grace primarily as an 
independent energy or force separated from the Holy Spirit in the Summa Theologica, it 
is also Aquinas who closely relates grace to the actions and the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit in the human heart. In other words, while in the Summa Aquinas describes grace 
more as an impersonal energy proceeding from God but in disconnection from the Holy 
Spirit, in the Commentaries on John and Romans, for instance, he sees grace as the 
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personal actions of the Spirit in the human soul.36 If Arminius were following Aquinas in 
this respect, it is safe to suggest that he was primarily reading the Aquinas of the 
Commentaries, rather than the Aquinas of the Summa Theologica. 
The third main concept in Arminius’s description of grace is that after 
regeneration, grace is a “perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy Spirit.” The 
gracious work of the Holy Spirit is not limited to regeneration, but it continually 
strengthens and preserves the life of faith. In other words, for Arminius, believers must 
have the continual assistance of the Spirit of grace to remain sanctified and in relation 
with God. Much as the regeneration to a new spiritual life is impossible without grace, so 
too the life of faith and sanctity and perseverance in grace demands the continuous 
assistance of grace.37 Arminius strongly emphasizes the continuing and cooperating 
nature of grace after conversion to counter the accusation of Pelagianism against his 
theology.  
Thus, Arminius in his definition and understanding of grace links grace primarily 
to God’s nature and attributes and the work of the Holy Spirit. For Arminius, it is because 
God loves humans that the Holy Spirit works in the life of sinners.  
                                                
36 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, vol. 1, Chapters 1–8, 
trans. Fr. Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., ed. The Aquinas Institute (Lander, WY: The Aquinas 
Institue, 2013), 110–113; Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, vol. 3, 
Chapters 13–21, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P., and James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 70–74; 85–88. See also Gilles 
Emery, O.P., “The Holy Spirit in Aquinas’s Commentary on Romans,” in Reading 
Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 127–162. 
37 See, Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His 
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Distinctions of Grace 
Arminius, like his contemporaries, categorizes the effects or functions of salvific 
grace into two main groups. First, salvific grace directly effects liberation, regeneration, 
conversion, and faith. Second, salvific grace sustains continual growth in the Christian 
life, permanence in the union with Christ, and assurance of salvation. Arminius identifies 
this second category as efficient, secondary, subsequent, cooperating, concomitant, 
accompanying, and opening grace or entering grace. The first distinction he calls 
sufficient, primary, preceding, prevenient, exiting, moving, operating, and knocking.38 By 
expanding the categorization of grace, Arminius desires to increase clarity, specificity, 
and caution in his treatment of the doctrine of grace. For confusion in clearly 
distinguishing these categories, says Arminius, could lead a person into dangerous 
mistakes and even quite easily into heresy.39  
These categories, therefore, serve Arminius to explain the operation of grace. 
However, he does not believe in different ontological kinds of grace. Instead, he is 
defending different effects or functions of divine grace. Arminius clearly states that “‘co-
                                                
Declaration, 141.  
38 Apology, Article XVI, in Works, 2:18. See also Priv. Disp., LXX, in Works, 
2:451. “Quarto, salutaris gratia vel pro ipfa prima gratia acciditur, vel pro secunda, pro 
præveniente vel subsequente, pro operante, vel pro cooperante: pro pulsante vel 
aperiente, vel ingrediente,” Opera, 158. See also Stanglin and McCall, 152. 
39 Ibid. He said: “unless a man properly distinguishes each of these [the different 
categories of grace], and uses such words as correspond with these distinctions, he must 
of necessity stumble, and make others appear to stumble . . . it is evident with what 
caution persons ought to speak [ubi] on subjects, on which the descent into heresy, or into 
the suspicion of heresy, is so smooth and easy.” 
 168 
operating and accompanying grace, differs neither in kind nor efficacy from that exciting 
and moving grace which is called preventing and operating, but it is the same grace 
continued.”40 The present chapter will focus on the nature of the preventing or exciting 
grace in Arminius’s writings.   
Prevenient Grace: Its Content and Definition  
It important to construct a workable definition of prevenient grace from 
Arminius’s theological conceptualizations. Although Arminius did not offer a concise 
definition of the concept of prevenient grace, the doctrine permeates all Arminius’s 
conclusions on salvation. Therefore, it is possible to build a precise definition of 
prevenient grace by tracing his teaching on grace over the course of his writings. As we 
have seen previously, he refers to this initial operative state of God’s grace using a wide 
range of adjectives like “preceding, prevenient, preparative, preventing, exciting, and 
operating.”41 If a definition of prevenient grace were to rely only on this set of words, 
then for Arminius the most prominent characteristic of prevenient grace is the 
anticipation of its operation to human freedom of will and actions. In other words, God is 
not dependent on human beings in his initiative to rescue them from the pit of sin. 
Prevenient grace, therefore, precedes or goes before human desire for God’s offer 
of salvation in order that God's saving actions may be possible and accepted. For 
                                                
40 Priv. Disp., LXX, in Works, 2:451. 
41 See Apology, Article IV, in Works, 2:749; Quest. VIII, in Works, 2:68; Pub. 
Disp., XI, in Works, 2:196; Priv. Disp., LXX, in Works, 2:451; Priv. Disp., LXXII, in 
Works, 2:454; Rom. VII., in Works, 2:544; Art. XV, in Works, 2:718; Art. XIX, in Works, 
2:724; Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:472. 
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Arminius, without prevenient grace all other effects of grace and human good actions 
would be altogether impossible. For that reason “subsequent or following grace,” he says, 
“does indeed assist the good purpose of man; but this good purpose would have no 
existence unless through preceding or preventing grace.”42 In addition, he strongly 
affirms that, “no man believes in Christ except he who has been previously disposed and 
prepared by preventing or preceding grace.”43 Then, for Arminius, by prevenient grace 
the Holy Spirit prepares the human heart for faith by softening, humbling, and 
illuminating it.  
This divine work is accomplished by the direct work and strict supervision of the 
Holy Spirit. Indeed for Arminius, the Holy Spirit is the “principal cause” who “by 
exciting grace, excites, moves and incites” humans to “second acts;”44 that is, to faith, 
obedience, and conversion. Arminius understood the Holy Spirit as working in the human 
heart in two significant ways: First, prevenient grace as the external influence of the Holy 
Spirit persuades humans by calling, illuminating, convincing, influencing, and appealing 
to them by the admonitions of the law and the preaching of the gospel. Second, 
prevenient grace as regenerative power of the Holy Spirit transforms, heals, recreates, 
liberates, and regenerates human nature and freedom of will.  
For Arminius, then, prevenient grace is primarily preparatory grace with special 
emphasis on the preaching of the law and the gospel. Prevenient grace as “quickening 
                                                
42 Pub. Disp., XI, in Works, 2:196.  
43 Art. XIX, in Works, 2:724.  
44 Priv. Disp., LXXII, in Works, 2:454.  
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power”45 prepares humans by confronting them with the requirement of the law. The 
law’s role is to “convict a man of sin, of the righteousness of God, to incite him to 
obedience, to convince him of his own weakness,” but even more important, to provoke 
in humans “a desire to be delivered and seek deliverance.”46 Immediately, Arminius here 
introduces the gospel. It is to those “prepared by the law” that “the grace of the gospel 
must be announced.”47 By the preaching of the gospel the Holy Spirit illuminates human 
minds resulting in “evangelical faith,” regeneration to a new life, and union, and 
communion with Christ.48  
Arminius does not limit prevenient grace to having merely an external role of 
divine help. Otherwise, he would rightly be accused of Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism. 
Therefore, prevenient grace is not only the outward persuasion of the preaching of the 
world, but it is also the inward operation of the Holy Spirit.49 So for Arminius, 
prevenient grace is also the internal operation of the Holy Spirit in the human heart as a 
convincing, healing, and regenerative power. This prevenient and internal operation of 
the Holy Spirit intends to free, heal, and regenerate human freedom of will, thus enabling 
                                                
45 Rom. VII, in Works, 2:588. 
46 Rom. VII, in Works, 2:520. 
47 Ibid., 2:588. 
48 Ibid., 2:588; Arminius clearly says “Evangelical faith is an assent of the mind, 
produced by the Holy Spirit, through the gospel, in sinners, who through the law know 
and acknowledge their sins, and are penitents on account of them,” Priv. Disp. XLIV, in 
Works, 2:400. 
49 “Persuasion is managed outwardly by the preaching of the word, inwardly by 
the operation . . . of the Holy Spirit,” Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:315. 
 171 
humans to respond positively to the gospel. Arminius points to this operation of 
prevenient or awakening grace saying that “the regeneration and renewal by God in 
Christ through the Holy Spirit of all human capacities, including the intellect, affections, 
and will, is required for humanity to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform that 
which is truly good.”50 For Arminius, therefore, a freed will is able to respond positively 
to God’s offer of salvation which presupposes the preventing work of grace in the human 
heart.  
Before concluding the analysis of the nature and content of prevenient grace, it is 
important to highlight that for Arminius prevenient grace is not an integral part of human 
nature. He states that “the capability of believing in Christ is not bestowed on man by 
virtue of the first creation.”51 This means that human beings in creation were not infused 
with a special power to overcome sin, as a remedy to be used after the fall. Rather, after 
the fall the Holy Spirit imparts to the human heart the power to believe in the message of 
the Gospel and in Christ. Arminius strongly affirms that God ‘was prepared [after the 
fall] to bestow those gracious aids which were necessary and sufficient for believing in 
Christ.”52 Therefore, for Arminius, they are not part of the natural capacity for faith and 
the acceptance of the Gospel. He insists that “faith in Christ belongs to a new creation.”53 
                                                
50 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
140; see Decl. Sent., in Works, 1:659–660. Emphasis added. 
51 Apology, Article XIX, Works, 2:24. 
52 Apology, Article XIX, Works, 2:23. 
53 Apology, Article XIX, Works, 2:24. 
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It is the supernatural endowment of the Holy Spirit by prevenient grace as the divine 
answer to the problem of sin.  
Therefore, I define prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology as the previous and 
supernatural movement of God’s goodness and grace toward sinful humans that precedes 
all other means of salvation. By the internal work of the Holy Spirit, prevenient grace 
illuminates the intellect, and liberates the will, giving humans the ability to understand 
and accept the call to believe, thus preparing the way for all subsequent means of 
salvation.  
Arminius’s Biblical Support for the  
Concept of Prevenient Grace 
Unfortunately, Arminius did not do extensive exegetical work on biblical 
passages that support the doctrine of prevenient grace. Instead, Arminius constructed his 
doctrine of prevenient grace on the basis of only a few scripture verses. Elsewhere 
Arminius provided biblical passages, like Matthew 9:13; 10:11–13; John 5:25; 6:44; Acts 
16:14; 1 Cor. 6:9–11; Galatians 5:19–25; Ephesians 2:2–7, 11–12; 4:17–20; 5:14; Titus 
2:12; and 3:3–7, to emphasize the concepts of prevenient grace, calling, the universality 
of salvation, the transformation of believers into a new life, and the work of renovation 
by the Holy Spirit. From these passages, I would like to highlight two in particular: John 
6:44 and Acts 16:14. Indeed, these two passages appear together almost everywhere in 
his conceptualization of prevenient grace. They describe the special and prevenient work 
of the Holy Spirit in the human.  
Arminius frequently quoted John 6:44 in connection with the inability of sinners 
to respond to the offer of salvation and the necessity to be drawn in by grace and the 
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work of the Holy Spirit previously. Speaking about the weakness of the human will, 
Arminius stated that God’s prevenient grace as a supreme good “is properly in the gospel: 
‘No man can come to me, except the Father draw him.’”54 It was clear for Arminius that 
this passage teaches the anticipation of God’s preventing and converting grace to human 
responsiveness to the evangelical gospel. In addition, using John 6:44 one more time, 
Arminius gave the name of “believers” only to those who believed in Christ “by the 
gratuitous and peculiar kindness of God.”55 He identified this peculiar and kind operation 
of God present in John 6:44 with the divine vocation to salvation to a “mankind 
constituted in the animal life.”56 That is, without prevenient grace, humans would be no 
more receptive to the gospel than are animals.  
Acts 16:14 became critical for Arminius to emphasize the necessity and 
concurrence of an internal and external operation of prevenient grace in the divine calling 
to salvation. According to Arminius, Lydia exemplified how the external preaching of the 
Word and the internal operation of the Holy Spirit illuminating the mind and affecting the 
heart produce “faith and credence” in the Word.57 This passage provided Arminius with 
the evidence that it is the prevenient grace of God that has the convicting power to 
transform a non-believer into a believer. Although he never did so directly, Arminius 
continually evoked Acts 16:4 in reference to the joining effort of the Word and the Holy 
                                                
54 Pub. Disp., XI, in Works, 2:193.  
55 Pub. Disp., XV, in Works, 2:228.  
56 Pub. Disp., XVI, in Works, 2:233.  
57 Pub. Disp., XVI, in Works, 2:234. 
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Spirit in the conversion of individuals. Indeed, for him it is in this joining of Word and 
Spirit that grace becomes really effectual.58  
The way in which Arminius worked with the biblical passages to understand 
divine prevenient grace now brings us to consider the operation of prevenient grace in his 
theology.  
The Operation of Prevenient Grace  
Arminius understood that the human will could resist the operation of God’s 
grace. He believed that the polemic between his point of view and the views of his 
defectors can be encapsulated in this question: “Is the grace of God an irresistible 
force?”59 Arminius unhesitatingly responds that “the Scripture teaches that many persons 
resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace offered”60 because “grace is not an omnipotent 
action of God which cannot be resisted by man’s free will.”61 These are not isolated 
passages. In fact, there are a great number of passages in which Arminius appeals to the 
concept of the resistibility of grace. He says, “the efficacy of saving grace is not 
consistent with that omnipotent act of God, by which he so inwardly acts in the heart and 
                                                
58 Pub. Disp., XVI, in Works, 2:234. 
59 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
141; Decl. Sent., in Works, 1:664. 
60 Ibid. 
61 “Quia gratia non est omnipotents actio Dei, cui resisti a libero hominis arbitrio 
non possit.” In Opera, p. 768; Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:470. 
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mind of man, that he on whom that act is impressed cannot do otherwise than consent to 
God who calls him; or, which is the same thing, grace is not an irresistible force.”62  
Arminius’s denial of grace as an irresistible force makes clear that he rejects any 
construction of grace that makes a human “as passive as a corpse.”63 However, while 
emphasizing the resistible nature of grace, he is not only and primarily defending human 
free will. In fact, he is equally concerned with the negative implications of an irresistible 
notion of grace for the conception of God’s character and His salvific purposes.    
As we have previously discussed, for Arminius prevenient grace involves the 
liberation of the enslaved will, and this in turn creates the possibility of acceptance of 
salvation. Arminius seems to resolve the tension between the corruption of the will and 
the capacity of the human will to choose salvation by collocating the freed will after the 
operation of prevenient grace has been effective in the human heart. However, this 
creates another tension in Arminius’s theology. If prevenient grace could be resisted and 
if a positive response to prevenient grace demands a freed will, this means that prevenient 
grace itself at some moment in the experience of conversion cannot operate as a resistible 
force, but must be irresistible if imputed by God to humanity. Otherwise, humans could 
not respond to prevenient grace if they did not have the free will to respond prior to it.   
Therefore, while considering the operation of prevenient grace, the question that 
is more pertinent to this study is: Could the resistibility of grace be extended to the 
                                                
62 Art. Article XVII, in Works, 2:722. 
63 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
121. 
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operation of prevenient grace? I argue that the proper answer to this question is that, for 
Arminius, prevenient grace is both unavoidable and resistible. On the one hand, the initial 
grace that liberates the human will from its moral bondage and corruption and calls 
humans into communion with Christ works first in a monergistic and unavoidable way in 
the human heart long before individuals consider any spiritual good. On the other hand, 
humans are also able to reject and resist the operation by which prevenient grace 
produces actual faith and conversion. Subsequently, I will analyze key passages in 
Arminius’s writings that support this conclusion.  
The Unavoidable Operation 
Throughout his writings, Arminius continually points to the unavoidable nature of 
prevenient grace. First, he states: 
in the very (initio conversionis) commencement of his conversion, man conducts 
himself in a (merè passive) purely passive manner; that is, though, by a vital act, that 
is, [sensu] by feeling, he has a perception of the grace which calls him, yet he can do 
no other than receive it and feel it. But, when he feels grace affecting or inclining his 
mind and heart, he freely assents to it, so that he is able at the same time to with-hold 
his assent.64  
In this quotation, we note two critical affirmations about conversion and grace. 
First, Arminius asserts that in the beginning of conversion, human beings are “passive” 
agents. This is important to note because Arminius everywhere else in his writings 
defends the active and conscious participation of humans, although under the influence of 
                                                
64 Art. XVII, in Works, 2:722. Emphasis added. “Homo se habet in initio 
conversionis suae merè passive, id est, quanquam acione vitali, id est sensu percipiat 
gratiam vocatem, tamen non potest non illam accipere, & sentire, at ubi sentit gratiam 
menten & cor assicientem, libere assentitur, ita ut possit non assentiri.” De Voc. 
Pecatorum . . .,  in Opera, 959. 
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grace, in the work of salvation. However, Arminius makes clear here that he does not 
concede any operating participation to humans in the initiation of conversion. Indeed, 
rejecting a semi-Pelagian statement accredited to him, Arminius affirms that grace could 
not be excluded from “the commencement of conversion, (principio conversionis)” but 
insists that it always precedes good actions.65 This means that the Holy Spirit 
monergistically begins the salvific actions in favor of humans, who are, until that point, 
unable even to desire to be free from their miserable situation.  
Second, according to the quotation above, Arminius further affirms that at the 
beginning of conversion, individuals cannot avoid receiving and feeling the “perception 
of grace.” It seems critical to pay close attention to Arminius’s language in connection 
with the perception of prevenient grace. To receive, accept (accipere from accipio), and 
to feel, perceive (sentire from sentio) describes the impression of prevenient grace on 
human intellectual reasoning as well as on human sense of intuition or feeling. Arminius 
does not want to divorce reason from emotions in the perception of prevenient grace. As 
a result, in the call to faith in Christ, the human will is incapable of deterring God’s 
action by prevenient grace either by human reason or by feelings.  
A third important implication of Arminius’s teaching in this quotation is that 
prevenient grace works by “affecting and inclining the human mind and heart” toward the 
acceptance of salvation. Prevenient grace not only sufficiently but also effectively or 
                                                
65 Apology, Article XVII, in Works, 2:19. “Caeterum ad hunc articulum dico; 
nunquam nobis in mentem venisse istis verbis tam inconditis uti, quae primo statim 
intuitu gratiam excludunt à principio conversionis, quam nos sacimus semper & ubique 
praecedaneam, comitantem, subsequentem.” in Opera, pp. 158–159. 
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efficaciously affects human reason and feelings. For Arminius this means that by 
prevenient grace humans come to a real and reasonable conviction of sin and their 
necessity of salvation. However, for Arminius, this does not mean that humans 
necessarily submit to such a conviction and permit the Holy Spirit to continue working in 
their hearts and minds. It seems that it is precisely at this point that human sinful nature 
could react against the calling and the internal working of the Holy Spirit and thus could 
reject God’s gracious gift.  
Another important example in Arminius’s writings is his claim that “it is 
unavoidable (necessum - necessary) that the free will should concur in preserving the 
grace bestowed, assisted, however, by subsequent grace, and it always remains within the 
power of the will to reject the grace bestowed and to refuse subsequent grace.”66 This 
assertion points to the sovereign conferral of prevenient grace. Clearly, according to 
Arminius, prevenient grace is bestowed by the independent actions of the Holy Spirit. 
Arminius intentionally separates the action of concurrence of human freedom of will 
from the initial endowment of regenerative grace. Free will has no role in this initial 
divine movement, but in order for prevenient grace to lead on to salvation, the human 
will must necessarily or inevitably (necessum) concur with the invitation. In such a 
concurrence, free will is assisted by subsequent grace. Thus, the necessary (necessum) 
                                                
66 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:470. “Quare necessum est liberum arbitrium 
concurrat ad conservandam gratiam datam, adjutum tamen a gratia subsequente; manet 
que semper in potestate liberi arbitrii gratiam rejicere, & subsequentem repudiare” in 
Opera, p. 763. In this context, it is more accurate to translate necessum as necessary 
rather than as unavoidable.   
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concurrence (concurrat) of human freedom of will with God’s initial grace follows the 
conferral of prevenient grace. For Arminius, this is only possible for human free will 
because by enabling grace God has previously regenerated human freedom to respond to 
the offer of salvation. In other words, prevenient grace has liberated the will, thus giving 
it the ability to choose a response of faith. Nevertheless rejection of prevenient grace is 
possible because the freed will is not only free to accept God’s prevenient grace, but 
alternatively to reject God’s grace, due to the fact that the infirmities of the will remain.   
Furthermore, discussing the sufficient and efficacious nature of grace, Arminius 
introduces a clear distinction between prevenient grace and subsequent grace. He says 
that prevenient and preparatory grace “are either sufficient or efficacious. For God 
‘prevenes’ [prevents or precedes] sufficiently and efficaciously’ and likewise ‘prepares’ 
sufficiently and efficaciously.”67 In contrast, he asks whether “co-operative grace” does 
not work in a similar way; however, he does not provide an answer to that. Arminius 
argues, in this quotation against Perkins, that God’s prevenient grace has located humans 
in a place where they are able to respond positively to salvation. It is only after humans 
have exercised their freed will that grace is finally effective or effectual. Arminius 
emphasizes that prevenient grace has sufficiently played its role not by overpowering free 
will (as Calvinist saw it) but by removing the infirmities of the will acquired by sin,68 so 
                                                
67 Perkins Exam., in Work, 3:472. “Quin & illæ ipsæ gratiæ, prævenients nempe 
& præparans, aut sufficientes sunt aut efficaces. Prævenit n. Deus suffienter & efficaciter, 
præparat itidem sufficienter & efficaciter” in Opera, 769. 
68 “It is part of grace not to take away, but to correct the nature itself, wheresoever 
it has become faulty,” Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:474. 
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that the will becomes able to accept the spiritual callings of the Holy Spirit. As Willen J. 
van Asselt and Paul H.A.M. Ables puts it: “Sufficient grace enables someone to believe, 
but it is effectual when someone actually believes.”69 
Indeed, Arminius further argues, if humans do not respond accordingly, God is 
not to be blamed. God has sufficiently provided the necessary means to salvation and has 
efficaciously worked in the human heart, in the sense that prevenient grace has liberated 
the will and enabled the individual to believe. Consequently, God has the right to demand 
spiritual fruit and faith from individuals and to justly hold accountable those who do not 
bear fruit.70 Arminius refers to four biblical texts to support his view that prevenient 
grace “is not only sufficient, but also efficacious.”71 The parable of the vineyard of Isaiah 
5; the lament of Jesus over Jerusalem of Matthew 23:37; the rebuke against the Jews for 
“resisting the Holy Spirit” in Acts 7:51; and the knocking on the door in Revelation 3:21 
together demonstrate three essential truths: First, God has sufficiently provided grace and 
the means of salvation. Second, God has some reasonable expectation that individuals 
will answer God’s call positively. Third, God’s hope is based on the fact that humans 
have sufficient ability, by grace, in their freedom of will to respond positively to God’s 
offer of salvation. In short: for Arminius, the sufficiency of free will is not the result of 
                                                
69 Willen J. van Asselt and Paul H.A.M. Ables, “The Seventeenth Century,” in 
Handbook of the Dutch Church, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2015), 301.  
70 See Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:474–481. 
71 Ibid., 3:479. 
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some good in nature, but the result of the sufficient and efficacious work of the Holy 
Spirit by prevenient grace.72  
Finally, Arminius understands that God’s prevenient grace to call all sinful 
humans to salvation “denotes a total and entire act, consisting of all its parts, whether 
essential or integral, what parts so ever are necessary for the purpose of being enabled to 
answer the divine vocation.”73 Therefore, in the beginning of conversion, God’s call by 
the preaching of the Word and the influence of the Holy Spirit does not lack any essential 
                                                
72 For Arminius all the issue of the sufficiency and efficacy of grace connects with 
God’s justice. God expects humans to respond positively to divine salvation because they 
have “sufficient power” in their “possession” to act. If God demands obedience to the law 
and a life of faith, it is because God has sufficiently given the power to perform such 
actions, otherwise God’s justice would be jeopardized. Arminius assures us that “the 
cause why God can with justice expostulate with those who do not bear fruits is this,—
that ‘they had grace sufficient for that, but rejected it.’” Arminius further argues that “it 
seems fair to conclude that God cannot require fruits from those from whom He, though 
by their own desert, has taken the power necessary to bring forth fruits . . . and if He wills 
to require the act, He is bound to restore the grace without which the act cannot be 
performed,” Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:476, 478. 
Explaining Matthew 23:37, Arminius introduces two distinctions in God’s will. 
The will of “good pleasure” and the will “of sign [or revealed will].” By the will of good 
pleasure, Arminius argues, that the desired divine gathering of Jerusalem people “is not 
only sufficient, but also efficacious.” Arminius concedes to Perkins that if the passage 
refers to the revealed will, in such a case God “helps, or is prepared to help, in order that” 
human beings “may be able to will . . .,” and God “has either given them grace sufficient, 
or was prepared to give it.” Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:479. 
Arminius, in order to support his point, finally uses the conclusions of Cardinal 
Bellarmine on Acts 7:51 and Revelation 3:20. The rejection of the Holy Spirit 
demonstrates that God’s prevenient grace has previously inspired good desires in the 
heart; therefore, “they had sufficient grace for not resisting, nay, for assenting to the Holy 
Ghost.” Likewise, knocking at the door signifies that “when God knocks, it is certain that 
man can open, and by consequence have grace sufficient.” Perkins Exam., in Works, 
3:480–481. 
73 Pub. Disp., XVI, in Works, 2:230. 
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and necessary element to enable depraved sinners to respond freely and spiritually to 
faith. In other words, by prevenient grace all helpless sinners are sufficiently and 
efficaciously enabled to respond to the Gospel. As a result, the accidental rejection of the 
call to faith in Christ is not the result of any inadequacy in God’s prevenient or enabling 
grace, but attributable to the sinful nature of individuals.  
It seems safe to conclude that for Arminius prevenient grace operates unavoidably 
in the human heart. Humans cannot avoid being called and confronted with the law and 
the gospel by the preaching of the Word. They cannot avoid being internally persuaded 
by the actions of the Holy Spirit. They can not even stop the initial liberation of their 
weakened and corrupted freedom of will by the work of prevenient grace. Therefore, 
Arminius’s conceptualization of prevenient grace is monergistic to the degree that 
enabling grace comes from God, makes the first move, and works sufficiently and 
efficaciously in the human heart creating a freed will with the capacity to respond freely 
to salvation.  
The Resistible Operation 
However, humans are able to resist the operation of prevenient grace and reject 
the acceptance of the Gospel. In this case, prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology is 
resistible. For Arminius, prevenient grace does not produce actual and salvific faith 
unless the human will concurs with the invitation of the Holy Spirit. Arminius affirmed 
that God “does not make use of omnipotent and irresistible motion to generate faith in 
men, but of gentle persuasion adapted to move the will of man by reason of its very 
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liberty; and therefore that the total cause why this man believes, and that does not, is the 
will of God and the free choice of man.”74 He further declared: 
It is unavoidable that the free will should concur in preserving the grace bestowed, 
assisted, however, by subsequent grace, and it always remains in the power of the free 
will to reject the grace bestowed, and to refuse subsequent grace; because grace is not 
the omnipotent action of God, which can not be resisted by man’s free will.75 It is 
styled “co-operating” or “concomitant,” only on account of the concurrence of the 
human will which operating and preventing grace has elicited from the will of man. 
This concurrence is not denied to him to whom exciting grace is applied, unless the 
man offers resistance to the grace exciting.76 
Arminius made clear in these affirmations that in order to produce actual faith and 
conversion, the free will of man, once it has received the divine prevenient grace or has 
been liberated by the power of prevenient grace (the unavoidable operation), must 
concur, agree, and cooperate with this operation of the Holy Spirit (the resistible 
operation). For that reason he stated that “those who are obedient to the vocation or call 
of God, freely yield their assent to grace; yet they are previously excited, impelled, drawn 
and assisted by grace; and in the very moment in which they actually assent, they possess 
the capability of not assenting.”77 As will be discussed later, Arminius reduced this 
cooperation to acceptance or yieldedness of the free will to grace.  
                                                
74 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:454. See also R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 185. 
Another slightly different translation says: “He has determined to save believers by grace; 
that is, by a mild and gentle suasion, convenient or adapted to their free-will, not by an 
omnipotent action or motion, which would be subject neither to their will, nor to their 
ability either of resistance or of will,” Perkins Exam., Works-II, 3:479. 
75 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:470. Emphasis added. 
76 Priv. Disp. LXX, in Works-II, 2:171. Emphasis added. 
77 Art. Article XVII, in Works, 2:722. 
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Resistance not only destroys the actual production of faith, it also invalidates the 
actual restoration of human free will. Furthermore, for Arminius, continual resistance to 
God’s prevenient grace inevitably results in perpetrating the sin against the Holy Spirit. 
Humans that “resist Divine and in fact evangelical truth, for the sake of resistance,—
though [they are] so overpowered with the refulgence of it, as to be rendered incapable of 
pleading ignorance in excuse” have rejected the “operation of the Holy Spirit . . . the 
conviction of the truth . . . and the illumination of the mind.”78 In other words, they have 
effectually rejected the operation of prevenient grace. According to Arminius, this result 
is unexpected and accidental from the standpoint of God’s purpose. He stated, “the 
accidental result of vocation, and that which is not of itself intended by God, is the 
rejection of the word of grace, the condemning of the divine counsel, the resistance 
offered to the Holy Spirit.”79 God does not intend that the person reject prevenient grace. 
However, this is possible because the rejection results from the corruption of human will. 
Although the free will is now freed by the power of prevenient grace to respond 
positively to salvation, infirmities remain that produce and make possible the rejection of 
God’s grace.  
In emphasizing that humans have the possibility to resist the grace of God, 
Arminius severed himself completely from the stance of  Calvin, Beza, and his 
colleagues at Leiden regarding how he viewed irresistible divine grace. For Arminius, 
prevenient grace, although it primarily operates monergistically and unavoidably in the 
                                                
78 Pub. Disp., VII, Works, 2:161. 
79 Pub. Disp., XVI, Works, 2:235. 
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human heart, freeing the will from its corruption and weaknesses, yet grace can be 
resisted by the same will and so block the production of actual faith, repentance, and 
conversion.  
In summary, the unavoidable and resistible nature of prevenient grace can be 
illustrated using Arminius’s own writings. As regards prevenient grace, Arminius used 
the language of “preparation,” “knocking,” and “opening.” He clearly stated that “grace 
prepares the will of man [human beings],” and subsequently, it “knocks at the doors of 
our hearts.”80 However, the preparation and the knocking guarantee neither the opening 
of the door, nor the dominion and residence of divine grace in the human heart. 
Nevertheless, for Arminius, the knocking at the door presupposes the existence of a 
liberated will capable of opening the door. He quoted Bellarmine explaining Rev. 3:20: 
“He who knocks at a door, certainly knowing that there is no one within who can open, 
knocks in vain, nay, is foolish: But be it far from us to imagine this of God: Therefore, 
when God knocks, it is certain that man can open.”81 Consequently, for Arminius, while 
the preparation and the knocking occurs unavoidably in the human heart, human beings 
can resist the operation of prevenient grace by resisting opening the door. As Stanglin 
and McCall put it: Prevenient grace originates “solely from God outside us (extra nos) in 
a monergistic way, and, to borrow imagery from Rev. 3:20, it stands at the door and 
knocks,”82 but I would add that the acceptance of prevenient grace or the opening of the 
                                                
80 Rom. VII, in Works, 2:632. 
81 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:481. 
82 Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 152. 
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door happens in a synergistic way, by the concurrence of the will already prepared and 
liberated by grace.  
Before concluding our analysis of the double operation of prevenient grace, 
unavoidable and resistible, it is important to review an example in Arminius’s writing in 
which this double operation is clearly evidenced.  
Common Grace 
Hicks argues that Arminius did not widely discuss the concept of common grace 
because he narrowly dedicated his attention to salvific grace.83 Certainly, Arminius did 
not pay close attention to and barely mentioned the concept of common grace in his 
theological work. However, I think that it was not a lack of interest in common grace that  
stopped Arminius from dedicating time and effort to this important theological category 
for Reformed theology. Instead, in reviewing his brief comments on common grace it 
becomes evident that he believed that there is no grace that is not salvific, including 
common grace.  
As a salvific grace, I would like to suggest that, for Arminius, common grace also 
functions as prevenient [salvific] grace. In a series of rhetorical questions to Perkins, 
Arminius suggests that common grace, if used in the way Perkins proposes, must be 
salvific or God’s justice could be questioned.84 He tries to challenge Perkins’s distinction 
                                                
83 Hicks, “Theology of Grace in . . . Jacobus Arminius,” 42, n45. 
84 For Arminius, Perkins’s idea that the rejection of common grace is a 
meritorious cause of damnation misrepresents the character of God. Arminius argued that 
if the rejection of common grace entails condemnation, the acceptance of common grace 
must necessarily lead to salvation. 
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of common grace and salvific grace by affirming that with the “aid of common grace” if 
accepted by the human “free assent,” the “offered blessing” of salvation could be 
received.85 In my opinion, this effectively renders the concept of common grace as equal 
to the working of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology. I suggest that it is for this 
reason that he did not find compelling reasons to treat common grace separately from 
prevenient grace.  
However, the more interesting point that I want to make here in the context of the 
operation of grace is that Arminius in his brief and rare treatment of common grace 
provided a specific example of his thinking regarding the unavoidable and resistible 
operation of prevenient grace. Arminius speaks of this dual operation of grace not 
primarily to demonstrate the nature of this operation, but because he wanted to counteract 
Perkins’s assertion that by “accepting the aid of common grace” humans “elect 
themselves,”86 resulting in making themselves “worthy of election.” This, obviously, 
Perkins regarded as an affront to the glory of God. Arminius responded: “Although one 
man, by accepting the [common] grace offered, through the aid of common grace, should 
make himself worthy of election . . . yet it would not thence follow that elections . . . 
                                                
85 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:445. 
86 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:444. “Etiamsi homo gratiae communis ope gratiam 
oblatam acceptando, se dignum electione faceret,” Opera, 751. The 1853 translation 
renders this passage as: “Even if a man should, by accepting common grace, through the 
aid of common grace, makes himself worthy of Election . . .,” Works-II, 3:481. 
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belong to man.”87 In this context Arminius mentioned the same idea, speaking of “the 
grace offered to man be accepted by him by the aid of grace.”88  
This accurately exemplified the double operation of prevenient grace, as 
unavoidable and resistible, in Arminius’s writings. By emphasizing the operation of 
prevenient grace in the acceptance of prevenient grace, Arminius not only provided a 
strong argument against the idea that his position caused some injury to God’s 
monergistic working of grace. But probably intentionally rather than inadvertently, he 
provided a support to our reasoning that prevenient grace (resistible operation) is 
accepted by the operation of prevenient grace (unavoidable operation). Thus it seems safe 
to conclude that Arminius affirmed a double operation of grace; otherwise the only 
reasonable conclusion would be that if prevenient grace does not primarily work 
unavoidably, then the result is an illogical and never-ending anticipation of grace to 
grace, or put another way, the affirmation of an able and free will of the individual before 
the first resistible operation of prevenient grace. 
It is important at this point to understand other specific ways in which this grace 
operates in every human heart.  
The Internal Operation  
As we have seen, Arminius continually underlined in his writings that prevenient 
grace is completely the work of the Holy Spirit on the sinner’s heart. Elsewhere in his 
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writing Arminius called attention to the priority of the internal operation of the prevenient 
grace by the work of the Holy Spirit.89 For him “the principal cause is the Holy Spirit, 
who infuses into man . . . by exciting grace, excites, moves and incites him to second 
acts.”90 In other words, he explains, “by the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit” the 
human will is “inclined to yield assent to those truths which are preached.”91 For 
Arminius, the Holy Spirit is the Author and Effector of divine prevenient grace that 
internally moves humans to the knowledge of God and salvation.92 He affirmed that 
although the efficient cause of prevenient grace is God the Father in the Son and the Son 
being “appointed by the Father to be the Mediator and the King of His church,” it is 
administered “by the Spirit” and “the Holy Spirit . . . [is] Himself its Effector.”93 He 
further stated that the “Holy Spirit is the Author of that light by the aid of which we 
obtain a perception and an understanding of the divine meaning of the word.” For that 
reason, the Holy Spirit imparts the inwardly-moving cause of God’s “grace, mercy, and 
                                                
89 See, for example, Orat. 2., in Works, 1:356–357; Orat. 3., in Works, 1:383, 
397–401; Pub. Disp., I, in Works, 2:90; Pub. Disp., in Works, 2:94; Pub. Disp., III, in 
Works, 2:111; Pub. Disp., VIII, in Works, 2:161; Pub. Disp., XIV, in Works, 2:213; Priv. 
Disp., VIII, in Works, 2:328; Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:315. 
90 Priv. Disp., LXXII, in Works, 2:454. 
91 Apology, Article VIII, in Works, 1:765; Perkins Exam., in Works-II, 3:324; see 
also Works 3:315. 
92 Priv. Disp., XLII, in Works, 2:395–396. 
93 Pub. Disp. XVI, in Works, 2:232. 
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(philanthropy) 'love of God our Saviour toward [all]' . . . by which He is inclined to 
relieve the misery of [sinners], and to impart unto [them] eternal felicity.”94       
For Arminius, emphasizing the internal operation of prevenient grace was critical 
to counteract the accusations of Pelagianism against him. Arminius acknowledged that 
Pelagius believed only in an external operation of grace, and that he disregarded the 
necessary, mandatory, and precedent operation of the internal work of the Holy Spirit. 
Arminius said, “for Pelagius maintained, that, with the exception of the preaching of the 
Gospel, no internal grace [is] required to produce faith in the minds of man [human 
beings].”95 Arminius would certainly agree with Pelagius that the preaching of the Word  
is a central part of the operation of God’s prevenient grace. However, like Augustine, 
Arminius wanted to make clear that the preaching of the Word cannot be sufficient and 
effectual without the internal operation of the Holy Spirit. For him, therefore, limiting 
prevenient grace to the external operation of the word preached makes of prevenient 
grace an intellectual scriptural appeal to a capable human mind and will, destroying the 
necessary anticipation of God’s prevenient grace as an internal and pneumatological 
regeneration of the human heart and will. 
Arminius, however, wanted to keep the proper balance between the internal and 
external operation of God’s prevenient grace by the work of the Holy Spirit. Although the 
work of the Holy Spirit is antecedent to the word preached, it is also concurrent with the 
annunciation of the Gospel. They cannot be separated in the experience, but the 
                                                
94 Pub. Disp. XVI, in Works, 2:232. 
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antecedent and internal operation of the Holy Spirit must be assumed. It important now to 
consider Arminius’s ideas regarding the external operation of prevenient grace by the 
instrument of the preaching of the Word of God.  
The External Operation 
In the working of salvation, Arminius rightly points to the centrality of the 
preaching of the Word. For Arminius, while revelation made possible the certainty of 
faith, that revelation contained in the Word is delivered to human beings by the “Word 
preached.”96 God’s revelation of his nature and actions in the Scriptures prevents [keeps] 
Christian religion from becoming a human fabrication.97 It also prevents [keeps] believers 
from wrongfully worshipping God, by establishing the scriptural reason for Christian 
devotion toward God and specially Christ.98 All that information contained in revelation 
targets the human mind and understanding because humans are “capable of Divine good” 
and have implanted in their hearts the desire for “the enjoyment and Infinite Good, which 
is God.”99 It is within this dynamic of the Holy Spirit and the most usual method of the 
preaching of the Word that prevenient grace regenerates the believers, implanting in them 
faith and acceptance of the message of salvation.  
                                                
95 Quest. V, in Works, 2:66; se also Rom. VII., in Works, 2:630. 
96 Orat. 1., in Works, 1:381. 
97 Orat. 1., in Works, 1:380. 
98 Ibid., 1:380–381.  
99 Ibid., 1:380.  
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Arminius, then, sees the dynamic of the Spirit and the Word in the preaching of 
the Gospel as the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in the Word. First, the “Holy Spirit 
is the Author of that light by the aid of which we obtain a perception and an 
understanding of the divine meaning of the word, and is the Effector of that certainty by 
which we believe those meanings to be truly divine.”100 From that perspective, Arminius 
believes that the Word of God is the instrument in the hands of the Holy Spirit to produce 
faith and the surrender of the human will to the will of God. He says, the “instrument is 
the word of God, which is comprehended in the sacred books of Scriptures; and [it is the] 
instrument produced and brought forward by Himself (Holy Spirit), and instructed in his 
truth.”101 Impressively, for Arminius, the power of the word and the efficacy of the 
preaching of the Gospel do not reside in the Word itself, but in the action of the Holy 
Spirit in the production of the Word as well as in the illumination of the mind during the 
preaching of the Word. It is, says Arminius, 
the Holy Spirit [that] gives to the Word all that force which he afterwards employs,–
such being the great efficacy with which it is endued and applied, that whomsoever 
he only counsels by his word he himself persuades by imparting Divine meaning to 
the Word, by enlightening the mind as with a lamp, and by inspiring and sealing it by 
his own immediate action.102  
                                                
100 Orat. 1., in Works, 1:397–398. 
101 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:400. 
102 Ibid. 
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He also states, “the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by which he assists the 
preaching of the gospel, [is] the organ, or instrument, by which He, the Holy Spirit, is 
accustomed to be efficacious in the hearts of the hearers.”103 
Thus, in the context of the prevenient grace of God in conversion, Arminius, 
understood that the actions of the Holy Spirit are not limited to the production of the 
content of Scripture, but they are also present in the application of the living Word in 
human hearts. In other words, it is by the internal operation and illumination of the Spirit 
and more commonly by the external preaching of the Word that the prevenient word of 
God brings human beings to the acceptance of the offer of salvation.  
Thus, prevenient grace is especially bestowed on human hearts at the intersection 
of the internal work of the Holy Spirit and the hearing of the word. This means that 
although prevenient grace as the work of the Holy Spirit in the human minds antecedes 
the preaching of the Gospel, preparing the hearers to understand and receive the message 
of salvation, it works with further brightness and intensity at the moment of preaching 
and teaching the Holy Scripture. Picirilli reaches the same conclusion. He states, 
“apparently, this pre-regenerating grace is co-extensive with the intelligent hearing of the 
gospel.”104 If this is the case, then the preaching acquires a central role in the salvific 
work of God. It is worth noting that this understanding of Arminius is consistent with 
Romans 10:14–17. Interestingly, Arminius quoted this passage only six times, but only 
                                                
103 Apology, Article VIII, in Works-II, 1:300; see also Apology, Article VIII, in 
Works, 1:764. Emphasis added. 
104 Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 158. 
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one time in connection with salvation. He used this passage, among others, to explain 
vocation, that is God’s calling of sinful humans. He says:  
we define vocation, a gracious act of God in Christ, by which, through his word and 
Spirit, He calls forth sinful men, who are liable to condemnation and placed under the 
dominion of sin, from the condition of the animal life, and from the pollutions and 
corruptions of this world, (2 Tim. 1:9; Matt. 11:28; 1 Pet. 2:9, 10; Gal. 1:4; 2 Pet. 
2:20; Rom. 10:13–15; 1 Pet. 3:19; Gen. 6:3,) unto “the fellowship of Jesus Christ,” 
and of his kingdom and its benefits; that, being united unto Him as their Head, they 
may derive from him life, [sensum] sensation, motion, and a plenitude of every 
spiritual blessing, to the glory of God and their own salvation. (1 Cor. 1:9; Gal. 2:20; 
Eph. 1:3, 6; 2 Thess. 2:13, 14).105 
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that for Arminius the calling occurs when the 
word of God is preached.106 The calling, as the concurrent work of the internal operation 
of the Holy Spirit that makes effectual the external operation of the word, is therefore an 
essential part of prevenient grace. In conclusion, according to Arminius, this calling is 
given after the capacity to respond to the Gospel has been enabled by prevenient grace.  
Before concluding this section on the external operation of prevenient grace, it is 
important to note the part of the Church. Because of his pastoral concerns and 
understanding of the role of the Church, Arminius also believed that the Church as the 
body of Christ has a central role in the preaching of the divine truth and the calling to 
salvation. Certainly, Arminius carefully avoided giving to the Church such a prominent 
role in this work as would have placed the Church over Scripture;107 nevertheless, he 
understood that “if any act of the Church occurs in this place, it is that by which she is 
                                                
105 Pub. Disp., XVI, in Works, 2:232. 
106 See, Stanglin, Assurance of Salvation, 93–94. 
107 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:395–396. 
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occupied in the sincere preaching of this word, and by which she sedulously exercises 
herself in promoting its publication.”108 In other words, for Arminius, while the Church 
preaches the Gospel, the Holy Spirit applies the Word to human hearts restoring to 
humans the ability to exercise his freed will and respond positively to God’s actions of 
salvation on their behalf. It would be helpful to conclude this section with Arminius’s 
own words. The following quotation shows how closely Arminius related the external 
and internal operation of God’s prevenient grace: “But persuasion is managed outwardly 
by the preaching of the word, inwardly by the operation or rather co-operation of the 
Holy Spirit, tending to this end, that the word may be understood and apprehended with 
sure faith.”109 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analyzed Arminius’s theology of prevenient grace, 
specifically its nature, content, definition, and operation. It seems evident to me that the 
doctrine of prevenient grace is not a secondary idea in Arminius, but a central theme that 
pervades every aspect of his doctrine of grace.  
Here follows a summary with some implications of the results of my study:  
Arminius believed that grace is unmerited divine mercy toward miserable sinners 
as well as the active participation of the Holy Spirit in the life of human beings that leads 
them to salvation. Although grace could not be divided in its essence, it is proper to talk 
                                                
108 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:400. 
109 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:315. 
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about the different effects or modes of grace.110 One of the effects of grace is prevenient 
grace that Arminius defined as the divine grace that by the work of the Holy Spirit 
restores human freedom of will to empower human beings to accept the offer of salvation 
and the invitation to believe and have faith in Christ as Savior and Lord.  
Prevenient grace is essential for Arminius because he understood that humans are 
in a condition of total depravity, and thus unable to perform truly spiritual good. 
Corrupted human nature is incapable of hearing and receiving the Gospel of salvation and 
humans are incapable of subjecting their wills and lives to the will of God. Arminius 
believed that in this desperate condition the solution was not an overpowering 
manifestation of divine grace that irresistibly leads humans to a relationship with God. 
Rather, for him prevenient grace restores humans’ abilities to will to receive salvation, 
not as impassible rocks or pieces of wood, but as willing participants in accepting 
Christ’s work done in their favor.  
This idea of Arminius’s had major implications for the Protestant Reformation in 
general and the Reformed tradition in particular. Arminius wanted to correct the 
Reformed tradition’s understanding of the role of human beings in salvation. He wanted 
to preserve the monergistic and sovereign view of God’s work in redemption and at the 
same time to recognize the biblical claim that humans participate in the acceptance of the 
divine invitation to salvation. Using the concept of prevenient grace helped him to 
                                                
110 See also Junius Conf., in Works, 3:134, 168. 
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maintain the monergistic movement of God that always comes before human actions and 
the synergistic participation of individuals in the acceptance of salvation.   
For that reason, according to Arminius, prevenient grace operates in the human 
heart primarily as a monergistic movement of God toward humans. Prevenient grace 
works unavoidably in individuals to restore and liberate their freedom of will from their 
clouded and corrupted nature. This results in a freed and restored will able to evaluate 
and accept the divine offer of salvation. Obviously, humans have no say in this 
movement as it is entirely a divine and free gift of God. In this way, the concept of 
prevenient grace helped Arminius to embrace the Reformed understanding of the 
monergistic and sovereign work of God in salvation, and at the same time to destroy the 
Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian (or neo-Pelagian) understanding of an unblemished will 
capable of responding to or initiating salvation.  
However, Arminius did not want to limit his understanding of the operation of 
prevenient grace to an unavoidable movement. He added a new layer of understanding to 
the idea by affirming that prevenient grace could be resisted by the freed will of human 
beings. In this case, Arminius understood a resistible operation of God’s prevenient 
grace. Because prevenient grace has anticipated human will and freed it from the slavery 
of sin and corruption, humans are able to reject the divine gentle suasion or invitation to 
accept the offer of salvation. On the one hand, Arminius made clear that acceptance of 
prevenient grace is possible because of the working of prevenient grace that has freed or 
liberated the human will. This obviously, for Arminius, does not mean that human will 
has a meritorious participation in salvation. On the other hand, Arminius understood that 
rejection is an accidental action due to the corruption of human will. In this way, 
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Arminius corrected the Reformed understanding of an irresistible working of grace 
without human concurrence. In sum, because of prevenient grace Arminius could assert 
consistently that “salvation belongs [only] to the Lord” (Jon. 2:9), while at the same time 
giving a role to human will in the acceptance of salvation.  
Having paid attention to the operation of prevenient grace in relation to the God–
human relationship, this chapter also paid attention to the operation of prevenient grace in 
relation to the Agent–instrument. The operational agent of prevenient grace is the Holy 
Spirit, while the instrument of the Word of God is the preaching of the Church. By 
prevenient grace the Holy Spirit works internally in the human heart preparing, liberating, 
and empowering the human will and mind to understand and accept Christ and salvation. 
Prevenient grace, for Arminius, is highly pneumatological. The role of the Holy Spirit in 
a personal, internal, and gentle relationship with individuals characterizes every aspect of 
Arminius’s understanding of prevenient grace.  
In the working of prevenient grace, the Holy Spirit does not limit his work to the 
internal empowerment of the will and the illumination of the mind. He employs the 
external instrument of the Holy Scripture by the preaching of the word. While the Church 
and his ministers preach the Gospel, the Holy Spirit concurs with the word that 
illuminates the soul and effects the divine calling of salvation. I do not think that 
Arminius limited the working of prevenient grace to the moment that the preaching and 
teaching of the word is taking place, as Picirilli claims. However, I agree with Picirilli 
that at the intersection of the preaching of the Gospel and the internal operation of the 
Holy Spirit, the prevenient grace of God works in a more radical and effective way in the 
calling to salvation. Thus, it is safe to conclude that for Arminius, the preaching of the 
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word is the usual external instrument of prevenient grace that invites human beings into a 
salvific relationship with God.  
In the next chapter I turn to explore carefully and deeply the question of the 
universality of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology: Does Arminius support 




PREVENIENT GRACE IN ARMINIUS’ THEOLOGY II 
Introduction 
The universality of prevenient grace is one of the most controversial aspects of 
this concept in Arminius’s theology, besides the resistible nature of its operation. In the 
previous chapter, I have suggested a solution to the concept of resistible prevenient grace. 
The aim of this chapter is explore the universal work of prevenient grace in Arminius’s 
writings.  
The chapter explores the language of universality in Arminius’s writings and its 
relation to the concept of prevenient grace. After a complete analysis of the issue of 
universality of prevenient grace, the challenge of Arminius’s concept of divine 
foreknowledge is that ultimately it renders God a determinist. I will try to offer a possible 
solution to demonstrate that Arminius maintained a theological tension between God’s 
foreknowledge and the universality of prevenient grace. The chapter finishes by 
describing the spiritual result of the work of prevenient grace and by proposing that the 
concept of prevenient grace is the organizing principle of Arminius’s soteriological ideas 
by which he reconciles and holds together all the essential elements of Arminius’s 
concept of salvation.   
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Prevenient Grace: The Universal Work  
of the Holy Spirit 
As we have seen, some Arminian theologians have argued that prevenient grace 
in Arminius’s theology is circumscribed to the locations where the gospel is preached.1 
Yet it seems to me more appropriate to conclude that although Arminius viewed 
prevenient grace as being closely connected with the preaching of the Word, he also 
understood prevenient grace as the universal work of the Holy Spirit that is extended to 
all human beings throughout the world. Not only is the universality of prevenient grace 
evident in the way that Arminius used the theological tradition of the Christian Church, 
but an analysis of Arminius’s understanding of the amplitude of the atonement, the divine 
covenant, the vocation to salvation, the universal experience of the human struggle 
between the Spirit and the flesh described in Romans 7, and the special operations of the 
Holy Spirit also confirms a broadly universal language in Arminius writings.  
Since Arminius does not deal directly with the universality of prevenient grace as 
a separate doctrine, it will be necessary to explore his theological constructions of the 
previously mentioned concepts in order to establish that Arminius actually defended a 
universal view of the doctrine of prevenient grace. Therefore, this section explores the 
language of the universality of prevenient grace, giving special attention to those 
theological topics that relate to the subject.  
                                                
1 Olson, Arminian Theology, 167; Eaton, 72. 
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Universal Language of Prevenient Grace in  
the Christian Theological Tradition  
Arminius referred to patristic literature to support his belief that the calling to 
salvation is extended to all human beings.  
For example, Arminius quoted Prosper of Aquitaine to emphasize that “on all 
men has always been bestowed some measure of heavenly doctrine” and “this aid 
[prevenient grace] is afforded to all men, by innumerable methods both secret and 
manifest.”2 Arminius frequently quoted Prosper to support his view on grace, free will, 
the universality of Christ’s sacrifice, the cleansing of original sin at baptism, and the 
possibility that believers could fall from grace and regeneration.3 By quoting the 
expression “this aid is afforded to all men,” Arminius most likely concurred with Prosper 
that the divine aid of prevenient grace is universally and equally given to all human 
                                                
2 Apology, Article XXVIII, in Works 2:54. After quoting Prosper, Arminius 
finished his argument stating: “I do not produce these passages, as if I thought that either 
my brethren or I must abide by the sentiments of the Fathers, but only for the purpose of 
removing from myself the crime of Pelagianism in this matter.” It seems to me proper to 
conclude that if Arminius quouted this particular portion of Prosper’s work in order to 
avoid any improper identification of his ideas with the heresy of Pelagius, then, he agreed 
with Prosper in this particular aspect. The quotation from Prosper that appears above is a 
reference from the book The Vocation of the Gentiles. This is one of the disputed works 
of Prosper. However, modern scholars, like Arminius in his time, believe that the work is 
an authentic contribution of Prosper. See Alexander Y. Hwang, Intrepid Lover of Perfect 
Grace: The Life and Thought of Prosper of Aquitaine (Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2009), 17–20. Shelton also quotes this sentence from 
Arminius as evidence that prevenient grace is granted to “all people.” However, Shelton 
fails to disclose that the affirmation was not from Arminius himself, but a reference taken 
from Prosper. See Shelton, 118.  
3 See, Apology, Articles I, II, XII, XIII, XIV, in Works, 1:738–770.  
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beings.4 Although Prosper evidently experienced a theological development between his 
first theological work, De Providentia Dei, and his later contributions after his encounter 
with Augustine, the idea of universal grace and salvation was a common element in all 
his works.5  
Indeed, Prosper was useful for Arminius because Prosper’s language, in that 
context, evidently points to prevenient grace — that divine grace “persuading us by 
exhortation, admonishing us by examples, affrighting us by dangers, exciting us by 
miracles, by giving understanding, by inspiring counsel, and by illuminating the heart 
itself, and imbuing it with the affections of faith.”6 In Arminius’s writings, these images 
of divine salvific actions denote the initial work of conversion impelled by the prevenient 
grace of God. Although this is not the only evidence of the universality of prevenient 
grace in Arminius’s writings, it is an indication of Arminius’s understanding of God’s all- 
encompassing love for all sinners.  
Arminius frequently drew upon Augustine’s writings because he considered the 
church father an authority in theological and biblical matters. Indeed, Augustine is by far 
the most cited authority of antiquity in Arminius’s writings. However, as Aza Goudriann 
points out, Arminius’s reading of Augustine was “selective”; he used Augustine to 
                                                
4 Hwang states that for Prosper “the light of God’s illumination and offer of 
salvation are given to all, equally,” see Hwang, Intrepid Lover of Perfect Grace, 62.  
5 Prosper of Aquitaine, De Providentia Dei, Text, translation, and commentary by 
Miroslav Marcovich (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1989), x. 
6 Apology, Article XXVIII, in Works 2:54. 
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support his own theological viewpoints and conceptualizations. 7 With reference to the 
universality of prevenient grace, Arminius concurred with Augustine’s conclusions in On 
Nature and Grace that God “is everywhere present, who, by many methods through the 
creature that is subservient to Him as his Lord, can call him who is averse . . . can exhort 
a diligent man . . . can aid him who strives, and can lend an attentive ear to him who 
deprecates.”8 The expression that captured Arminius’s imagination was “God is 
everywhere present.” Since negation of the universal presence of God not only would 
undermine God’s sovereignty but also God’s providence and redemptive work, for 
Arminius, because God is everywhere, His salvific actions are also everywhere present. 
In this case, Augustine’s language regarding calling, aiding, and exhorting refer to the 
concept of prevenient grace as the beginning of redemption. 
God’s Character: Love and Justice 
Arminius desired above all to preserve the biblical picture of God’s character. He 
believed that the concept of unconditional election betrayed God’s character of love and 
justice.9 For that reason, the love and justice of God demand universal reach for divine 
prevenient grace.  
                                                
7 Goudriann, “‘Augustine Asleep’ or ‘Augustine Awake’? Jacobus Arminius’ 
Reception of Augustine,” 63. 
8 Apology, Article XXVIII, in Works, 2:54. 
9 For Arminius the Supralapsarian doctrine of predestination could not 
demonstrate God’s mercy and justice, because the act is in itself “contrary to his mercy 
and justice.” See Decl. Sent., in Works, 1:623–625. 
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First, the justice or righteousness of God demands that all God’s creatures be 
given an opportunity for salvation, otherwise, “God cannot [be] just.” Consequently, 
God’s justice demands universal prevenient grace in Arminius’s system of theology. God 
is, therefore, compelled by his justice and character to offer a salvific opportunity and 
help for all unmerited sinners. As Den Boer puts it, “God’s justice ‘obligates’ God . . . to 
distribute prevenient grace universally.”10 For Arminius, this is because one main 
characteristic of God’s justice, together with truth and fidelity, is sincerity.11 This means 
that there is no duplicity in God’s deeds, purpose, and words. Therefore, when the 
Scriptures say that God “invites” all to salvation, God truly intends to save all, and 
provides the necessary means of redemption for all human beings. As Stanglin and 
McCall explain, “when God . . . invites or warns . . ., he certainly means it and he says it 
with utter sincerity.”12  
Thus, rearticulating one of Arminius’s questions regarding God’s justice, it is 
possible to ask: Will the justice of God ordain the eternal perdition of a human being who 
never received the opportunity to accept the offer of salvation? Arminius would most 
probably respond in the negative.13 For that reason, Arminius believed that the prevenient 
grace of God gives all humans the opportunity to receive salvation. This is because God’s 
                                                
10 Den Boer, God’s Twofold Love, 181n14. 
11 Priv. Disp., XXI, in Works, 2:351. 
12 Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 78. See also, Jerry L. Walls, Does 
God Love Everyone? The Heart of What is Wrong with Christianity (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade, 2016), 57–59. 
13 Priv. Disp., XXI, in Works, 2:355. 
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justice always communicates all good “according to regeneration” in a “just . . . right . . . 
and equal” way, unfailingly giving “to every one his own.”14   
In the same manner, for Arminius, God’s love for his creatures demands 
prevenient grace as a divine act of salvation. Scripture reveals the love of God and Christ 
towards human beings expressed in benevolent, salvific, and beneficial actions.15 
Communication of good in creation and salvation proceeds from “divine love and 
goodness” resulting in actions of “grace, benignity, and mercy.”16 Although God’s love 
for justice overrides His love for creatures, for Arminius God has demonstrated a great 
deal of love for human beings and their happiness.17 Therefore, Arminius considered the 
twofold love of God as equal by affirming that God made the greatest demonstration of 
love, at the same time towards miserable sinners and towards divine justice, by offering 
his Son as mediator, legal satisfaction, and sacrificial substitute.18 By offering his life, the 
eternal Son of God becomes the “Son of his love” in whom all God’s sinful creatures 
encounter mercy and grace.19  
                                                
14 Priv. Disp., XXI, in Works, 2:350. 
15 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:383. 
16 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:130–133; Priv. Disp., XX, in Works, 2:347–349. 
17 See Pub. Disp., XIV, in Works, 2:221–222; Art. II, 2:707. Elsewhere Arminius 
affirms that God loves primarily himself and the good of justice, and secondarily, the 
creature and her felicity. 
18 Pub. Disp., XIV, in Works, 2:221. 
19 Elsewhere Arminius affirms that reception of divine love, prevenient grace,  
and all other salvific benefits exist in Christ and are mediated only through Christ; see for 
instance, Priv. Disp., XL, in Works, 2:392. He states: “For the love with which God loves 
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Then, as God does with justice, so too God equally extends his love to all of his 
creatures. This love first touches sinful individuals, calling them into a new relationship 
with the divine reality. Arminius admitted, however, that the “love of God” is not equal 
“in all respects towards all men,” but at the same time, he negates that “there is so much 
difference.”20 In this context Arminius equated God’s love with prevenient grace, 
affirming that, because of the Gospel, God has decided for all eternity “to treat . . . all 
men, fallen in Adam, according to this grace.”21 With this assertion, Arminius refuted the 
inference that God’s love “towards all men in general” undermines the intensity of God’s 
special love for the elected ones.22 While election displays a special divine love toward 
those who respond to the offer of salvation, prevenient grace demonstrates the universal 
love of God toward all created individuals without favoritism.  
In this context, Arminius wisely connected prevenient grace, as the preparation 
for regeneration, with God’s character of love and justice. For him, the Scriptures make 
clear that God tirelessly works for the salvation of all wretched humans, thus showing 
His patience, long-suffering, and mercy. Exodus 33:19 and 34:6–7 became sufficient 
evidence of this reality. According to Arminius, these characteristics of God’s character 
are actualized in prevenient grace’s actions toward sinners, described in Isaiah 5:4, 
                                                
men absolutely to salvation, and according to which He absolutely intends to bestow on 
them eternal life,—this love [non est] has no existence except in Jesus Christ, the Son of 
his love.” 
20 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:330. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:337. 
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Romans 2:4, and Romans 9:22. Indeed, in these actions God satisfies his love for justice 
and love for creatures by “admonish[ing], invit[ing], and incit[ing] [them] to faith and 
conversion.”23   
The Extent of the Atonement  
In contrast to many Arminians, Arminius maintained a satisfaction and penal 
substitution view of the atonement. For him, Christ died to “pay the price of redemption 
for the sins and the captivity of the human race.”24 Similar to Anselm of Canterbury 
(1033–1109), Arminius believed that God rightly required “satisfaction from the sinner 
for the injuries with He has sustained.”25 However, unlike Anselm but similar to his 
Reformed contemporaries, Arminius viewed God’s justice rather than God’s honor as the 
entity aggrieved by the sin of human beings.26 Consequently, Christ took “upon himself, 
                                                
23 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:310. 
24 Orat. 4., in Works, 1:416. John M. Hicks, “The Righteousness of Saving Faith: 
Arminian Versus Remonstrant Grace,” Evangelical Journal, vol. 9, no 1 (Spring, 1991): 
28. Hicks says that “Arminius’s doctrine of atonement is fundamentally the same as that 
of the Reformers except he gives an explicit universal potential to the benefits of Christ’s 
death.” 
25 Ibid., Works, 1:412. For a further account of Arminius’s view of the extent of 
the atonement see the recent and massive work on the history of the doctrine of the 
atonement by David L. Allen, The Extent of the Atonement: A Historical and Critical 
Review (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2016), 135–149. 
26 Ibid., Works, 1:413–415. See the dialogue between God’s Mercy and God’s 
Justice in order to find a solution in favor of sinful humanity. The solution was provided 
by God’s Wisdom, which suggested an expiatory sacrifice “to appease Justice, and open 
such a way for Mercy.” It should be offered by the same person as both a priest and a 
victim. Such a person should be taken from among men because the victim must be a 
human victim. Jesus Christ, out of  love for humans, became both the priest and the 
victim as “the Son of God and of man.” 
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on our account, the discharge of those difficult and arduous duties which were full of 
pain, trouble, and misery.”27 Christ offered himself on the cross as a sacrifice that 
provided “the price for sins by suffering the punishment due to them.”28 Evidently, 
Arminius entirely agreed with his colleagues about the nature of Christ’s atonement.   
The disagreement between Arminius and Reformed theology concerns the extent 
of the atonement. The crucial question was: Did Jesus die for everyone? Absolutely, said 
Arminius. He advocated for a universal view of Christ’s atonement. However, Arminius 
invoked the established sufficient/efficient formula to explain the scope of Christ’s death. 
He summarized his view, explaining:  
The λύτρον or “price” of the death of Christ is affirmed to be universal in its 
sufficiency, but particular in its efficacy; that is, sufficient for redemption of the 
whole world, and for the expiation of all sins; but that its efficacy does not appertain 
to all universally; which efficacy consists in its actual application by faith and the 
sacraments of regeneration.29 
It seems crucial here to pay close attention to the ideas contained in this 
declaration. First, what did Arminius propose to teach regarding the universality of the 
atonement? And second, what are the reasons why Arminius limited the application and 
efficacy of the atonement?  
Arminius interpreted the universal passages of the New Testament theologically. 
He undoubtedly encountered in the affirmations of the universal passages evidences for 
God’s universal prevenient grace and love. Arminius divided the universal passages into 
                                                
27 Orat. 4., Works, 1:416; Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:328. 
28 Orat. 4., in Works, 1:419. 
29 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:324. 
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two well-defined groups. First, he explored the passages that refer to the death of Christ 
and contain the expression “world” and “whole world.” Second, he examined those 
passages that include the word “all” as a clear reference to the whole of humanity. 
First, the death of Christ was universally intended for all. Arminius concluded that 
the expression “world” and “whole world” in the New Testament universalizes the divine 
salvific plan. Arminius referred specifically to Johannine literature like John 1:29; 3:16; 
6:51; 4:42; and 1 John 2:2; 4:14. He also quoted 2 Corinthians 5:19, “God was in Christ 
reconciling the world unto Himself.”30 He argued against Perkins that the word “world” 
in all these passages refers to “the whole body of humanity” and not only to the elect.31 
Affirming the contrary, like Perkins does, and thus particularizing the scope of the word 
“world,” betrays not only the biblical truth about the extent of the atonement, but more 
precisely the scriptural affirmations on the nature of atonement.  
Likewise, Arminius interpreted those passages that speak about the sacrifice of 
Christ being offered for “all” as intended to influence the human race universally. 
Passages like Hebrews 2:9 and 1 Timothy 4:10 testify regarding the salvific actions of 
God in Christ in favor of all human beings.32 Interestingly, Arminius connected these 
“all” passages with several biblical texts that speak of Christ as mediator between God 
and men and Christ dying for the ungodly (for instance 1 Timothy 2:5; Romans 5:6, 8). 
                                                
30 Apology, Article XII, in Works, 2:9–10; Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:329. 
31 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:329. From these passages he asserted that “in the 
word ‘world,’ all men, in general, are the be understood.” 
32 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:329. 
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His argument is that just as all sinners participate in the sin and nature of Adam, 
similarly, all sinners participate in the salvific actions of Christ’s death. He explained that 
“the case of the whole human race is one; all were equally conceived and born in sins, 
and children of wrath.”33 Logically, for Arminius the premise that there is no distinction 
at the level of the natural and sinful life of humanity means that there is no distinction at 
the level of the divine salvific solution for the problem. For that reason, “Christ took 
upon Him the human nature common to all” representing the “person of all men.”34 In 
other words, the satisfaction and penal substitution nature of the atonement together 
guarantee the universal scope of the expiatory sacrifice. 
In addition to the biblical record, Arminius also believed that the theological 
tradition of Christianity sided in his favor. He quoted Prosper of Aquitaine affirming that 
“the blood of Jesus Christ is the price paid for the whole world . . . and the redemption of 
the whole world.”35 In this manner, Arminius argued that the potency, sufficiency, and 
magnitude of the blood of Christ as the price for sin extended to all humanity.  
It is important to remark here that for Arminius no further condition should be 
added to the sufficiency of Christ’s death. His opponents agreed with Arminius that 
Christ’s sacrifice was sufficient for the sins of the whole world. However, they added a 
condition that for Arminius completely destroyed the universal language of the 
                                                
33 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:329. 
34 Ibid., Works, 3:328. 
35 Ibid., Works, 3:325. Arminius explains in his Examination of Perkins’s 
Pamphlet that “Scripture in many places most plainly teaches that Christ died ‘for all,’ 
and ‘for the life of the world.’” 
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atonement in Scripture. For instance, Arminius contended that Perkins’s affirmation that 
the atonement was sufficient for the whole world (“provided that God had willed it to be 
offered for the sins of the whole world”)36 undermined sufficiency in connection with 
Christ’s death. For Arminius, the sufficiency of Christ’s death is actualized in the fact 
that payment and substitution have been made for all.   
Second, Arminius evidently accepted a distinction between the sufficiency and 
the efficacy of the atonement. For him, the merits of Christ’s death are to be applied only 
to the believers by faith. However, in Arminius’s writings this particular application 
refers to actual salvation. Beyond the obvious difference (in which for Calvin the 
atonement is particularly applied to those who have been sovereignly elected by God, and 
for Arminius the application depends on the human acceptance of Christ’s sacrifice), for 
Arminius, the universal efficacy of the cross is materialized in the universal application 
of prevenient grace. In other words, the universal nature of prevenient grace is guaranteed 
by the universal extension of the atonement that at the same time is grounded in God’s 
justice and love. As Gary L. Shultz, Jr. puts it, “prevenient grace itself is a result of 
Christ’s universal atonement.”37 
                                                
36 Ibid., Works, 3:324. The current discussion on the sufficiency of Christ’s death 
within the Reformed tradition seems to follow the same pattern of thought as that of 
Perkins against which Arminius reacted. For instance, Roger Nicole, “The Case for 
Divine Atonement,” Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society, vol.10, no. 4 (1967): 
199. Nicole says that the sacrifice of Christ was “amply sufficient to redeem all 
mankind,” adding, counterfactually, that it would be the case “if [God] had so intended.” 
37 Gary L. Shultz, Jr. A Multi-Intentioned View of the Extent of the Atonement 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2013), 31. 
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Although Arminius did not explicitly state this conclusion, a logical result of his 
theology is that the merits of Christ are actualized universally in the working of 
prevenient grace in the human heart. It seems safe to conclude that in Arminius’s 
theology the universal extent of the atonement necessarily demands the universal scope 
of prevenient grace. In other words, the divine working of God in Christ on the cross 
provided the legal ground of prevenient grace for all individuals.  
The Universality of the Divine-Human Covenant  
Arminius has not been considered a covenant theologian. However, he used the 
concept of covenant widely to express his understanding of salvation. Related to our 
study, the covenantal theology of Arminius anticipates a covenantal prevenient grace that 
extends to all humanity.38  
Arminius understood that covenant is God’s mode of relationship not only with 
humanity but also within the Trinity. He approached the biblical covenants from a 
synergistic view of human-divine relationship. Indeed, such an approach helped Arminius 
to protect the glory and character of God as well as to stress the liberty and human 
responsibility in both the fall into sin and the work of salvation. Humans, in their pristine 
                                                
38 Most of Arminius’s theology of covenant can be found disseminated 
throughout his writings. However, there are specific works in which he focused more 
specifically on the concept of covenant. Among these writings are his orations; Orat. 1., 
in Works, 1:321–347; Orat. 4., in Works, 1:402–433. Equally important are his 
disputations; Priv. Disp., XXIX, in Works, 2:369–370; Priv. Disp., XXX, in Works, 
2:371–373; and Priv. Disp., XXIXX, in Works, 389–391. For specific studies on 
Arminius’s covenantal theology, see Richard A. Muller, “The Federal Motif in 
Seventeenth-Century Arminian Theology,” Nederlandsch Archief Voor Kerkgeschiedenis 
62/1 (1982):102–122; Raymond A. Blacketer, “Arminius’s Concept of Covenant,” 193–
220. 
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nature, as rational, intelligent, free, social, and spiritual/moral beings were capable of 
maintaining a willing, healthy, and free covenantal relationship with their Creator. 
However, sin stopped humans from continuing to partake of a covenantal relation with 
God. It is in the context of the new sinful nature and miserable condition of human beings 
that Arminius introduced the covenant of grace describing the merciful intervention of 
God on behalf of humanity.  
Most miserable, and deserving of the deepest commiseration, was the condition of 
mankind in that state of their affairs,—if  this declaration be a true one, “Happy is the 
people whose God is the Lord!” (Psalm 144:15.) And this inevitable misery would 
have rested upon Adam and his race for ever, had not Jehovah, full of mercy and 
commiseration, deigned to receive them into favor, and resolved to enter into another 
covenant with the same parties; not according to that which they had transgressed, 
and which was then become obsolete and had been abolished; but into a new 
covenant of grace.39 
For Arminius, therefore, divine grace toward sinful individuals becomes the 
essential characteristic of the covenant of grace. It is in this context of grace and covenant 
that Arminius stated clearly the universal nature of prevenient grace. Thanks to God’s 
covenant with Christ, the covenant of redemption,40 “God has taken the whole human 
race into the grace of reconciliation, and has entered into a covenant of grace with Adam, 
and with the whole of his posterity in him: In which he promises the remission of all 
sins.”41 
                                                
39 Orat. 4., in Works, 1:410. 
40 Arminius believed that the covenant of redemption between God and the Son is 
the foundation of the covenant of grace. 
41 Apology, Article XIII, XIV, in Works, 2:11. 
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Thus, for Arminius, salvific grace or prevenient grace is available to everyone. He 
openly affirmed that in Adam God has entered into covenant with the “whole human 
race” or the whole of Adam’s posterity; thus, divine redemption and reconciliation are 
universally offered. So, he advocated for a covenantal theology that it is not restricted to 
the elect. While Reformed theology collocated the covenant of grace in the context of 
predestination or election, Arminius collocated the covenant in the context of the 
universality of prevenient grace or the divine call to salvation to all human beings. It is 
the answer of the soul to the prevenient grace of God that leads to spiritual regeneration 
and participation in the covenant relationship of grace. 
The Extent of the Battle between the Spirit  
and the Flesh in Romans 7 
Arminius’s interpretation of Romans 7 is one of the most persuasive arguments in 
favor of the universality of prevenient grace. For Arminius, the battle between the Spirit 
and the Flesh happens in every single human being, including those who are not yet 
regenerated. On the one hand, Arminius understood that categorizing the individual in the 
spiritual struggle of Romans 7 as unregenerate created serious theological problems. One 
problem was that this interpretation aroused the suspicion of Pelagianism, to which 
Arminius quickly responded by qualifying the unregenerate person. However, on the 
other hand, Arminius believed that categorizing as regenerate the individual of Romans 7 
represented a departure from the biblical teaching of the passages as well as from the 
traditional interpretation of the Church. Unlike his contemporaries, he interpreted the 
miserable person as unregenerate.  
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It seems to me that Arminius defended only two specific spiritual stages in the 
experience of human beings: the regenerate and the unregenerate. However, he divided 
the unregenerate human beings into two different grades or steps; unregenerate 
individuals under the influence of grace and unregenerate individuals in their natural 
depravity.42 Here, I will discuss only the two kinds of unregenerate persons according to 
Arminius. First, humans exist in total depravity “devoid of regeneration” as well as 
“those things which usually precede regeneration.”43 This kind of unregenerate person, 
for Arminius, are “those who have felt no [actum] motion of the regenerating Spirit, or of 
its tendency for regeneration.”44 In this case, individuals are devoid of a knowledge of the 
law and strangers to the influence of the Holy Spirit, and therefore totally dead “in 
transgressions and sin” (Eph 2:1). Interestingly, in this group Arminius also included 
those who had rejected the calling to salvation or had turned away from the way of 
redemption.45  
                                                
42 For Arminius’s definition of a regenerate human under grace, see, Rom. VII., in 
Works, 2:497. 
43 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:489. 
44 Apology, Article XVI, in Works, 2:17. See also, Rom. VII., in Works, 2:498. He 
clearly defined this kind of unregenerate: “An unregenerate man is,—not only [one] who 
is entirely blind, ignorant of the will of God, knowingly and willingly contaminating 
himself by sins without any remorse of conscience, affected with no sense of the wrath of 
God, terrified with no compunctions [or] visits of conscience, not oppressed with the 
burden of sin, and inflamed with no desire of deliverance.” 
45 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:498. Arminius also defined a second category of 
unregenerate human being: “it is also he who knows the will of God but does it not, who 
is acquainted with the way of righteousness but departs from it.” 
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The second kind of unregenerate persons are those unconverted human beings 
affected in their minds by the requirements of the law, living under the law, and also 
under the influence of those things preceding regeneration, but who are not yet 
transformed by God’s grace. Arminius identified this second group as the humans 
engaged in a spiritual struggle between the Spirit and the Flesh in Romans 7.46 These 
unregenerate persons are “those who feel [actus] those motions of the Holy Spirit which 
belong either to preparation or to the very essence of regeneration, but who are not yet 
regenerated.”47 They are also under the conviction of sin by the law. Here Arminius finds 
the proper function of the law advanced by the Epistle of Romans, as convincing humans 
about sin and leading them to Christ for mercy, grace, and salvation. For Arminius, 
humans in this condition do not necessarily occupy a middle ground or “intermediate 
stage” between been regenerate and unregenerate, as Olson suggests,48 but rather, 
                                                
46 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:490. 
47 Apology., Article XVI, in Works, 2:17. He further explains: “Let the word 
‘unregenerate’ be taken for a man who [jam renascitur] is now in the act of the new birth, 
though he be not yet actually born again,” Ibid., Works, 2:18. About these individuals 
Arminius further says he or she is one: “Who is affected with a painful sense of sin, is 
oppressed with its burden, and who sorrows after a godly sort;—who knows that 
righteousness cannot be acquired by the law;—and who is therefore compelled to flee to 
Christ,” “Dissertation on the True and Genuine Meaning of the Seventh Chapter of the 
Epistle to the Romans,” Rom. VII., in Works, 2:498. It is important to mention that 
Arminius sometimes identifies this unregenerate person under the law as not having the 
“light of the Holy Spirit.” This seems to be somewhat inconsistent with his analysis of 
Romans 7 and the unregenerate individual in connection with the Holy Spirit. However, 
he is evidently referring not to the light that initially illuminates the soul to call people to 
salvation, that is, prevenient grace, but he refers to the light of the Holy Spirit that has 
already resulted in regeneration “by the Spirit of Christ,” Rom. VII., in Works, 2:608. 
48 Olson, Arminian Theology, 164–165. Indeed, Arminius rejected the notion of 
an “intermediate state” or different “degrees” of regeneration stating that “liberty 
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although unregenerate and unconverted they are in the process of regeneration. For 
Arminius, it is better to speak of “a grade or step from the one [state] to the other” than to 
present three states of humans in relation to salvation. However, Arminius did not see this 
matter as being of critical importance because Augustine, Bucer, Musculus, and the 
Scriptures sometimes present three and even four conditions of human beings.49 
In this context, one thing seems to me evident in Arminius’s understanding of the 
“wretched man” in Romans 7. The “wretched man” represents an unregenerate 
individual, but one that is under the work of God’s prevenient grace by both the 
conviction of the law and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Arminius never 
separates the operation of the law from the operation of the Holy Spirit. He clearly stated 
that anything good in this step of the unregenerate individual is not “from the store-house 
of nature, but it deduces [to] them from the operation of the Spirit, who employs the 
preaching of the law and blesses it.”50 The question at this point is: Do all human beings 
universally experience this struggle between the Spirit and the Flesh as unregenerate 
individuals? According to Arminius, humans can universally show a spiritual struggle 
between the Spirit and the Flesh as described in Romans 7 as a result of the working of 
the Holy Spirit and the conviction of the law. Arminius came to demonstrate that reality 
                                                
[regeneration] cannot consist in even the smallest portion of servitude or captivity” 
because it is impossible to say that “this man is partly free from sin, and partly its slave 
and captive; but a necessity would arise for the existence of a third thing from these two, 
which might obtain the name of ‘a medium between the extremes,’ belonging neither to 
this nor to that,” Rom. VII., in Works, 2:573, 591. 
49 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:591–592, 628. 
50 Ibid., 2:632. 
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by appealing to several biblical texts and authorities within the Reformed tradition like 
Calvin and Beza.  
As part of his understanding of the role of the law in Romans 7 in the life of the 
unregenerate individual, Arminius also believed that all humans have at least a basic 
knowledge of the requirements of the law. After dividing the function of the law, first, 
into an instrument of condemnation, and second, into a document of instruction, 
guidance, and conviction, Arminius claimed that “all sinners universally are said to be 
under it.”51 However, since in the first function of the law the universality is unqualified, 
Arminius admitted that in the second, sinners are under the law to “different degrees and 
orders.”52 This basically means that the “efficacy, guidance, power, and exercises” of the 
operation of the law appear in different form and force in different individuals. Arminius 
seems to refer to the different influences exercised by the written law of Scripture and the 
written law of the natural world in their heart.  
Indeed, in this context, he mentioned the distinction of Romans 2:13–18 between 
Gentiles and Jews in their relation to the law.53 In any case, Arminius wanted to make 
clear that the presence of the law, Scriptural or natural, universally produces a struggle in 
the human heart between the Spirit and the Flesh. For him, not only the apostolic 
testimony of Romans 2 points to this reality, but also several other passages, such as 
Luke 12:47; 1 Corinthians 7:1; 13:2, and 2 Peter 2:21, which speak of unregenerate 
                                                
51 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:492–493. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:494. 
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individuals as having a knowledge, albeit limited, of the law.54 In order to sustain his 
argument, Arminius referred to theological authorities, in this case Peter Martyr, the 
influential Italian Reformed theologian. Martyr affirmed:  
We do not deny that there is occasionally some contest of this kind in unregenerate 
man; not because their minds are not carnal and inclined to vicious pursuits, but 
because in them are still engraven the laws of nature, and because in them shines 
some illumination of the Spirit of God.55 
In my view, therefore, because Arminius elsewhere relates the influence of the 
law to the concept of prevenient grace, and because he universalized the function of the 
law, resulting in a painful contest between the Spirit and the Flesh; consequently, he 
necessarily understood the working of the Holy Spirit in the administration of prevenient 
grace as a universal reality in the experience of all human beings.  
Indeed Arminius made clear this reality in his interpretation of Romans 7. He  
claimed that the influence of the Holy Spirit manifestly works in the life of unregenerate 
individuals. In my understanding, Arminius interprets this working of the Holy Spirit to 
be closely related to the operation of prevenient grace. This seems obvious because 
prevenient grace language is present everywhere. He says that the unregenerate in this 
case is in “the commencing act” or initial “operation of the Holy Spirit.”56 Likewise, he 
says that “grace prepares the will of man” and also “knocks at the door of our hearts.”57 
                                                
54 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:521. 
55 Ibid., 2:519. 
56 Ibid., 2:494. 
57 Ibid., 2:632. 
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Significantly, Arminius presents supporting biblical references like Hebrew 6:4–5; 
Matthew 7:22; 11:28; Revelation 3:17, 18; and Galatians 2:16.58 In relation to Matthew 
11:28, Arminius speaks of calling, an integral part of prevenient grace, as the necessary 
preceding work to justification and sanctification. Later, in his consideration of Romans 
7:15, he concludes that “the contest between the mind (incited by the law and the Spirit) 
and the flesh . . . must of necessity be placed among the beginnings and the precursors of 
regeneration.”59 Using this evidence, Clarke claims that for Arminius not only the 
influence of the Holy Spirit is present in the unregenerate, but that they can even “show a 
good deal of the workings of the Holy Spirit.”60  
Because everywhere else Arminius used language to include all sinners 
universally, it is difficult to believe that in this case he is thinking of a particular 
application of prevenient grace. Indeed, Arminius openly denied the reality of a human 
being existing only in “the flesh” because the imperative of the law and the illumination 
of the Holy Spirit works in all, though in different degrees.61 For this reason, he carefully 
distinguished between the “indwelling of the Holy Spirit” in the human heart and the 
“preparation by the Spirit” of the human heart. At this point, he made the clearest 
reference to prevenient grace, highlighting that it is “one thing to feel or perceive some 
                                                
58 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:494–495. 
59 Ibid., 2:521. 
60 F. Stuart Clarke, “Arminius’s Use of Ramism in His Interpretation of Romans 7 
and 9,” in Interpreting the Bible: Historical and Theological Studies in Honour of David 
F. Wright, ed. A. N. S. Lane (Leicester, England: Apollos, 1997), 137. 
61 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:530. 
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effect of preparing grace; and it is another to be under grace, or to be ruled, led and 
influenced by grace.”62 
Before closing our discussion on this topic, it seems important to underline that 
for Arminius, this human being of Romans 7 is different from the human being in 
Galatians 5:16–18. The spiritual struggle of Romans 7 is experienced in the unconverted 
life, but in an individual under the influence of prevenient grace. Therefore, this human is 
frequently conquered by the power of sin. Differently, the individual in Galatians 5:16– 
18 is under the dominion of grace and the power of the Holy Spirit, therefore, God 
“[prevents] sin from having dominion over [them], and [hinders them] from fulfilling the 
lust of the flesh.”63 Arminius believed in the possibility of a complete victory over sin, 
although he did not assert the possibility of attaining perfection [in the sense of being 
beyond the possibility of falling from grace]. For that reason, Arminius asked a question 
of great importance: “After the Holy Spirit has commenced the mortification and death of 
sin, what is the act of the same Spirit respecting sin?.”64 He answered: “Undoubtedly it is 
the persecution of the remains of sin, that He may subdue and extinguish them until they 
no longer exist.”65 There is no middle ground for Arminius, because “liberty cannot 
[exist] with even the smallest portion of servitude or captivity.”66 This, Arminius argued, 
                                                
62 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:544. 
63 Ibid., 2:571. 
64 Ibid., 2:572–573. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:573. 
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is not the case of the human of Romans 7 who, if he followed the reasoning of his 
contemporaries, would be “partly free” and “partly a slave.” Galatians 5, therefore, 
provided Arminius with the argument to demonstrate that the struggle continues after 
regeneration, but that the Holy Spirit, this time, is the victor. For that reason, he 
maintained that “all who have been grafted into Christ by true faith, having been made 
partakers of his life-giving Spirit, possess sufficient spiritual strength to fight against 
Satan, sin, the world, and their own flesh—and to gain victory over these enemies—yet 
none of this at any time without the perpetual assistance of the grace of the same Holy 
Spirit.”67  
However, Arminius insisted on the possibility that the once-converted person can 
lapse in the unsurrendered state which would then be characterized by the struggle of 
Romans 7. For that reason, he suggested the necessity of daily renewal, spiritual rebirth, 
or conversion in order for a person to surrender completely to God. He stated: 
I confess indeed, that it may be correctly said, ‘the new man is daily renewed more 
and more;’—both because it is needful that this newness, which has been produced in 
a [human being] by the act of the regenerating Spirit, should increase and be 
augmented day by day;—and because the remains of the old man ought by degrees to 
be taken away and weakened more and more.68 
Thus, for Arminius, the struggle of the converted lies in attaining this daily 
victory, which the individual can do by keeping aliving their relationship with the Holy 
                                                
67 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 
141; Decl. Sent., in Works, 1:664. 
68 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:550. He also said that “this work of regeneration and 
illumination is not completed in one moment; but that it is advanced and promoted, 
froom [die] time to time, by daily increase,” Pub. disp., XI, in Works, 2:195. 
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Spirit. The struggle of the unconverted, but under the working of prevenient grace, 
continues until the individual accepts the God’s grace and salvation. I think that this is a 
key difference to keep in mind in Arminius’s understanding of Romans 7 and Galatians 
5.  
In summary, when interpreting Romans 7, Arminius continually made clear that 
the Pauline image of a wretched human being refers to an unregenerate individual, but 
one that it is awakened by the influence of prevenient grace and the actions of the Holy 
Spirit beginning with the law and following with the Gospel. He stated:   
these things are attributed to the unregenerate, without any injury to grace and the 
Holy Spirit; because they are believed to be, in those in whom they are found, 
through the operation of grace of the Holy Spirit. For there are certain acts which 
precede conversion, and they proceed from the Holy Spirit who prepares the will.69 
It is important to analyze the scope of the calling to salvation in connection with 
the concept of prevenient grace, and it is to this what we now turn. 
The Universality of Vocation  
Divine vocation, as we have seen, is closely related to prevenient grace in 
Arminius’s theology. Here, I will pay close attention to the calling to salvation as an 
integral part of the process of prevenient grace. Thus, I briefly discuss Arminius’s 
understanding of the universality of the divine calling to salvation. Indeed, he believed 
that in Christ God calls all individuals to salvation.  
                                                
69 Rom. VII., in Works, 2:542. 
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Arminius in his concluding arguments against Perkins clearly stated that “all men 
are called with some calling [by some vocation].”70 He listed some forms of calling such 
as the “witness of God . . . the truth . . . and the writing of the law in their minds.”71 
Arminius evidently had prevenient grace in mind because he asserted that this calling is 
not immediately salvific, implying that a human response to God’s call is necessary. A 
universal calling to salvation, therefore, does not imply for Arminius that all humans will 
actually be saved. But it does imply that God really comes to every human being with an 
offer to participate in his program of redemption. Universal prevenient grace is engraved 
in the calling as the knocking on the door.  
The Extent of the Special Operation  
of the Holy Spirit  
Arminius certainly related prevenient grace to the preaching of the Word. 
However, he likewise did not want to limit the operation of the Holy Spirit only to those 
places where the Word is preached. This is obviously crucial for Arminius’s 
understanding of the universality of grace, for otherwise divine prevenient grace 
effectively would be restricted to within the boundaries of Christian preaching and 
ministry. The language of universality in connection with the heathen or unevangelized 
nations and individuals is certainly a difficult topic, so a Christian thinker must proceed 
with caution in this respect. It seems to me that Arminius considered that good works are 
present in the life of the heathen thanks to the influence of God’s prevenient grace by the 
                                                
70 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:484. 
71 Ibid. 
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work of the Holy Spirit. Here, Arminius carefully related the prevenient work of grace to 
the concept of natural theology.  
Arminius denied that a true good work could be possible without the work of the 
Holy Spirit and the knowledge of God. He does not consider it possible to act rightly and 
honestly only by “nature.” In other words, for Arminius, human nature deprived of grace 
and of the Spirit of God only “tends downward to those things that are earthly.”72 Yet at 
the same time, Arminius openly stated that Paul acknowledges that the heathens “have a 
true knowledge of God.”73 How are both possible?  
According to Arminius, any evidence of good works “agreeable to God” demands 
the existence of a true knowledge of God. It is evident that even the Gentiles are capable 
of doing some portion of good; therefore, they have a true knowledge of God. But 
Arminius went further to affirm that a true knowledge of God is only possible by the 
assistance of grace and the Holy Spirit. A comprehensive reading of Arminius’s 
disputations on the topic shows that Arminius rejected the idea that humans come into the 
world with an innate knowledge of God and moral life. Such knowledge, present even in 
heathens, is the result of the general revelation of God informed by grace and the work of 
the Holy Spirit. For Arminius, God “did not leave Himself without witness” (Acts 14:17); 
therefore, to all humans God has “revealed some truth concerning His power and 
goodness; and has preserved the law engraved on their minds.”74 This understanding is 
                                                
72 Apology., Article XV, in Works, 2:15. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:483. 
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really singular in Arminius’s theology. It is possible, then, to conclude that Arminius 
effectively believed that the Holy Spirit was working within the heathen even though the 
preaching of the word was not present.75 For Arminius, his opponents not only deny this 
but contradict themselves by affirming both that the heathens have no knowledge of God 
and that they are able to do good works. For this reason, Arminius sarcastically said that 
his opponents are the true Pelagians and the hunters caught in their own snare.  
From this conclusion arises a critical question: Did Arminius believe this special 
work of the Spirit to be salvific or only another common activity within the providential 
work of God? Arminius’s intention points to the salvific nature of this work of the Spirit. 
This seems to be evident because he consciously related Romans 1 and 2 to the history of 
the conversions of Cornelius and Lydia in Acts 10 and 16. For Arminius, all human 
beings by the general revelation of God are able to have true knowledge of God. This true 
knowledge of God informs them not only about the existence of God, but also about the 
                                                
75 It is possible to see Arminius’s logic by constructing two syllogisms from his 
discussion:  
Major premise: Good works demand a true knowledge of God. 
Minor premise: Gentiles are capable of doing some good.  
Conclusion: Therefore, gentiles have a true knowledge of God. 
Major premise: True knowledge of God demands grace and the work of the Holy 
Spirit. 
Minor premise: Gentiles have a true knowledge of God. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the grace and the work of the Holy Spirit is present within 
the gentiles.  
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“knowledge of Truth,” His eternal power and Godhead, and their duty to glorify God. 
Unrighteousness, then, is only possible because “they knew God.” Consequently, they are 
“deprived of all excuse.” In Arminius’s evaluation this is only possible because God’s 
grace precedes their accountability. For him, the story of Cornelius and Lydia 
demonstrates that the preventing work of the Holy Spirit is working in the human hearts 
long before they hear the message of the Gospel.76  
At this point, Arminius is careful to clarify that natural theology is not sufficient 
for salvation unless the work of the Holy Spirit is adjoined to it. His reading of Romans 1 
and 2 makes clear this reality. Responding to his opponents Arminius asked: “What is the 
nature of this expression, ‘If they do those things which the powers of nature enable them 
to perform?’”77 I provide Arminius’s answer in its entirety here to make clear Arminius’s 
thought.  
Is “nature,” when entirely destitute of grace and of the Spirit of God, furnished with 
the knowledge of that Truth which is said to be “help in unrighteousness,” by the 
knowledge of “that which may be known of God, even his eternal power and 
Godhead,” which may instigate man to glorify God, and which deprives him of all 
excuses, if he does not glorify God as he knows Him? I do not think, that such 
properties as these can, without falsehood and injury to Divine Grace, be ascribed to 
“nature,” which, when destitute of grace and of the Spirit of God, tends directly 
downward to those things that are earthly.”78  
For Arminius then, nature is only able to lead humans to glorify God as a result of 
grace and of the Holy Spirit in the heart of those who may not have the opportunity to 
                                                
76 Apology., Article XV, in Works, 2:15–16. 
77 Apology., Article XV, Works, 2:15. 
78 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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hear the Gospel. John Platt accurately understands Arminius’s meaning in this respect, 
asserting that “Arminius takes the important step of assigning the knowledge of God 
obtainable from natural order to the realm, not of nature, by of grace.”79  
Nevertheless, Arminius continues to be cautious, asserting that this work of the 
Holy Spirit is preparatory and does not necessarily lead to actual salvation in every 
instance and that the preaching of the Word was certainly critical and the ordinary means 
for the work of conversion. For him, the stories of Cornelius, Lydia, the Bereans, and 
others exemplify that the preaching of the Gospel is the “ordinary means” of actual 
conversion.80 More precisely, Arminius quotes Acts 19:9–10 to establish that “God sends 
the external preaching of his word to nations, when it is his good pleasure for the great 
numbers of them to be converted.”81 For Arminius, in conversion both realities—the 
internal operation of the Holy Spirit and the preaching of the word—must be maintained. 
Nevertheless, Arminius did not completely close the door to an “extraordinary” work of 
the Spirit, one separated from the Word. He supported a common saying of his time that 
“the Holy Spirit is not so bound himself to this method [preaching] as to be unable to 
operate in an extraordinary way, without the intervention of human aid.”82  
                                                
79 John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the 
Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575–1650 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1982), 
180. 




Finally, in this context Arminius also corrected Scholastic conclusions regarding 
the nature of conversion and grace by specifically pointing to prevenient grace. Different 
than for the medieval theologians like Biel and others, for Arminius prevenient grace is 
the work of the Holy Spirit and is not integrated with nature. He radically rejected the 
Scholastic maxim “God will do that which is in Him, for the man who does what is in 
himself,” unless prevenient grace is added to the formula.83 In his corrected paraphrase 
Arminius says, “God will bestow more grace upon that man who does what is in him by 
the power of Divine Grace which is already granted to him.”84 Similarly, in answering 
question number four of the Synod, Arminius affirmed that good works are made and 
“rewarded in a moral view, not so much through the powers of nature, as by some 
operation in them [unbelievers] of the Holy Spirit.”85 Obviously, it is not because humans 
do what is in them by the power of human nature or will, but because they accept 
prevenient grace that humans receive further divine grace leading them to salvation.  
It seems proper, then, to conclude that, for Arminius, natural theology remains an 
essential aspect of the special operation of prevenient grace by the work of the Holy 
                                                
83 Fesko defends the opinion that this idea in Arminius’s writings clearly 
demonstrates Arminius’s acceptance of the medieval facientibus formula: “Facientibus 
quod in se est Deus non denegat gratian (‘Do what is in you and God will not deny his 
grace’).” See, Fesko, “Arminius on Facientus,” 350. Like Muller before him, Fesko 
believes that Arminius’s likely sources are medieval theologians like Gabriel Biel, Peter 
Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas. However, Arminius demonstrated that even when nature 
is involved in the preparation for salvation and conversion, the working grace of God and 
of the Holy Spirit is to be presupposed. Prevenient grace is not an integral part of nature, 
not even the testimony of nature is out of nature, much less so prevenient grace. 
84 Apology., Article XV, in Works, 2:16. Emphasis added. 
85 Quest., in Works, 2:66. 
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Spirit. Obviously, Arminius’s theological language in this respect is universal and not 
limited to where the gospel is preached. However, Arminius believed that the final step in 
this process would typically be the preaching of the Word.  
The remaining question in connection with Arminius’s understanding regarding 
the nature of the good works of the unevangelized is: How different is Arminius from 
other Reformed theologians of his time? Although, this dissertation does not look to 
validate or compare Arminius’s conceptualizations with other Reformed theologians, it 
seems of benefit to briefly summarize the position of the Reformed tradition on this 
concept.  
John Calvin, as Herman Kuiper says, believed in a universal or “general common 
grace” that sustains the world and even results in the performing of good works by the 
ungodly.86 These good works result from the reality of the imago dei present in humanity, 
the testimony of nature, and even the work of divine grace to maintain order, peace, and 
harmony in society. However, for Calvin, this work of grace is non-salvific in nature. He 
clearly says: “In every age there have been some who, under the guidance of nature, were 
all their lives devoted to virtue. It is of no consequence, that many blots may be detected 
in their conducts; by the mere study of virtue, they evinced that there was somewhat of 
purity in their nature.”87 Calvin continues by affirming that “some have not only excelled 
in illustrious deeds, but conducted themselves most honorably through the whole course 
                                                
86 Herman Kuiper, Calvin on Common Grace (Goes, the Netherlands: Oosterbaan 
& Le Cointre, 1928), 181.   
87 Calvin, Intitutes, II.3.3, 4. 
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of their lives.”88 This is the result of grace, but a kind of grace that does not “purify,” but 
only maintains under “internal restraint” the evilness of human nature.89 In sum, for 
Calvin, the actions of the Holy Spirit in the heart of unevangelized individuals are only 
for the preservation of society, having a restraining effect on their corrupted nature.  
Calvin’s concept of this providential but non-salvific grace, called common grace, 
became the commonplace understanding of the Reformed tradition. For instance, Martyr 
also argued that human beings are able to perform good and virtuous works because the 
imago dei is present in the soul and the testimony of nature. However, as John P. 
Donnelly explains, Martyr believes that all these good acts of the ungodly are 
contaminated by sin, and consequently, they are unpleasing to God.90 In sum, the 
Reformed theologians recurred to the concept of general or common grace as a necessary 
category to explain the good works and the presence of some kind of divine grace among 
the pagans and unevangelized. However, this divine activity does not intend to provide 
salvific grace.  
It seems to me, that Arminius’s conceptualization regarding the actions of the 
Holy Spirit among the pagans, different from his Reformed contemporaries, could be 
understood as salvific actions of God’s prevenient grace. For Arminius, this work of the 
                                                
88 Calvin, Intitutes, II.3.3, 4.   
89 Ibid. Calvin finalizes his argument stating that this grace is not “a special 
grace,” therefore, “we cannot set any value on anything that seems praiseworthy in 
ungodly men.” 
90 John Patrick Donnelly, S. J., Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s 
Doctrine of Man and Grace (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1976), 110, 113.   
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Holy Spirit and the consequent virtuous works of the unevangelized are salvific in the 
sense that God’s prevenient grace has liberated and prepared the will to hear and respond 
to salvation. It could also be understood as salvific in the sense that although this 
manifestation of prevenient grace does not necessarily and finally results in actual 
conversion, it does prepare the will for the manifestation of the Word of God. As I said 
previously, Arminius expected that at some point in their lives, these unevangelized 
individuals would come in contact with the preaching of the Word. However, it is not 
only at that precise moment that God’s salvific actions by prevenient grace are working 
in their favor. Previously, their wills have been informed and liberated by the internal 
work of the Holy Spirit. Certainly, Arminius did not completely clarify all the 
implications of his views. For instance, he did not respond to the question of whether, if 
the heathens never come in contact with the preaching of the Word and the Gospel their 
acceptance of prevenient grace through the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit, the 
testimony of nature, and the consequent performing of moral works is sufficient for 
eternal salvation? Arminius’s conceptualization seems to indicate that the answer 
ordinarily is no. This is evident because, for instance, he avoids controversy by distancing 
himself from, although not openly condemning, the position of Zwingli regarding the 
salvation of the pious or virtuous pagans like “Socrates, Aristides, and others in similar 
circumstances,”91 However, it seems to me that because Arminius understood common 
grace as equal with prevenient grace, then the revelation that involves sufficient 
                                                
91 Apology, Article XVIII, in Works, 2:21.  
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accountability to result in eternal damnation must, if accepted, also constitute sufficient 
revelation to enable eternal salvation. Indeed, contrary to Martyr, Arminius does say that 
the good works of the heathen are pleasing to God because they are the resulting work of 
the Holy Spirit’s influence in the human heart.  
Thus it could be said at this point that for Arminius, prevenient grace that is also 
salvific grace comes to all people by one means or the other; the ‘ordinary’ means is by 
the Holy Spirit and the preaching of the Gospel; the ‘extraordinary’ means is by the Spirit 
without the Word, which would most often be by the Spirit through the witness of God in 
nature.92 In any case, the implications of Arminius’s conceptualization on the universality 
of grace in the context of the special work of the Holy Spirit among the heathens is that 
all people without exception have sufficient grace, and their will has been sufficiently 
liberated, to provide the opportunity to respond to God’s salvific invitation. Nevertheless, 
Arminius made it clear that the special revelation through the Word and the Gospel is so 
much more effective that exposure to the Word leads many more people to salvation than 
does the Holy Spirit and the testimony of God in nature, apart from the Word. Thus, it is 
safe to conclude that prevenient grace as the initial work of God in liberating the will is 
universally and effectively manifested to all human beings.  
                                                
92 It should be noted, however, that the distinction that Arminius presented 
between the “ordinary” work of the preaching of the Word, and the “extraordinary” work 
of the Holy Spirit through natural revelation as means of salvation relates to actual 
conversion and not necessarily with the initial working of prevenient grace, see Apology.,  
Article XVIII, in Works, 2:20–22. Arminius clearly regarded the natural revelation more 
highly than did his contemporaries. For instance, see the distinctions between the 
“ingrafted word” of God “universally” disclosed “to the mind of men” and the “outward 
word” in Scripture, Priv. Disp. V, in Works 2:322–324.   
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Prevenient Grace and Divine Foreknowledge  
and Election  
A challenge to the universality of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology is his 
own concept of divine foreknowledge. One could argue that Arminius’s ideas on God’s 
knowledge betray his conclusion about the universal efficacy of prevenient grace. As we 
will see, in my understanding Arminius’s conceptualization of God’s knowledge in 
general and God’s foreknowledge in particular seems to imply at least some kind of 
determinism. If God in the actualization of his foreknowledge regarding the contingent 
choices of individuals grants prevenient grace only to those who he foreknows will 
positively accept or respond to it, then, the real universality of prevenient grace and the 
actual decision of human will are jeopardized.  
But before pursuing this discussion, a brief but precise comment concerning 
Arminius’s understanding of foreknowledge and election may prove instructive.  
Divine foreknowledge and election relate closely to grace, especially prevenient 
grace, in the theology of Arminius. From my readings on the concept of divine 
foreknowledge, I distinguish between historical foreknowledge, sovereign 
foreknowledge, and ontological or metaphysical foreknowledge. By historical 
foreknowledge, I mean God’s knowledge of future events based on His knowledge of the 
becoming of history.93 Sovereign foreknowledge is the knowledge that God has of future 
events based on His eternal sovereign decision about what the future will be like. In this 
                                                
93 For instance, see Fernando Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology: 
Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Fernando Canale, 2005), 104–111; 
120–131. Some scholars identified this concept of divine foreknowledge as “a 
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case, God’s foreknowledge is based on God’s will.94 Arminius did not have either a 
historical nor a sovereign view of God’s foreknowledge. Instead, Arminius had an 
ontological view of God’s foreknowledge. God knows the future looking into himself, 
that it is, looking into his own essence.95 Consequently, the cause of God’s knowledge for 
Arminius is God’s will, only in the sense that His will decides to create a particular 
reality already present in his essence or nature. It seems useful at this point to explain 
briefly Arminius’s views on God’s knowledge before considering the relationship 
between God’s foreknowledge and prevenient grace.  
Arminius’s concept of God’s knowledge is solidly constructed upon a faithful 
acceptance of the classical view of God’s nature and attributes.96 Timelessness, eternity, 
impassibility, and immutability are essential for Arminius’s conceptualization of God’s 
understanding. Because God is impassible and immutable, his nature is both “devoid of 
all [passionis] suffering or feeling” and “void of all changes;—of being transferred from 
place to place, because it is itself its own end and good, and because it is immense;—of 
                                                
perceptualist model of divine cognition.” See McGregor, Luis de Molina, 97. 
94 For instances see John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to 
Christian Belief (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2013), 306, 308–310; Michael Horton, The 
Christian Faith, 263; Michael Bird, Evangelical Theology: A Biblical and Systematic 
Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2013), 518–519. 
95 For instance, one modern theologian that equates God’s foreknowledge with 
God’s essence is Norman L. Geisler, Systematic Theology in One Volume (Minneapolis, 
MN: Bethany, 2011), 497–498. 
96 Arminius affirmed the classical view of God. God is one, simple, self-existence 
(aseity), timeless, eternal, infinite, immutable, impassible, incorruptible, omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and omniscient. He also enlisted all the communicable attributes of God’s 
character like love, goodness, and beauty. See Priv. Disp. XX, in Works, 2:347–350. 
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generation and corruption;—of  alteration;—of increase and decrease.”97 This reality of 
God’s nature directly shapes God’s life, knowledge, and will. Arminius assured his 
readers that God “knows all things from eternity, nothing [de novo] recently.”98 
Obviously, this divine knowledge of future reality is complete, perfect, immutable, and 
certain.   
Arminius divided God’s knowledge into three essential orders or logical 
moments: God’s natural necessary knowledge (scientia naturalis), God’s foreknowledge 
(scientia libera), and God’s middle knowledge (scientia media).99 These logical moments 
of God’s knowledge could have become familiar to Arminius by the influence of Louis 
de Molina (1535–1600), a Spanish Jesuit scholar. In order to guide the discussion of 
Arminius’s understanding and modification of these logical moments of God’s 
knowledge, it seems useful to know how some Molinist scholars have diagrammed these 
logical orders: 
Moment 1: God’s scientia naturalis of everything that could be.  
Moment 2: God’s scientia media of everything that would be. 
Interval of the free act of God’s will: Divine wisdom chooses to create a particular 
world from all the possibilities.  
                                                
97 Pub. Disp. IV, in Works, 2:117. 
98 Ibid.,, Works, 2:121. 
99 Pub. Disp. IV, in Works, 2:123–124. Arminius used different terminology to 
refer to these logical moments of God’s knowledge: sciencia naturalis: natural, 
necessary, infinite, indeterminate, practical, of simple intelligence; sciencia libera: 
vision, free, definite, determinate, and foreknowledge; and sciencia media. 
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Moment 3: God’s scientia libera of everything that will be and happen.100  
Before considering Arminius’s view, it is important to understand that this logical 
order occurs in the mind of God, not in a historical sequence. In other words, all divine 
knowledge is prior to creation and the historical continuum. Arminius, like most 
theologians of his time, understood that God’s knowledge is a timeless “simple and 
infinite intuition” in the life of God.101 MacGregor calls this concept of knowledge a 
“conceptualist model of divine cognition.”102     
According to Arminius, God’s natural and necessary knowledge is the main 
source of all other kinds of God’s knowledge. In other words, divine foreknowledge and 
middle knowledge are deeply rooted in the natural and necessary knowledge of God. 
These three logical moments of God’s knowledge are faculties of God’s life. For 
Arminius, there is no distinction between God’s life and God’s essence.103 Thus, as a 
result of his natural and necessary knowledge, God knows himself  “entirely and 
adequately” before knowing all reality. It is by knowing his own reality or being 
[essence] that God is able to know “other things [and all things possible] entirely and 
                                                
100 This is a modified diagram from Kenneth Keathley, Salvation and 
Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2010), 17; see also 
the popular Molinist booklet by William Lane Craig, What Does God Know? Reconciling 
Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Norcross, GA.: Ravi Zacharias 
International Ministries, 2002). 
101 Priv. Disp., XVII, in Works, 2:341. 
102 MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 97. 
103 See, Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:119. He clearly stated that “the Life of God is 
his Essence itself, and his very Being.” 
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excellently, as they are in Himself and in his Understanding [in the mind of God].”104 In 
this manner, God knows minutely not only all possibilities but also all reality. Again, the 
knowledge of Himself, other things, and other beings is an eternal, immeasurable, single 
and undivided act, certain, infallibly aware of all future realities, even future 
contingencies, without the influence of any external cause.105 It is in this context that we 
need to understand Arminius’s view of foreknowledge and middle knowledge as 
ontologically rooted in God’s essence.  
Arminius defined foreknowledge as God’s understanding of all realities and 
entities “which are, will be, or have been.”106 Regarding foreknowledge, Arminius 
explained that “a thing does not come to pass because it has been foreknown or foretold 
[by divine will]; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet to come to pass.” In 
other words, “things [non sint] do not exist because God knows them [futuras] as about to 
come into existence, but that he knows future things because they are future.”107 That is 
to say that for Arminius, foreknowledge is “[in the divine mind] posterior in nature and 
order to the thing that is future.”108 Arminius means that in a logical progression in the 
                                                
104 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:121–122. 
105 See, Priv. disp., XVIII, in Works, 2:341. Arminius affirms: “The understanding 
of God is certain and infallible: So that He sees certainly and infallibly even things future 
and contingent; whether He sees them in their causes, or in themselves. But this 
infallibility depends on the infinity of the essence of God, and not on his unchangeable 
will.” 
106 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:123. 
107 Ibid., Works, 2:124. 
108 Priv. Disp., XXVIII, in Works, 2:368. 
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mind of God, not a historical or chronological progression, future things [reality or 
created reality] are prior to God’s foreknowledge of them. God knows future reality 
because such a reality is in His own nature before He knows it.109 In his argument with 
Gomarus, Arminius explains this when he says that God “by His wisdom knows all 
things, and by the same wisdom sets His will to determine what things are to be 
created.”110 It seems obvious that for Arminius once that God had decided to create a 
specific world or reality, the future is completely closed. Consequently, contingent 
choices are contingent only in the mind of God, not in history. This, it seems to me, raises 
the question of determinism in Arminius’s theology. For instance, if at some moment in 
eternity God knows that an individual will accept or will not accept prevenient grace in 
her life, then the question that this raises is: Will that specific individual be truly free to 
do otherwise in respect to what she will do at the future time.? 
Arminius continues arguing that created reality (as logical, not as historical 
actualization) precedes God’s foreknowledge. In other words, God’s foreknowledge is 
similar to “human (after)knowledge.”111 This is possible because in God’s natural 
knowledge all possible future realities already exist, and from this knowledge God 
decided to create a specific world that accorded with his wisdom. Consequently, as I 
                                                
109 Priv. Disp., XVII, in Works, 2:341. He clearly states that God’s knowledge is 
“by simple and infinite intuition, according to succession of order, and not of time.” 
110 Gomarus Exam., in Works, 3:556. 
111 See the discussion regarding God’s knowledge in Reformation Arminianism in 
Steven M. Studebaker, “The Mode of Divine Knowledge in Reformation Arminianism 
and Open Theism” JETS 47/3 (September 2004): 469–480. See also, Robert E. Picirilli, 
“Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Future,” JETS 43/2 (June 2000): 263. 
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previously affirmed, although in one sense the cause of God’s foreknowledge is still 
God’s will, in another sense the real and natural cause of God’s foreknowledge is his very 
nature, internal being, or reality.112 Arminius is evidently counteracting his Reformed 
contemporaries notion of the sovereign or predestinarian foreknowledge, or more 
precisely, foreordination. 
Therefore for Arminius, strictly speaking the cause of God’s free knowledge is 
God’s knowledge of his own Essence and Infinity. He explained that “every kind of 
God’s knowledge is necessary: For the free understanding of God [foreknowledge] does 
not arise [ex eo] from this circumstance, that a free act of his will exhibits or offers an 
object to the understanding; but when any object whatsoever [posito] is laid down, the 
                                                
112 Similar to Arminius’s later position, Franciscus Junius experienced exuberant 
joy when he discovered that God’s foreknowledge does not equate with God’s will, but 
with God’s nature. He described this joy in very descriptive language: “Foreknowledge 
could not be sure and infallible, unless it rested on an immutable cause. But he denied 
that God's will was that immutable cause; it was something else, namely the divine 
nature, which precedes that will. I was as thrilled with this as if I had found a great 
treasure, which I value so cheaply in comparison with certain knowledge of those things 
about which I have been anxiously worrying for seven years now, that I prefer true 
knowledge which satisfies my mind on those articles about providence and predestination 
(so may God love me) than the riches of Croesus and Midas, indeed the treasures of the 
whole world,” cited in Clarke, 24. Fernando Canale affirms that, for Arminius, God’s 
nature or reality is the basis of foreknowledge. Canale is right in seeing God’s nature as 
an integral component of the basis of God’s foreknowledge. However, he fails to 
acknowledge that, for Arminius, God also exercises his volition, informed by his own 
divine essence or being, to bring forth His creative decrees resulting in an unique feasible 
world. This means, that according to Arminius, God’s will is also an integral basis of the 
divine foreknowledge. See Canale, 115–116.  
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Divine understanding knows it necessarily on account of the infinity of its own 
Essence.”113 
Likewise, it seems to me, that middle knowledge of future contingencies is rooted 
in God’s natural knowledge. Similar to Louis de Molina,114 Arminius argued that using 
his middle knowledge God knows “anything [si hoc sit] if it be or exist” or “if this 
happen, that will take place.”115 More precisely, middle knowledge mediates “in things 
which depend on the liberty of created [arbitrii] choice or pleasure.”116 Using this middle 
knowledge, therefore, God knows everything that would happen and under what 
circumstances a specific and free act of created beings will take place or be actualized. 
Therefore, God knows counterfactual truth of future contingencies. For instance, God 
                                                
113 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:124. Emphasis added. 
114 There is disagreement among scholars about whether Arminius was a 
committed or only an incidental Molinist. Kirk R. MacGregor suggests a distinction 
between Arminius and Molina’s systems and use of middle knowledge. He explains that 
middle knowledge needs careful definition in order to identify Arminius as a Molinist. He 
says that “if the theory simply denotes the doctrine of God’s prevolitional counterfactual 
knowledge, then Arminius’s system is undoubtedly based upon scientia media. On the 
other hand, if the theory is taken as shorthand for the full range of divine cognitive 
activities posited by Molina from God’s counterfactual knowledge to his creative decree, 
then Arminius’s system is not grounded in scientia media, as it deviates quite sharply 
from Molina’s depiction of God’s complete and unlimited deliberation,” see A Molinist-
Anabaptist Systematic Theology (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), 64–
65; 69–72. Obviously, there are other scholars who believe that Arminius’s and Molina’s 
views of middle knowledge are the same. See Barry E. Bryant, “Molina, Arminius, 
Plaifere, Goad, and Wesley on Human Free-Will, Divine Omniscience, and Middle 
Knowledge,” Wesleyan Theological Journal, vol. 27 (1992): 93–103; and Dekker, “Was 
Arminius a Molinist?,” 337–352. 
115 Pub. Disp., IV, Works, 2:123; Priv. Disp., XVIII, in Works, 2:342. 
116 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:124; Priv. Disp., XVIII, in Works, 2:342. 
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knew under which conditions Judas either would or would not use his freedom of will to 
betray Jesus. Likewise, God knows under which circumstances an individual either 
would or would not use his freedom of will to accept God’s offer of salvation. Dekker 
affirms that for Molina and Arminius, God actually created the specific circumstances, 
and that “by creating the circumstances, God has genuine control over what people [with] 
genuinely free will do.”117 If Dekker is correct, the implication of this for my argument is 
that once God’s volition has decided to create one specific world from all the possibilities 
already known by His natural knowledge and all the feasible decisions of human free will 
by His middle knowledge, the divine foreknowledge is rendered deterministic in the 
system of Molina and Arminius. However, I think that for Arminius, although God really 
created the specific circumstances, humans could do otherwise in the same set of 
circumstances. This means that for Arminius, through middle knowledge, God merely 
knows the free exercise of the human that will result in a specific set of circumstances. 
All these orders of God’s knowledge in relation to prevenient grace could be 
better understood if they were discussed in relation to God’s will. For Arminius, these 
orders of God’s knowledge either precede or follow the free act of divine will. While 
divine sciencia naturalis and scientia media precede the free act of God’s will, sciencia 
                                                
117 Dekker, “Was Arminius a Molinist?,” 351. McGregor concludes, similar to 
Dekker, that God’s creates or actualizes the specific circumstances in which a individual 
will exercise his freedom of will. They also agree that the sets of circumstances are 
“freedom-preserving in character,” see McGregor, Louis de Molina, 93, or “the relation 
between circumstances and human volition is not strictly implicative, and God has no 
control over the realizability of a certain relation between circumstances and human 
volition,” see, Dekker, “Was Arminius a Molinist?,” 351. 
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libera naturally and consequently follows it. Therefore, contrary to his Reformed 
colleagues, for Arminius the cause of things depends partly on the natural knowledge of 
God and partly in the free decision of God’s volition.118 It is also before the free act of 
divine will that God knows through his middle knowledge what free will creatures would 
actualize from all the possibilities already present in the mind of God. Consequently, God 
uses his natural knowledge of all possibilities and his middle knowledge of those most 
feasible actions of free will agents to determine by his sovereign will a specific reality. 
Logically, once that specific reality is determined by God, He actually has exhaustive and 
certain foreknowledge of all future events. From a logical perspective, this could really 
sound deterministic. It is important, however, to consider the way in which for Arminius 
this knowledge of God and the working of prevenient grace actualizes itself in time and 
history.  
Evidently, the working of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology was greatly 
influenced by these previous concepts. Some necessary questions arise from Arminius’s 
conceptualizations: Does prevenient grace work in a historical reality or only in the 
timeless life of God? Do human beings exercise their freedom of will in a historical 
reality or only in God’s mind? It seems to me that Arminius did not answer these 
                                                
118 For Calvin and Reformed theologians in general, God foreknows because he 
wills. A script writer can serve as an illustration. A script writer writes a particular 
narrative that later is performed on stage. Likewise, God fore-writes future reality that 
later is played out exactly as God wrote it in history. Then, the Calvinist logical order of 
God’s knowledge is this: God’s will takes place in a historical continuum. Because he 
wills, he foreordains all events in a certain and specific way. As a result, God certainly 
foreknows all future reality. 
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questions precisely, but if we follow his logic we can nonetheless draw some tentative 
conclusions.  
The general tenor of Arminius’s theology indicates that prevenient grace is 
granted to all human beings as a reality from the inner and eternal essence or 
understanding of God. In other words, God exhaustively foreknows those who will 
positively respond to the offer of salvation and those who will obstinately reject the 
working of prevenient grace in their hearts. While this knowledge is evidently present in 
the eternal and timeless life and knowledge of God, it is recapitulated in history. I mean 
that prevenient grace is not limited only to those who God foreknows will respond 
positively. Arminius clearly would note that such a conclusion would immediately be 
equated with Calvinist conclusions of limited grace. Rather, for Arminius every 
individual necessarily exercises their freedom of will to accept or reject the working of 
divine prevenient grace, although this be only a recapitulation in history of the eternal 
knowledge of God.  
Arminius clearly pointed to both these realities, affirming: “Pre-damnation 
[predestination to damnation] is antecedent to all things; by no means does it exist 
without the foreknowledge of the causes of damnation.”119 In this context, Arminius 
rejects a Calvinistic version of predestination because it requires that humans commit sins 
“without any foreknowledge of an inclination, will, or action on the part of man.”120 
                                                
119 Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in Gunter, Arminius and His 
Declaration, 132. 
120 Ibid., 120. 
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Similarly, he clearly connected foreknowledge, prevenient grace, and election in the 
fourth decree of divine predestination. He explains that: 
This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from 
all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, 
through his subsequent grace would persevere, according to the before described 
administration of those means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; 
and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and 
persevere.121 
Arminius, in this way, preserved the biblical semantic tension or paradox between 
free will and divine foreknowledge as well as divine sovereingty.122 As I have already 
noted, Arminius’s model still seems to be deterministic for some scholars.123 
                                                
121 Decl. Sent., in Works, 1:653–654; Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in 
Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration, 135.  
122 I see the tension in passages like Job 42:2; Isa.14:24; 43:13; 46:9–10; and Eph. 
1:11 for divine foreknowledge and sovereignty and passages like John 12:48; 2 Cor. 5:10, 
1 Tim. 2:4; and 2 Peter 2:9 for an equally emphatic affirmation of human freedom and 
responsibility. 
123 As we have noted, Arminius’s concept of God’s knowledge is evidently 
complicated and somehow ambivalent. There surely are certain elements in Arminius’s 
concept of God’s knowledge that could be interpreted as theologically and 
philosophically deterministic. Some scholars have previously noted deterministic 
elements in Arminius’ theology, specifically in his conceptualization of God’s 
knowledge. For instance, one could conclude from Dekker’s analysis of Arminius’s use 
of middle knowledge that Arminius was necessarily a determinist; see Dekker, “Was 
Arminius a Molinist?,” 337–352. Roger Olson undoubtedly noted Dekker’s implications 
of determinism in Arminius’s theology, and concluded that he “tends to agree with 
Dekker.” Then, he affirms, if Arminius effectively used middle knowledge, he 
contradicted himself making God the author of evil. See “Are Arminian Theology and 
Middle Knowledge Compatible?” in 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2013/09/are-arminian-theology-and-middle-
knowledge-compatible/, accessed January 28, 2016. Interestingly, Olson in his book 
Arminian Theology states “that Arminius occasionally but rarely said things that could be 
interpreted as Molinist,” 194–197. To my mind, Arminius’s use of the concept of middle 
knowledge is occasional and limited and did not necessarily result in determinism in his 
theology. See, Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:123–124. This view is defended by Witt, who 
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Nevertheless, I think, that he produced a non-deterministic alternative to the Reformed 
theology of his time. It even seems possible to say that Arminius mantained a traditional 
view of foreknowledge that implies determinism in a way that he did not intend.  
As regards prevenient grace and foreknowledge, this seems obvious to me for 
three reasons: First, as we have previously seen, Arminius understood prevenient grace in 
particular and grace in general as a force that could be resisted. He affirmed, for example, 
that “if  he [God] resolves to use a force that is not irresistible, but that can be resisted by 
the creature, then that thing is said to be done, not necessarily, but contingently, although 
its actual occurrence was certainly foreknown by God.”124 Then, prevenient grace works 
                                                
affirms that while Arminius discussed the biblical passages used by Molina, namely 1 
Samuel 23 and Matthew 11, he “states that God knows what creatures might do or are 
able to do; he does not state explicitly that God knows with certainty what creatures will 
do or would do.” See Witt, “Creation, Redemption and Grace,” 364–365. It seems to me 
that Arminius did say “that God knows with certainty” the future free decisions of human 
beings, but that this divine certainty is rooted in divine knowledge and not in divine will. 
In this case, God’s knowledge is certain, but it is not necessary. William den Boer also 
rejects a deterministic reading of middle knowledge in Arminius’s writings. Indeed, he 
suggests that Arminius integrated middle knowledge “to create room for creaturely 
contingencies without harming God’s foreknowledge and its certainty.” He says that 
middle knowledge permitted Arminius to insist on both God’s omniscience, God’s 
control over his creation, grace, and human freedom without inconsistencies. On this, see 
den Boer, God’s Twofold Love, 147. Stanglin and McCall argue against determinism in 
Arminius theology asserting that “Arminius affirms foreknowledge but rejects 
determinism,” Theologian of Grace, 64–65. For what to me seems the best (though 
lengthy) analysis of Arminius’s concept of God’s knowledge, see Witt, “Creation, 
Redemption and Grace in the Theology of Jacob Arminius,” 335–370. McCall argues that 
Arminius completely avoided determinism. See Thomas H. McCall, “Was Arminius and 
(Unwitting) Determinist? Another Look at Arminius’s Modal Logic,” Journal of 
Reformed Theology, 8 (2014): 301–309. 
124 Apology., Article V, in Works, 1:753. Elsewhere Arminius affirmed in his 
writings that contingency and necessity are logically incompatible. A divine or human act 
cannot be contingent and necessary at the same time. 
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contingently in the human heart. While deciding for salvation, God does not impose 
necessity or coercion in the free exercise of the human will. At the same time, God 
eternally foreknew who “would believe by the assistance of his prevenient grace.”125 
Clearly, for Arminius, God’s foreknowledge does not close the future until the human 
decision in favor or against prevenient grace actually occurs.  
Arminius’s conceptualization of a certain divine foreknowledge and human 
contingency brings us directly to his second affirmation. He understood God’s infallible 
knowledge as passive or merely intellectual, and therefore not disruptive of human 
freedom of will. He said that God saw the human fall into sin from all eternity; however, 
the “fall happened infallibly, in respect only of that foreknowledge, not in respect of any 
act of God’s will.”126 Arminius clearly distinguished between infallibility and necessity, 
stating that while infallibility relates to God’s eternal knowledge, necessity depends on 
God’s will.127 Therefore, the infallible or certain knowledge of God of contingent things 
does not render them so necessarily, because God knows contingent things 
                                                
125 Apology., Article IV, in Works, 1:749. 
126 Junius Conf., in Works, 3:180. 
127 Arminius used the distinction of “necessity of the consequence” and “the 
necessity of consequent.” See Perkins Exam., Works, 3:374– 375. Using Arminius’s 
logic, necessity of consequence relates to God’s infallible knowledge of humans actions, 
while necessity of consequent depends on the necessity of specific human actions. The 
first is passive knowledge of an event. The second is divine and active will that renders 
an event necessarily. Arguing with Perkins, Arminius said: “I allow, indeed, that ‘man 
may sin infallibly, and yet freely:’ but sinning infallibly and necessarily is not the same. 
For ‘infallibly’ is said with respect to the Divine prescience: but ‘necessarily’ with 
respect to God’s decree and the Divine will,” Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:375; see also 
Junius Conf., in Works, 3:180 and Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 64. This 
distinction allows the exercise of human freedom of will.  
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contingently.128 God has a passive or intellectual knowledge of future contingencies, but 
he does not will future contingencies.  
In this context, an evidence that God neither wills nor exerts his omnipotent 
actions of future contingencies is Arminius’s precise distinction between the 
foreknowledge of God and the omnipotence of God. I quote a large portion from 
Arminius’s writing to support this idea:  
For God, in virtue of His knowledge knew who by His grace would believe, and who 
by their own fault would remain in unbelief. I should wish with you [Perkins] to 
consider that the certainty of the event belongs properly to the foreknowledge of God; 
but the necessity, to the omnipotent and irresistible action of God: which, indeed, may 
be the foundation of the foreknowledge of some events; but is not of this, because 
God has determined to save believers by grace, that is, by gentle and sweet persuasion 
[the action of prevenient grace], fitting or congruous to their own will; not by 
almighty action or motion, which they neither will not can resist, nor can will to 
resist. Much less does the damnation of some proceed from irresistible necessity 
imposed by God.129 
This distinction also helps Arminius to differentiate also between infallibility and 
necessity.130 For Arminius, because God only knows with certainty, the foreknowledge of 
God renders all actualization of future events infallible. This does not mean that God 
makes the future decisions of human beings happen because he does not use his 
                                                
128 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:123.  
129 Perkins Exam., in Works, 3:443. This distinction between 
foreknowledge/certainty/infallibly and omnipotence/necessity is well attested in 
Arminius’s writings, see also Junius Conf., in Works, 3:180. 
130 Perkins Exam. in Works, 3:375. Arminius stated responding to Perkins 
regarding the actualization sin and the fall: “I allow, indeed, that ‘man may sin infallibly, 
and yet freely:’ but infallibly and necessarily is not the same. For ‘infallibly’ is said with 
respect to the infinite Divine prescience: but “necessarily,’ with respect to God’s decree 
and the Divine will, by which He wills sin to happen.” 
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omnipotence regarding the actualization of future contingencies. This is closely related in 
Arminius with the way in which he understood that prevenient grace works.  
Thus, Arminius was not so much preoccupied with the affirmations of an 
exhaustive foreknowledge of God of the future human decisions as with the assertion that 
God’s power or omnipotence unilaterally forced humans to act in a specific way. Thus, 
for Arminius, the certainty of knowledge of God does not impose necessity in the human 
will.  
Third, Arminius defended the biblical tension between the liberty of human 
beings and the exhaustive knowledge of God of future reality.131 He distinctly showed 
this tension by affirming that, on the one hand, “contingency and liberty do not make the 
prescience [foreknowledge] of God uncertain,”132 but on the other hand, stating that 
God’s understanding though “certain and infallible, . . . does not impose any necessity on 
things [creatures].”133 He has both openness and foreknowledge. Though I do not find 
that Arminius completely exorcised the deterministic phantasm from his theology, by 
maintaining the tension he surely corrected the deterministic problem of the Augustinian-
Calvinist tradition. Indeed, I would like to suggest that in a sense Arminius offered one of 
the best solutions. Perhaps Christian theology only needs to maintain the biblical tension 
                                                
131 Many biblical passages clearly teach that God exhaustively knows present and 
future actions of free agents (for instances see Ps 147:5; Job 38:31–33; Is 46:10; Dan 
2:36–43; 1 Sam 16:7; Jer 17:9–10; Rom 8:27; 1 Jn 3:19–20). At the same time, the Holy 
Scriptures affirm that humans are agents with freedom of will (for instances of this, see 
Deut 30:19–20; Job 24:15; Ezek 18:30–32; Jn 7:17; Rom 13:2; Rev 3:20). 
132 Priv. Disp., XVII, in Works, 2:344. 
133 Pub. Disp., IV, in Works, 2:123.  
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between a God who foreknows all future reality and God’s creatures that enjoy the gift of 
freedom to decide on a relational life with their Creator.    
Arminius closely related his ideas of foreknowledge of future human response to 
prevenient grace to divine election. This means that for Arminius divine election rests on 
the human acceptance or rejection of God’s prevenient grace. Arminius argued that since 
Christ is the truly elect, then those who choose Christ under the influence of the Holy 
Spirit and the working of prevenient grace are elected in Him for eternal salvation.  
The Spiritual Result of Prevenient Grace:  
 Regeneration and Faith  
Before finishing our consideration of the concept of prevenient grace in 
Arminius’s theology, it is critical to explore the spiritual results of prevenient grace in the 
believers. Because I have previously discussed sufficiently the first spiritual result of 
prevenient grace as the liberation of the human will, here I will uniquely focus on faith as 
the salvific result of prevenient grace.  
In his writings Arminius gives special attention to the nature and role of faith in 
salvation. In order to understand Arminius’s concept of faith, I think that his Oration 
“The Certainty of Sacred Theology” should receive our special attention. This is one of 
his Orations presented to students and faculty of Leiden University. Arminius defines 
certainty as “a property of the mind or understanding, and a mode of knowledge 
according [to] which the mind knows an object as it is, and is certain that it knows that 
object as it is.”134 For Arminius, there are three causes of certainty: experience, 
                                                
134 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:375.  
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knowledge, and faith. These three causes of certainty are produced in the mind by 
different means. While experience produces certainty by sensorial activity, certainty of 
knowledge comes from the proper uses of reason. Human senses carefully observe and 
interact with external objects and reason deduces “general conclusions from known 
principles.”135  
By contrast, faith obtains certainty from an external source, that is revelation. 
Arminius does not completely negate a role to the senses, reasoning, and discourse in 
faith, but he surely limits their scope in relation to revelation. Revelation is mandatory in 
the experience of faith because it brings to the human mind knowledge about God and 
Christ’s nature and actions.136 Such revelation is contained in the Word of God or the 
Holy Scriptures that sufficiently have demonstrated its divine origin.137  
According to Arminius faith entails more than “historical faith” and “theoretical 
knowledge” or to “believe that God and Christ exist.”138 Salvific faith believes in God 
                                                
135 Orat. 3., Works, 1:377.  
136 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:377, 380–381.  
137 Ibid., Works, 1:383–401. Arminius presents eleven biblical proofs of the divine 
origin of the Scripture: 1) The internal testimony of Scriptures; 2) The way it reveals the 
nature of God and the person of Christ; 3) Its divine end: Glory of God and restoration of 
human beings; 4) The prophecies and predictions regarding the Messiah; 5) The style and 
character of the Scriptures as well as the promises and rewards contained in the Holy 
Word; 6) The miracles performed by prophets, apostles, and Christ; 7) The antiquity, 
propagation, preservation, and defense of the Scripture in history; 8) The sanctity of life 
in the biblical writers and believers; 9) The constancy of the martyrs in their suffering for 
the Word of God; 10) The testimony of the Church; and 11) The internal testimony of the 
Holy Spirit. 
138 Ibid., Works, 1:382. 
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and Christ and in their affirmations concerning divine nature and actions.139 True and 
living faith, therefore, is practical and involves certainty (ασφαλεια); full assurance 
(πλεροφορια  – Hebrews 6:2); and trust or confidence (πεποιφεσις  – 2 Cor. 3:4).140 The 
certainty of faith receives the word of God as true and divine in full assurance and 
confidence of its divine purpose and end.141 This faith is necessary and critical for the 
glory of God and the salvation of human beings.142  
How is faith produced in our minds? For Arminius spiritual vision is made 
possible by the combination of an “external light” of arguments and reasoning and an 
“internal light” in the soul and mind resulting in a perfect “vision of faith.”143 Because the 
objects of faith—God and Christ—are capable of being known, human beings need the 
combination of external and internal light that makes it possible to receive such 
knowledge of God. Faith, therefore, results from the external light contained in the Holy 
Scriptures and the internal light shining in the soul by the work of the Holy Spirit. I 
would like to suggest that according to Arminius the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit  
produces salvific and living faith in the believers. He succinctly affirmed that “faith is the 
effect of God illuminating the mind.”144 Faith, then, is in reality the result of the 
                                                
139 Orat. 3., in Works, 1:382. 
140 Ibid., Works, 1:382–383. 
141 Ibid., Works, 1:382. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., Works, 1:383. 
144 Quest. VI, in Works, 2:67. 
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prevenient grace of God working through the Holy Scripture, other external souces like 
nature, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit.145  
As we have previously seen, this relation of the Spirit and the Word in the context 
of prevenient grace in the writings of Arminius becomes particularly clear in his 
understanding of the role of the preaching of the word in the experience of conversion. 
Arminius discussed this relation referring to the Spirit as the first cause and the word as 
the instrumental cause in human conversion for salvation. I now turn to discuss this idea.  
Arminius ardently defended faith as a free gift of God resulting from the 
illumination and consequent acceptance of prevenient grace. He returned to the analogy 
of the beggar as an argument in favor of the gratuity of prevenient grace resulting in faith. 
The illustration is not Arminius’s invention, but rather was commonly used in a variety of 
ways by other Protestant reformers including Luther.146   
A rich man bestows, on a poor and famishing beggar, alms by which he may be able 
to maintain himself and his family. Does it cease to be a pure gift, because the beggar 
extends his hand to receive it?  Can it be said with propriety, that ‘the alms depended 
partly on the liberality of the Donor, and partly on the liberty of the Receiver,’ though 
the latter would not have possessed the alms unless he had received it by stretching 
out his hand? Can it be correctly said, because the beggar is always prepared to 
receive, that ‘he can have the alms, or not have it, just as he pleases?’  If these 
assertions cannot be truly made about a beggar who receives alms, how much less can 
                                                
145 Shultz Jr., came to a similar conclusion stating that, for Arminius, faith is a 
work of the Holy Spirit through prevenient grace,” Multi-Intentioned View, 31. See also, 
F. Leroy Forlines, Classical Arminianism: A Theology of Salvation (Nashville, TN: 
Randall House, 2011), 132. Forlines discusses the relation between prevenient grace and 
faith in his analysis of a declaration from John Piper. He agree with Piper statement that 
“the act of faith is ultimately owing to the prevenient grace of God.” However, Forlines 
understands that this prevenient grace does not entail a unconditional act, but it “leaves 
room for the individuals’s reponse of belief.” 
146 See Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation, 97n97. 
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they be made about the gift of faith, for the receiving of which far more acts of Divine 
Grace are required!147 
Arminius did not discuss all the theological implications of the analogy. His main 
concern was to evidence the compassionate action of the benefactor and the willing 
acceptance of the gift by the miserable person. Arminius argued that although the beggar 
is actively involved in the action, she could not boast and credit herself for the event. The 
benefactor deserves all recognition and praise for the gracious gift.  
However, a different possible assumption could rightly arise from the analogy. 
Because the beggar is begging, his action moves the rich man to compassion. This 
reading implies that by begging, the beggar is conscious of his condition and is looking 
for external help in order to save his life. Reading the analogy in this way results in some 
semi-Pelagian connotation not necessarily intended by Arminius. This is precisely the 
conclusion of Muller and J. V. Fesko. They note that Arminius speaks not simply of any 
kind of beggar, but one who is “always prepared to receive.” In this expression, they find 
a semi-Pelagian view or medieval synergism of grace in Arminius’s theology. Muller 
concludes that the expression parallels “the late medieval maxim, ‘facientibus quod in se 
est, Deus no denegat gratiam.’”148 Similarly, using this expression in conjunction with 
several others from Arminius’s writing, Fesko states that “Arminius’s construction is not 
                                                
147 Apology, Article XXVII, in Works, 2:52. 
148 Muller, “The Priority of the Intellect in the Soteriology of Jabob Arminius,” 
WTJ 55.1 (1993), 60. For an analysis of the medieval concept facientibus quod in se est 
deus non denegat gratiam see Heiko A. Oberman, The Reformation: Roots and 
Ramifications, trans. Andrew Colin Gow (New York, NY: T&T Clark, 1994), 104–107. 
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Pelagian, but it does fall into a semi-Pelagian category.”149 Like Muller before him, 
Fesko finds Arminius’s source in the semi-Pelagian medieval theology of Gabriel Biel.150  
Although I recognize the tension between the role of God and the role of humans 
in the beggar analogy, as a result of my study I disagree with Muller and Fesko’s 
conclusions for several reasons:  
First, Fesko collocates the working of prevenient grace in the context of a natural 
or creational human will. This is quite contrary to Arminius’s conclusions. Arminius 
continually emphasized that in order to receive or accept grace individuals previously 
need to be liberated by prevenient grace. In Arminius’s theological conceptualizations, 
regeneration of the will and the spiritual capacities must be experienced before human 
beings can participate in the acceptance of salvation. Elsewhere, Arminius emphasized 
the concept that one of the primary results of prevenient grace is regeneration of the 
“mind and feelings,” or “mind and affections,”151 in order that individuals be rendered 
spiritual and capable of performing good. He quoted scriptural verses profusely, among 
them Phil 2:13; Eph 2:10; and 2 Cor 5:17, to support his conclusions that only a human 
regenerated by the prevenient grace of God could will and perform what is really good.152 
                                                
149 Fesko, “Arminius on Facientibus,” 356. 
150 Fesko concludes that “Arminius clearly states that if a person’s will concurs 
with prevenient grace, then more grace is given unless he resist the prevenient grace,” 
352. 
151 Art., XX, in Works, 2:724. See also Rom. VII, in Works, 2:539.   
152The idea that the free will of humans must first be regenerated or liberated by 
the prevenient grace of God is well attested and clear in Arminius writings. See Rom. VII, 
in Works, 2:538; Pub. Disp., XI, in Works, 2:189–196. Arminius always understood there 
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Interestingly, for Arminius this work of regeneration is not a unique and one-time event 
in life, but it is continually perfected in “steps and intervals” as a daily salvific experience 
of the believers.153 He also stated that the human must experience the regeneration of 
their “intellect, affections, [and] will” before they can “understand, esteem, consider, 
will, and perform, that which is truly good.”154 Therefore, according to Arminius this 
essential spiritual result of prevenient grace does not open a place for a creational or 
natural freedom of will. Willing or accepting salvation, in Arminius’s theology, is always 
a result of prevenient grace, not a result of a natural endowment.  
Second, Fesko also says that Arminius’s use of this phrase in the analogy of the 
beggar differs from that of other Reformed theologians like Zacharias Ursinus (1534–
1583), Thomas Goodwin (1600– 1680), and others.155 However, this conclusion seems to 
me to be somewhat misleading. A closer comparison between Arminius’s and Goodwin’s 
view of the will shows a complete agreement. Fesko quotes Thomas Goodwin as asking: 
“Does the hand of a beggar that takes alms return any thing to the man that gives? No, it 
                                                
to be a three stages or conditions of humans in relation to their freedom of will. In their 
“primitive innocence” humans enjoyed an unblemished free will. After the fall into sin, 
their state of “corruption” obliterated and destroyed completely their freedom of will, 
desire, and performance of spiritual good. And finally, after the regeneration or liberation 
of their freedom of will by God’s prevenient grace, they are again able to accept the offer 
of salvation and experience a new relationship with God. 
153 Pub. Disp., XI, in Works, 2:195. See also Rom. VII, in Works 2:550.  
154 Gunter, Arminius and His Declaration of Sentiments, 140; Decl. Sent., in 
Works, 1:659.  
155 Fesko, “Arminius on Facientibus,” 352–353. 
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only takes it.”156 This is very similar to Arminius’s rhetorical question: “Can it be said 
with propriety, that ‘the alms depended partly on the liberality of the donor, and partly on 
the liberty of the receiver,’ though the latter would not have possessed the alms unless he 
had received it by stretching out his hands?” No, it cannot, Arminius would respond. 
Arminius clears all doubt about this, and concludes that to receive “the gift of faith . . . far 
more acts of divine grace”157 are needed, meaning that prevenient grace must work in 
advance. 
Third, Fesko further argues that the medieval theologians already mentioned are 
the likely sources of Arminius’s facientibus formula. Certainly, Arminius agreed with the 
medieval theologians about the universality of prevenient grace. Arminius also assigned a 
role to God’s providence in the impartation of prevenient grace. But, contrary to Fesko’s 
argument, Arminius did not accept the concept of a “creational” or natural prevenient 
grace. Quite the contrary: for Arminius prevenient grace is a post-creation and post-fall 
gift of the Holy Spirit. In other words, it is imparted by the influence of the Holy Spirit as 
a solution to the problem of sin. It is not a gift received or possessed by the act of creation 
as a natural or innate capacity. 
Fourth, in my opinion Fesko and Muller fail to observe that Arminius begins his 
analogy focusing not on the beggar but on the compassion of the rich man. The rich man 
is moved to compassion by the condition of the beggar, not by her begging actions. This 
conclusion clearly appears elsewhere in Arminius’s writings. For instance, as we 
                                                
156 Fesko, “Arminius on Facientibus,” 353. 
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previously discussed, in his Oration The Priesthood of Christ, Arminius undoubtedly 
describes the condition of the beggar as “most miserable” and the salvific actions of God 
toward the poor individuals as “full of mercy.”158 The merciful action of God results from 
His compassion toward the wretched condition of the individual, not from the beggar 
doing first what it is in herself. 
Fifth, Arminius’s main point seems to be that by receiving alms the beggar does 
not perform a meritorious salvific action. Arminius actually points out that the beggar is 
“always prepared to receive,” but here he is only describing the needed condition of the 
beggar. I understand that Arminius’s point is that the beggar is “prepared to receive” not 
because she has previously prepared herself “to receive,” but because she is in need “to 
receive.” Furthermore, in Arminius’s theology, preparation “to receive” occurs as the 
result of the Holy Spirit’s actions by prevenient grace. 
Finally, using the beggar analogy Arminius emphasized that grace is truly freely 
offered, but it is not sovereignly imposed. Arminius certainly was a synergist, but in 
relation to salvation and faith he limited his synergism to acceptance. This basically 
means, that for Arminius, acceptance is not necessarily equal to meritorious 
collaboration. Indeed, acceptance results from the strengthening, accompanying, and 
continual assistance of human freedom of will by God’s grace. Arminius made clear this 
reality in the conclusion of the illustration, by affirming that the “receiving” of the “gift 
of faith” is accompanied by a great number of actions of divine grace. 
                                                
157 Apology, Article XVII, in Works, 2:52. 
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Several scholars read the analogy of the beggar in Arminius’s writing as contrary 
to the spirit of semi-Pelagianism. Olson finds in Arminius’s analogy a “synergism that 
preserves all the power, ability and efficacy in salvation to grace.”159 He further affirms 
that for Arminius “the only ‘contribution’ humans make is non-resistance to grace. This 
is the same as accepting a gift.”160 Indeed, this is the kind of acceptance exemplified in 
the actions of the beggar. Stanglin and McCall conclude that Arminius’s “chief point is 
that donation of money, like faith, is still a pure gift, even if the beggar is ready to receive 
it,” because for Arminius, “there are other gifts and persuasions that precede this gift of 
faith and prepare the will to receive it.”161 Similarly, Gijsbert van den Brink states: “The 
advantage of the beggar-metaphor is that it underlines the asymmetrical nature of the 
divine-human relationship. It shows that the bringing about of salvation is a ‘one-sided 
act of God,’ for which He and He alone is to be credited and praised. But at the same 
time it demonstrates how it is possible that God’s power does nevertheless not remove 
the human freedom of choice.”162 In summary, the analogy of the beggar provided 
Arminius with an excellent illustration of the working of prevenient grace and the 
consequent result of faith and salvation. It also demonstrates, from my point of view, the 
                                                
158 Orat. 4, in Works, 1:410. 
159 R. Olson, Arminian Theology, 165. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Stanglin and McCall, Theologian of Grace, 166–167. See also, Stanglin, 
Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation, 97–98. 
162 Gijsbert van den Brink, Almighty God: A Study of the Doctrine of Divine 
Omnipotence, Studies in Philosophical Theology (Kampen, the Netherlands: Pharos, 
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necessary spiritual result of regeneration or rather the liberation and empowerment of 
human freedom of will and spiritual capacities and the actualization of actual faith in 
those who do not reject the working of the Holy Spirit in their life.  
Prevenient Grace as Organizing Principle  
in Arminius’s Soteriology 
If one is looking for a central and organizing principle by which Arminius’s 
individual soteriological teachings may be related to each other, that principle is 
prevenient grace. Prevenient grace provides Arminius with the internal logic to his 
espousal of grace and free will, God’s sovereignty and human responsibility; love and 
justice, divine election/predestination and human faith; and divine foreknowledge and 
human future decisions.  
An organizing principle is an idea or concept through which a whole system of 
thinking can be explained and understood. It is also the supporting factor or what holds 
together the whole system and structure. Prevenient grace is central in Arminius’s 
soteriology because it functions as this organizing principle to give coherence, meaning, 
presuppositional support, and logical order to all his soteriological constructions. I think 
that deprived of prevenient grace, Arminius’s soteriology would fall apart like a house of 
cards into a heretical system of salvation like Pelagianism. In this context, for instance, 
prevenient grace helps us to appreciate Arminius’s positive view of freedom of will and 
human nature. His positive anthropology, therefore, is the result of God’s prevenient 
grace.  
                                                
1993), 239. 
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Consequently, Arminius used the doctrine of prevenient grace as a correction to 
both Pelagian and Reformed soteriology. Arminius rejected Pelagianism for negating the 
deep consequences that sin inflicted on human nature. The solution, for Arminius, is not 
to stress an independent and capable human freedom of will, but to point to prevenient 
grace as the divine healing and liberation of human-damaged freedom to establish a 
relationship with God. In this way, Arminius sustained both the biblical doctrine of total 
depravity and the free will of human beings.  
Likewise, Arminius rejected the predestinarian view of Reformed theology. For 
Arminius, the solution is not an irresistible work of God’s grace to awaken dead 
individuals from their sinful perversions. Rather, it is prevenient grace that with gentle 
persuasion monergistically empowers and restores human freedom of will, by inviting 
individuals to a covenant relationship of salvation with God. Thus, prevenient grace as an 
organizing principle allowed Arminius to balance the doctrine of total depravity, the 
doctrine of freedom of will, and the doctrine God’s sovereignty in salvation. 
As we have seen, since Augustine and throughout the medieval era, theologians 
used the concept of prevenient grace in diverse ways. Likewise, Reformation theologians 
like Melanchthon and the Anabaptists used prevenient grace in their conceptualization of 
conversion. It seems to me, then, that Arminius successfully draws from the theological 
teaching of the Church the doctrine of prevenient grace as an organizing principle to 
correct both medieval and Reformed theology alike. In this way, Arminius was able to 
hold together the biblical claims of God’s grace and the liberty of human will.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
Throughout the analysis of Arminius’s conception of prevenient grace, many 
important aspects of this idea have surfaced.  
The language of universality of prevenient grace clearly demonstrates that 
Arminius believed that the Holy Spirit works in every human being. In Arminius’s 
soteriology, prevenient grace is critical because of its universal scope. Early Church 
Fathers like Prosper and Augustine gave Arminius the rationale for a universal operation 
of prevenient grace. Like Prosper before him, Arminius believed that God’s prevenient 
grace aids humans in different ways, forms, moments, and experiences. For Arminius, 
God’s justice demands that prevenient grace is given to every individual. Otherwise, he 
believed that God cannot condemn to eternal perdition one of his creatures without giving 
them an opportunity to respond God’s offer of salvation. It is not only out of justice that 
God has decided to grant prevenient grace to all humans, but also out of love. This love 
was most fully demonstrated on the cross. Christ gave his life and defeated sin and death 
to open a way of salvation for all humans. It is in the working of prevenient grace that all 
humans participate in the merits and application of the atonement. This, as I 
demonstrated, does not mean that the actualization of faith and salvation or the efficacy 
of the atonement pertains to all, because once the benefits of prevenient grace have been 
applied and the human will freed, humans need to accept the working of salvation.  
I explored several other layers of evidences in Arminius writings regarding the 
universality of prevenient grace in the working of salvation. I believe that Arminius’s 
concept of covenant also points to a common working of prevenient grace. The covenant 
of redemption, for Arminius, is the pathway by which every individual of the human race 
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is embraced into the salvific purpose of God. This becomes a reality in the battle between 
the Spirit and the flesh described by Paul in Romans 7. Arminius distanced himself from 
the interpretation of his day that understood the “I” of Romans 7 as a converted believer. 
Instead, for Arminius this human being is an unconverted individual on the path of 
regeneration. This struggle present in every human being is evidence that the Holy Spirit 
is working by his prevenient grace in the heart of all humanity. This battle between the 
Spirit and the flesh is an opportunity for the universal vocation to salvation. For God’s 
justice cannot lie or mislead; when God calls, he is serious. A universal invitation to 
salvation means that God has freed the human will, thus giving everyone the power to 
respond to the Gospel.  
Perhaps one of the most challenging proposals of  my research regarding the 
universal scope of prevenient grace is the extent to which I think Arminius understood 
the special working of the Holy Spirit. For Arminius, the Holy Spirit may work in special 
and unknown ways in those places where the preaching of the word is not present. He 
argued that good works prove that the Holy Spirit is working even in the hearts of 
heathens. For me, this was a surprising finding in Arminius. It seems to me that he comes 
close to defending a universal grace working through the means of nature. However, a 
careful reading of his ideas demonstrates that for Arminius even the working of the Holy 
Spirit through the testimony of nature is not deprived of the internal prevenient grace of 
God. For, different to the medieval theologians, Arminius brings natural theology within 
the contours of prevenient grace. This is an important contribution of Arminius to the 
concept of the universality of prevenient grace.  
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The only barrier that I found to a universal understanding of prevenient grace in 
Arminius’s theology is Arminius’s conceptualization of divine foreknowledge. As we 
have seen, some scholars believe that Arminius ultimately was a determinist. If he had a 
determinist view of God’s foreknowledge of future contingencies, the scope of prevenient 
grace could not be universal, but would be limited to the elect. However, such a 
conclusion contradicts the tenor of Arminius’s entire theology and his main goal to 
portray divine actions as allowing the participation of human freedom of will. Although I 
did not develop a totally comprehensive understanding of Arminius’s concept of divine 
foreknowledge, I propose that Arminius allowed a tension to exist between the 
exhaustive knowledge of God of future contingencies and the liberty of human free will. 
It seems evident to me that the knowledge of God of the future is passive and intellectual, 
although certain or infallible. It therefore does not impose any necessity on human 
liberty. Certainly, God foreknows those who will accept prevenient grace by the 
restoration of their freedom of will by the working of the divine prevenient grace, and 
those who will reject it by their own corrupted will. But, this does not mean that God in 
any way forces them into a particular decision.  
The working of prevenient grace as a gentle suasion or persuasion of the Holy 
Spirit in the human heart results in actual regeneration, liberation, and empowerment of 
the dead and sinful freedom of human will. This regeneration allows humans to 
participate, not in a cooperation equal to God’s work on them, but by accepting the offer 
of salvation and not resisting the working of the Holy Spirit. Accepting the invitation 
results in faith in Christ and in His work of salvation in their favor. At this point, it is 
important to highlight that faith for Arminius is a complete gift of God. The only way in 
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which humans participate in the process is by accepting the gift by the working of 
prevenient grace.  
In the last section of this chapter, I proposed that prevenient grace is the 
organizing principle of Arminius’s soteriology or ordo salutis. Arminius’s 
conceptualization of the human will and the role of humans in accepting salvation would 
be seriously misunderstood if it were not read within the framework of God’s prevenient 
grace. This suggests that all quotations from Arminius’s writing that have any flavor of 
semi-Pelagianism or radical synergism must be understood in the context of prevenient 
grace. It seems clear to me that whenever Arminius talked about human will and human 
acceptance of salvation, even if it  was not openly present, prevenient grace was always 
in the background of Arminius’s intentions. In other words, he presupposed the sovereign 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I do not want to bore my readers with another summary of the main points of my 
dissertation. Summaries of my findings are already an integral part of the conclusions and 
summaries of each chapter. Therefore, I limit my work here to presenting my specific 
findings and conclusions about the concept of prevenient grace in Jacobus Arminius’s 
theology, and making some recommendations for future research on this topic.  
Arminius was a child of a troubled and changing world. His was a time of 
political, social, and religious upheaval. His early life experiences were painful. Suffering 
seems to have been a daily reality throughout his life. However, these experiences 
prepared him for a ministry of compassion and a solid academic career as a professor of 
theology at Leiden University. Arminius came reluctantly to the debate about 
predestination in the Reformed Church in Netherlands. Because (to our knowledge) he 
did not write anything before 1590, we can only speculate about his points of view before 
that year. Nevertheless, I found a tension between his early education and the time in 
which he studied sacred theology in preparation for ministry. While his early education 
was more influential with regard to developing a concept of human freedom of will, his 
later education was one of solid Reformed theology and doctrine. Records of his time in 
Geneva under the tutoring of Beza do not indicate that he was an opponent of the 
predestinarian and Reformed model of salvation. Arminius used to speak his mind; for 
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instance, in Geneva he openly disagreed with Beza regarding topics of philosophy and 
logic. So it would be very unlikely that, if at that time he already disagreed with the 
Reformed view of predestination, he would have remained silent. Therefore, I suggest 
that Arminius changed his mind after 1590 not as a betrayal to his Reformed 
commitments—for in his mind he was always a faithful pastor of the Reformed 
tradition—nor because of competing external theological influences, but because of his 
careful and intentional exploration of the biblical text and the theological tradition of the 
Christian church. Thus, his biblical and theological explorations led him to discover 
prevenient grace as a proper solution to maintaining a view of salvation that on the one 
hand credits all merit and glory to God, and on the other hand recognizes that humans 
participate in accepting the divine invitation.  
As we have seen, Arminius obviously did not create this idea. Prevenient grace as 
a theological idea had had an extensive history in the history of Christian doctrine long 
before Arminius, indeed since the time of Augustine. However, Arminius’s 
conceptualization of it balanced some of the previous views of prevenient grace and was 
in continuity with some of them. He would agree with Augustine, the Fathers of the 
Second Council of Orange, Melanchthon, and the Anabaptist preachers that prevenient 
grace is the necessary and previous working of God’s love and grace in the human heart 
before any willingness of the individual to receive and accept salvation. Like them, he 
also visualized prevenient grace as the gratuitous gift of the Holy Spirit to a human in a 
state of total corruption. However, he completely sided with the Council, against 
Augustine, while affirming that the gift of prevenient grace could be rejected by the 
human will. In contrast to the Councils of Orange and Trent but like Melanchthon and the 
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Anabaptists, he understood the working of prevenient grace to ordinarily to occur at the 
intersection of preaching and the internal work of the Holy Spirit rather than exclusively 
at the moment of baptism.  
However, there are also important points of discontinuity between Arminius and 
other scholars. Different from the medieval theologians, Arminius believed that 
prevenient grace comes from divine love and grace and is not a natural endowment 
received by individuals at creation. He disregarded a “creational prevenient grace” in 
favor of an unmerited, supernatural, post-creational prevenient grace. He would also 
disagree with the medieval theologians, like Molina, that prevenient grace is only an 
accompanying, supporting, or concurrent aid to a weak and wounded free will but in 
some way still capable of consenting with the working of prevenient grace. Rather, for 
him prevenient grace entails the complete restoration or liberation of a completely lost 
and dead freedom of will. Nevertheless, he certainly accepted the conclusions of the 
medieval theologians that prevenient grace works universally in all human beings by 
calling them into a salvific relationship with God.   
Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace is highly pneumatological in nature. In 
this regard he closely followed the contributions in the realm of conversion of some 
earlier protestant theological reformers, like Melanchthon and the Anabaptists. This 
emphasis on pneumatology as the relationship between the Spirit and the individual 
distances Arminius from the concept of prevenient grace as a metaphysical substance 
infused in the human soul that was so present in the medieval theological 
conceptualizations. Similar to Melanchthon, for Arminius the internal illumination of the 
Holy Spirit working on the human understanding, will, and heart is the most critical 
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operation of prevenient grace. Also, similar to his Reformation contemporaries, Arminius 
viewed prevenient grace not only as a supporting aid, but more precisely as a power that 
heals, frees, and liberates the human will. For Arminius and Melanchthon, this working 
of God’s prevenient grace does not erode the decision of human freed will.  
Thus, a proper definition of prevenient grace in Arminius’s theology is: 
Prevenient grace usually entails the preceding and divine working of God’s mercy and 
grace toward sinful humans that works internally by the illumination of the Holy Spirit 
and externally by the preaching of the Gospel. Prevenient grace heals, empowers, and 
frees the enslaved freedom of will, giving humans the opportunity to receive and accept 
the invitation and the call to the experience of salvation.  
For me, a surprising finding of my study was that for Arminius there actually 
exists a monergistic and sovereign operation of prevenient grace. This means that, before 
everything, prevenient grace monergistically operates in the human heart to restore its 
freedom of will. That is, it gives the person power to understand the Gospel and accept 
the work of Christ in its favor. In this way, Arminius understood that the initial working 
of prevenient grace occurs in an unavoidable manner in human beings. God renews and 
heals human infirmities and gives them a completely freed will. Once humans enjoy their 
freed will, they have a measure of a restored spiritual capacity to respond to God and 
receive the gift of faith. In this way, Arminius also understood that prevenient grace is 
resistible. The freed will of humans not only has the capacity to accept, but because the 
corruption of sin is still present in the human heart, it has the capacity to reject the offer 
of salvation. Arminius in this way restricted the participation of humans in salvation to 
the need to respond to God’s gift and offer of redemption. This is the balance that 
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Arminius proposed to correct both the irresistible working of God’s grace of the 
Augustinian/Reformed tradition and the high anthropology of an unblemished or only 
weakened freedom of will of the Pelagian/Semi-Pelagian tradition.  
I also discovered in my research that for Arminius the universal scope of 
prevenient grace goes well beyond where the preaching of Scripture and the Gospel takes 
place. The Holy Spirit works in unknown or unrevealed ways and manners to restore 
humans to a spiritual relationship with God. The battle that occurs in the unregenerate 
person between the Holy Spirit and the flesh is a universal experience, that, although it is 
reinforced by the preaching of the word, is experienced to a greater or lesser extent by all 
individuals. For Arminius, even the evidence of God in nature is an integral part of 
prevenient grace and in some ways enough to be used by the Holy Spirit to illuminate the 
human heart. This does not mean that Arminius rejected the notion of the necessary union 
of the Spirit and the Word. But it does means that the prevenient grace of God is 
sometimes working long before the individual comes to the knowledge of the Word or to 
hearing the preaching of the Gospel. The language of universality of prevenient grace is 
also possible to find in Arminius’s conceptualization of the character of God, the extent 
of the atonement, and the divine covenant. Particularly interesting in this regard is 
Arminius’s understanding that the universal intention of God’s sacrifice is effectually 
actualized in the working of prevenient grace. Although God’s sacrifice does not 
ultimately mean that every human being will enjoy final salvation, it effectively opens a 
way for all humans, giving them a freed will to respond to God’s love and mercy.  
As I have previously mentioned, a freed will is the first spiritual result of the 
working of prevenient grace. Once humans accept using their freed will to respond to the 
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offer of salvation, the second spiritual result is faith in Christ as Lord and Savior. For 
Arminius, acceptance of the gift does not add merit to the human action, just as the 
beggar does not deserve the food more by extending her hand to receive it. Therefore, 
faith is properly a work of prevenient grace, that is, the internal light of the Spirit making 
effective the external light of the Scripture.  
All these characteristics of prevenient grace and its role in salvation in Arminius’s 
theology led me to propose that in Arminius’s writings prevenient grace is the organizing 
principle of his soteriology. We best understand Arminius’s doctrine of salvation and his 
ideas of human freedom of will in the context of prevenient grace. For prevenient grace is 
the principle that holds together all the elements of Arminius’s soteriology.  
Suggestions for Further Studies in Arminius 
Arminius’s life, ministry, writings, and theology are now getting more attention in 
academic works. Though there are abundant possible topics for further research on 
Arminius, here I limit my suggestions to some areas related to the concept of prevenient 
grace and freedom of will in Arminius’s theology that further research might illuminate, 
both historically and theologically.  
First, it would be helpful to compare Arminius’s concept of prevenient grace with 
his contemporaries within the Reformed Tradition. For instance, although some scholars 
think that only Arminius and Arminians are truly advocates of preparation for grace and 
faith, William Perkins’s work contains significant material on preparation for faith that 
mimics the concept of prevenient grace. Is preparation for faith intrinsically distinct from 
prevenient grace? Is the difference between preparation for faith in Reformed theology in 
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Arminius’s time and the concept of prevenient grace in Arminius’s writings limited to the 
resistible/irresistible nature of grace?  
Second, the main work of prevenient grace is to restore the liberty of human 
freedom of will. I have explored some connections between prevenient grace and 
freedom of will. However, much research remains to be done regarding the concept of 
freedom of will in Arminius’s writings. In connection with free will, the concept of 
divine freedom should be explored in Arminius’s theology. Arminius implies that God is 
good by necessity. He specifically says that “God is not freely good; that is, he is not 
good by the mode of liberty, but by that of natural necessity.”1 In light of this, a research 
question could be: If God is not free to do otherwise, can humans really enjoy a kind of 
freedom that God is not entitled to have? 
Third, in my first chapter I suggested that more historical work needs to be done 
to discover the connection and influence of English free-will thinkers on Arminius and 
vice versa. In this context, it would be helpful to explore the influence of the Danish 
Lutheran theologian Neils Hemmingsen (Nicholas Hemmingius) on Arminius, Corro, and 
Baro. It would also be important to explore Hemmingsen’s writings to unearth his 
concept of prevenient grace or his theology of conversion, if any.  
Finally, I think that a more comprehensive study is needed on the soteriological 
function of prevenient grace. I have explored some ideas on this in my research, but a 
broader exploration of Arminius’s doctrine of conversion is critical. Such research would 
                                                
1 Apology, Article XXII, in Works, 2:34. 
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explore the connections of prevenient grace with the concepts of repentance, the 
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